

**AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION:
TAXPAYER COSTS AVOIDED THROUGH PREVENTING CRIME**

by

Victoria Ann Reinhardt

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Doctoral Committee:

Professor Kristen Norman Major, Chair
Professor David Schultz
Professor Lou Kaluza

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ABSTRACT

An Ounce of Prevention: Taxpayer Costs Avoided through Preventing Crime

by

Victoria Ann Reinhardt

Chair: Kristen Norman Major

This dissertation is meant to determine if Benjamin Franklin's axiom, "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure", holds true when it comes to preventing crime. The primary focus of the research is the direct, out of pocket, cost to taxpayers for chronic, serious, and violent offenders. The direct taxpayer costs measured at the municipal, county, state and federal levels of government include law enforcement, prosecution, public defense, court costs, incarceration, out of home placement of children in need of protection as a result of a parent being incarcerated, and probation. Taxpayer costs avoided are provided from age 10 through age 25 and are broken down by activity and level of government. If a cost, either tangible or intangible, could not be directly linked to crime, it is not included.

Career criminals are a small percentage of the population, but have a tremendous impact on public safety. Snyder (November 2001) estimates that eight to 10 percent of adolescents commit up to 70 percent of all serious and violent adolescent crime. These

high-risk children have multiple risk factors and are often part of the cycle of intergenerational crime.

Public safety is important to policymakers. When crime decreases through apprehension of an offender or by preventing the criminal act, the public feels safer and more secure. Punishing or rehabilitating a criminal is mandatory, but crime prevention services are usually discretionary. Preventing crime, however, will avoid human pain and suffering, and can cost taxpayers less. If a crime prevention program is research based and has achieved measurable, positive results, public safety will be improved, but at what cost to taxpayers?

The taxpayer costs avoided tool resulting from this study can help policymakers answer the question: Is the cost to taxpayers for providing an ounce of crime prevention and avoiding economic and physical pain and suffering, worth the cost to taxpayers for the pound of criminal justice system cure? In some cases, the answer will be yes, and in others, it will be no. Policymakers will have the taxpayer costs avoided tool to assist them in making an informed decision.

CHAPTER I

Introduction - *“An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”*

Philosopher and Statesman Benjamin Franklin

To many, Benjamin Franklin's words about timely action to stop problems from occurring rather than reacting to crisis are absolute truths. We seem to instinctively know that when a negative act can be prevented, human suffering is avoided, and time and money can often be saved in the long term. But, are we sure Benjamin Franklin's axioms hold true when they are applied to crime prevention efforts?

Crime as a Societal Problem in the United States

In its simplest terms, the definition of the problem is – crime hurts people. Hurt refers to being physically harmed or killed, emotionally or mentally damaged, or being economically impacted through the theft of one's money or possessions. Negative impact, or hurt, can be direct or indirect. People can mean individuals, businesses, communities of interest, the government, or, in general, human society. The term crime covers a great deal of ground. Even though it would be best to prevent all types of crime, the results of this study are primarily aimed at measuring the cost-effectiveness of preventing serious and violent crime. It should be noted, however, that chronic, serious and violent criminal behavior often starts with less serious incidents at a young age and escalates to becoming

a way of life. Ramsey County (Minnesota) Sheriff Bob Fletcher (1995) stated that the average age was seven at first contact with law enforcement for juveniles who became career criminals as adults. Mark Fleisher also talks about the “street lifecycle” of a criminal as starting very early in life (McGuckin 1998). Career criminals or chronic offenders, refers to individuals during the period of five to 10 years of their lives in which most serious and violent criminal behavior occurs. The length of a criminal career varies, but tends to be relatively short, and occurs between the late teenage years and early to mid-twenties, according Anthony Bouza (1993) and David Courtwright (McGuckin, 1998). In terms of criminal behavior, serious and violent crime is defined as crimes in which physical harm either occurs or has a high probability of occurring, such as murder, assault, rape, robbery, arson, or a crime in which any type of weapon is either used or threatened.

“Why do some men and women and even children assault, batter, rape, mutilate and murder?” This question was asked by Richard Rhodes (1999) in, *Why They Kill, The Discoveries of a Maverick Criminologist*. Rhodes (1999) goes on to state “No question has so stubbornly resisted explanation.” The importance of this question lies in the need to better understand why people act the way they do in order to prevent harmful acts from occurring in the first place.

Rhodes (1999) book examines Dr. Lonnie H. Athens research for his 1992 book, *The Creation of Dangerous Violent Criminals*. Athens work (Rhodes, 1999) used a qualitative sociology approach. Athens (Rhodes, 1999) did not believe a quantitative approach would work to study violent criminals, as the numbers alone would not bring you to the core issues surrounding how and why each individual chose a criminal path.

The researcher agrees with Athens that numbers will not get to the core issues that lead to a lifetime of crime. Another problem with a quantitative approach after a serious and violent criminal act has been committed is that it is too late to change the choices made much earlier in the criminal's life.

Understanding the criminal mind better could result in development of methods to reach high risk youth before they make destructive choices. After personally interviewing 25 violent criminals, Athens (Rhodes, 1999) broke his interpretations down into four distinct types of individuals: physically defensive; frustrative; malefic (evil); and frustrative-malefic. Athens assumed that people falling into one of these categories behave as they do as a result of their social experiences and that those experiences turn them into violent criminals over time, rather than all at once (Rhodes, 1999). This process was coined as "violentization" by Athens (Rhodes, 1999). The four stages of violentization are brutalization, belligerency, violent performances and virulency (Rhodes, 1999). The researcher believes one possible outcome of understanding this process is the potential to identify children who are likely to be victims of violentization, interrupt the stages, and move them into a healthier child development direction.

Examples of violent individuals provided by Athens (Rhodes, 1999) included Perry Smith, who killed the Clutter family, Mike Tyson, a professional boxer who is violent in and out of the boxing ring, and Lee Harvey Oswald, who killed President John F. Kennedy. The common thread for all three are childhoods filled with abuse, violence and neglect (Rhodes, 1999). Child abuse and neglect were two factors mentioned by several authors as potentially leading to juvenile delinquency and adult criminal behavior. In the book, *Violence in American Society*, David Courtwright (McGuckin, 1998) talks

about the horrendous childhoods suffered by violent offenders. He proposes controlling violent young men by first dealing with the problems within families (McGuckin, 1998).

The statistics surrounding child abuse and neglect support the finding of an increased risk of criminal behavior in abused or neglected children. For example, if neglected and abused as a child, there is a 55 percent increase in the likelihood of being arrested as a juvenile and a 38 percent increase for adults (Hyde, 1995). Unfortunately, the problem of child abuse and neglect is escalating. The number of child abuse cases increased by 176 percent in the 1980s (Hyde, 1995). During that same time period, approximately \$90 billion was cut from government budgets for children's services (Hyde, 1995).

Increased risk factors for our children and families and less funding to support children in need of protective or healthy development services can lead to an increase in serious and violent acts by juveniles. JoAnn Bren Guernsey (1996), author of *Youth Violence An American Epidemic?*, believes that the current generation of children is a generation at risk. Falcon Baker in his book, *Saving Our Kids from Delinquency, Drugs and Despair*, suggests that crime is "getting to be child's play" as homicide was the third-leading cause of death for elementary and middle school children in 1994 (Hyde, 1995). According to an April 1995 report from the United States Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect, abuse and neglect was the leading cause of death for children (Guernsey, 1996).

Children growing up in homes in which they are abused and neglected and in environments without positive, nurturing relationships, can end up believing their choices will make no difference in what they view as a dismal future. Hyde (1995) cites children

feeling they have “nothing to lose” as a contributing factor to the problem of children committing serious and violent criminal acts. It is not difficult to see the children’s negative view of their world, after reading the series of stories by young authors in Susan Goodwillie’s (1993) book, *Children’s Express Voices from the Future*. Suki Cheong, age 14, told the story of Mark from Haverhill, Massachusetts (Goodwillie, 1993). On Mark’s fifth birthday his father gave him a gun and at age 16, Mark killed his abusive father with a rifle (Goodwillie, 1993). Mark knew that his father had also been abused as a child and that the cycle of violence was continuing from generation to generation (Goodwillie, 1993). Sonia, age 19, lives in New York and views violence as a continuum that is everywhere (Goodwillie, 1993). Thai, age 18, also believes that violence is a natural part of his surroundings – he is violent himself because he grew up with violence (Goodwillie, 1993).

To better understand the scope of crime and how it is evolving, it can be helpful to look at a history of criminal behavior. In medieval Europe, homicide rates equaled those in the largest cities in the United States today (Rhodes, 1999). When police forces and courts were interjected into society in the seventeenth century, homicide rates declined, and in the early twentieth century, specifically after World War II, homicide rates rose again (Rhodes, 1999).

The age at which violent crime is being committed has changed over time. Juveniles are committing more serious and violent criminal acts than in the past. In recent years, Hyde (1995) reported that 2.3 million people under 18 years of age were arrested each year in the United States. Between 1986 and 1991, violent crime arrests for individuals under 18 increased by 62 percent (Hyde, 1995). In the last decade, the

number of juveniles under age 18 convicted of murder is up by 93 percent, and since 1965, juvenile arrests for violent crime have tripled (Hyde, 1995). According to the American Medical Association, nearly a quarter of all murders, or ten murders per day, are committed by juveniles (Nakaya 2005).

The incidence of children being murdered is also increasing. The Children's Defense Fund (Hyde, 1995) reports that each day two children under five years old are murdered in the United States. There are also issues surrounding race in homicide rates among juveniles. Deatherage's (1996) research shows that homicide is the cause of death for two in every three deaths of black youths ages 15 to 24 years.

In the 2001 report, *Youth Violence: A Report of the Surgeon General*, United States Surgeon General Dr. David Satcher referred to the decade from 1983 to 1993 as an epidemic of youth violence. In 1999, 104,000 juveniles (under 18 years old) were arrested for serious violent criminal acts in the United States (U.S. Surgeon General, 2001). John Firman of the International Association of Chiefs of Police reports more "kids with no hope, no fear, no rules and no life expectancy" (Ojeda 2002).

The trends in crime statistics can be startling. In the article *Crime in America*, Kerby Anderson (July 14, 2002), states simply, "Americans are scared, and they are angry." With "one murder every 22 minutes, one rape every five minutes, one robbery every 49 seconds, and one burglary every 10 seconds" Anderson (July 14, 2002) believes Americans have a right to be scared and angry. He lists the five current trends in crime as an increasing crime rate, teenagers being responsible for a disproportionate amount of violent crime, a drop in the median age of criminals, habitual criminals committing a majority of crimes, and the reality that crime does pay because most criminals are not

caught or brought to justice (Anderson, July 14, 2002). Although many crimes remain unsolved, the researcher disagrees with Anderson's assumption that crime pays. The primary reason for disagreement is that the odds of being caught go up with each new crime committed. Therefore, repeated criminal behavior will more likely than not lead to eventually being caught and punished, rather than never getting caught and being brought to justice.

Peter Elikann (1996) describes the problem of crime in the United States in terms of its population in prison. The United States has the highest per capita prison population in the world (Elikann 1996). For example, in the United States we incarcerate about six times as many people than are incarcerated in England (Currie, 1998).

The incarceration rate for juveniles has increased dramatically over the years. Jay Albanese reported on the incarceration rates and costs for juveniles confined in the United States in 1975 and 1985 (Deatherage 1996). The incarceration rate per 100,000 juveniles was 241 in 1975 and 313 in 1985, an increase of 30 percent in ten years (Deatherage 1996).

As with murder rates among black youth, the problem of disproportionate minority confinement exists within the high incarceration rate in the United States. Janice Joseph zeroed in on this issue based on overrepresentation of black youths in the juvenile justice system (Deatherage 1996). Beck (August 2000) notes that in 1999, nine percent of black males in their late twenties were in prison. Elliott Currie (1998) reported that by the early 1990s, 29 percent of black men would spend time in prison during their lifetimes.

Gangs and guns have had an impact on youth violence in the United States. Hyde (1995) believes that the allure of a gang and "belonging" coupled with increased access

to guns has made the violence of the last decade more deadly. Between 1986 and 1994, children under 18 years old were 244 percent more likely to be killed by a gun (Guernsey, 1996). A child is killed by gunfire every one and one-half hours in the United States, which equals over 60,000 children killed between 1979 and 1993 (Guernsey, 1996).

Mark Fleisher (1998) researched female gang members in Kansas City, Missouri, for his book, *Dead End Kids, Gang Girls and the Boys They Know*. Fleisher (1998) found that the gang members seemed conditioned to violence in their day-to-day lives. One gang member stated, "Violence doesn't scare me. I'm used to it, it's normal" (Fleisher, 1998). Guernsey (1996) points out that gang violence is no longer just an inner-city problem. Gang membership is especially appealing to juveniles who do not have positive role models in their lives (Guernsey, 1996).

The common themes for the increase in serious and violent crime evolve around negative family, school, and community environments in which children grow and mature. Hyde (1995) lists the reasons for children being in trouble as drugs, poverty, homelessness, gangs, and domestic, school, and neighborhood violence. In the book *Juvenile Crime Opposing Viewpoints*, Steve Macko states that murders committed by youths under age 17 tripled between 1984 and 1994 (Ojeda 2002). Macko attributes the increase in juvenile crime as the breakdown of the family, living in poverty, and lack of a good education (Ojeda 2002). Scott Minerbrook lists risk factors for children becoming serious and violent offenders as personality and behavioral problems stemming from a dysfunctional family, witnessing violence, pressures from peers, and penal policies that allow violent criminals out of jails too early (Ojeda 2002). Tom O'Connor describes

similar causes of juvenile crime and violence – poverty, family problems, and the environment in our neighborhoods, families and schools (Ojeda 2002). Christian Smith claims that all behavior, including violence, is within the context of a family system (Ojeda 2002). Smith states “We must treat the entire family if we are to be successful in stopping the violence” (Ojeda, 2002).

Just as there are multiple, complex causes for the increase in serious and violent crime in the United States, a variety of solutions will be needed to turn the tide and make our homes, schools, and communities safer.

History of the Juvenile Justice System in the United States

Early in the history of the United States it was recognized that children who committed criminal acts were to be treated differently than adult criminals. It appears, however, that rather than viewing children as needing additional supports when being punished, they were afforded fewer rights and services than adult prisoners and isolated in settings in which they were often treated cruelly. There were individuals in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries trying to reform the juvenile justice system and the harsh treatment of children who were in trouble with the law (Hyde, 1995). One such attempt was the establishment of the first institution for juvenile delinquents, the House of Refuge, built in 1825 in New York City (Hyde, 1995). Although its intentions were good, the House of Refuge also became known for its harshness (Hyde, 1995).

The first state reform school was established in Massachusetts in 1847 (Bouza, 1993). The purpose of the school was to “undertake the instruction, employment and reformation of juvenile offenders” (Bouza, 1993). Reforms to the United States juvenile

justice system began in earnest in 1898 and were meant to provide a humane way to protect children who were in trouble (Hyde, 1995). At that time, children did not receive social justice and were considered the property of their parents (Hyde, 1995). Hyde (1995) cites the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, which became law on July 1, 1899, as the basis for the American juvenile justice system. The American juvenile justice system adopted and implemented beginning in the early 1900s was an improvement, but there were gaping holes in dealing with juvenile delinquents. It was in 1966 when another major change took place that required the system to try to rehabilitate, rather than only finding guilt or punishing the juveniles (Hyde, 1995). The Gault case, according to Hyde (1995), is a landmark case that clearly established certain rights to a juvenile accused of committing a crime. It determined juveniles have the right to an attorney, proper notification of the charges, and to confront and cross-examine witnesses (Hyde, 1995). In 1970, the Supreme Court ruled that juveniles had the same right as an adult to require that a guilty verdict be determined without a reasonable doubt (Hyde, 1995).

The Massachusetts Department of Youth Services closed the reform school opened in 1847 on January 17, 1972 because of the cruelty and abuse that existed within the reform school system, and de-institutionalization began (Bouza, 1993). The basic values of the de-institutionalization movement included the following: children need love most when they deserve it least; all children can be redeemed; only the most serious juvenile offenders should be incarcerated; family-type settings provide a nurturing environment whereas large institutions are dehumanizing; mechanical restraints should not be used on children; building up a child's confidence and self-respect is important; progress should be monitored; and the benefits accrued to society will be lower crime and

violence rates at a cost less than the cost of incarceration (Bouza, 1993). The reasons for reform of the juvenile justice system were primarily focused on the treatment of children, but the issue of cost to taxpayers was also brought into the picture.

Crime as an Economic and Taxpayer Problem

Many different aspects of the economic impact of crime have been considered and analyzed in an attempt to put a price tag on the cost of crime to society. The costs in studies have ranged from loss of income taxes from persons incarcerated to placing a value on human life itself. Regardless of which estimates are used, one fact remains constant – the impacts of crime and implementing public safety measures are very expensive.

Kerby Anderson (July 14, 2002) estimated the cost of crime at \$675 billion each year. Anderson's (July 14, 2002) analysis included \$78 billion for the criminal justice system, \$64 billion for private protection, \$202 billion for loss of life and work, \$120 billion for crimes against business, \$60 billion for stolen goods and fraud, \$40 billion for drug abuse, and \$110 billion for drunk driving. Anderson (July 14, 2002) also notes that there is a psychological cost of crime, because devastated lives and loss of security have value to our quality of life. In addition to the economic expense of crime, Judy Mann believes we need to think about the tragic impact of children lost to violence in our society (Ojeda 2002).

Incarceration alone carries a hefty price tag. One question raised by many researchers was whether or not the judicial system in the United States is paying more than is necessary to incarcerate people who are not a high risk to safety in our

communities. One of the main reasons for asking this question is because of the daily cost associated with incarceration. In total, prisons and jails cost more than \$31 billion per year, up from \$4 billion in 1975 (Elikann, 1996). Elikann (1996) reports the average actual cost per year per prisoner at about \$30,000. The annual cost of a maximum-security cell averages \$74,862 per bed (Elikann, 1996). Currie (1998) believes that the costs associated with imprisonment are often underestimated because the expense of dealing with HIV infection, violence, accidents, and substance abuse are calculated separately (Currie, 1998).

If alternative sentencing were put in place for offenders deemed a lower risk to public safety, Elikann (1996) argues it would be cheaper – in one state the average cost for an alternative sentencing program was one-fifth as expensive as incarceration (\$4,000 per year versus \$23,000), recidivism would be reduced, it would demand more of the offender than sitting out their time in jail, and overcrowding would be relieved. Some of the alternatives to incarceration discussed by Elikann (1996) are community service, fines and restitution, rehabilitation, drug courts, halfway houses, house arrest and electronic bracelets. Boot camps were also mentioned, but even though they fulfill the goal of punishment and save money, boot camps do not have much of an effect of recidivism (Elikann (1996).

Although relieving overcrowding in prisons saves costs associated with incarceration, not having to build a new prison can save billions. California spent \$4.5 billion on new jail cells (Elikann, 1996). In 1990 California took \$2 billion from its education budget and re-allocated it to building prisons (Elikann 1996). Elikann (1996) quotes James Bruton, Minnesota's Deputy Commissioner for Institutions, "We cannot

build ourselves out of the crime problem.” In addition, Elikann (1996) points out the ineffectiveness of prisons. North Dakota and South Dakota had virtually the same crime levels during the 1980s, but North Dakota’s incarceration rate was one-half that of South Dakota’s (Elikann 1996).

Incarcerating juveniles is an especially expensive proposition in the United States. Because additional services are often required for children, the cost per juvenile offender can be more than imprisoning an adult. Between 1975 and 1985, the total cost for juveniles incarcerated in the United States went up by 173 percent from \$867,790 to \$2,052,232, according to Jay Albanese (Deatherage 1996). When calculated on a per juvenile basis, Albanese’s research revealed that the cost per year went from \$11,469 to \$25,200 for an increase of 183 percent (Deatherage 1996). Lowering these costs by keeping children out of jail through a reduction in recidivism is also important. Steve Christian reports that the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice avoided almost \$65 million in costs between fiscal year 1997 and 1999 with only a four percent reduction in recidivism (Nakaya 2005).

The cost to taxpayers and society is not just for the individual convicted of a crime. Elikann (1996) notes that family members of inmates have a greater risk of becoming criminals and the family itself often becomes unstable and economically dependent on public assistance. Money can potentially be saved through a variety of efforts to prevent crime or reduce recidivism or through the imposition of less costly sentencing alternatives. Elikann (1996) states that if a change in priorities takes place and a portion of the cost savings is spent on the root problem, there is hope for solving the crime problem in the United States. If crime is reduced, the negative economic

consequences will be avoided and the positive impacts to our quality of life will be realized.

Crime Prevention Efforts

Sometimes a problem can appear so large and looming, that possible solutions are not evident. The reality is if we try to solve the problems of the universe, we will fail. Just as with other large and complicated issues, it is best to break down the problem to understand where we really need to focus our attention. When it comes to preventing serious and violent crime, our best hope for success is likely through identification of the children who are at high risk of becoming serious and violent offenders and targeting them with research-based prevention efforts.

So, who are these high-risk children? Estimates show that 10 percent or less of juveniles are likely to be on the path to becoming serious, chronic and violent offenders. Margaret Hyde (1995) refers to a small, hard-core group of violent juvenile criminals as being approximately six percent of the juvenile population. She believes these chronic offenders commit rape, murder and robbery without remorse or conscience (Hyde, 1995). The Director of the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence at the University of Colorado, Delbert S. Elliott (Hyde, 1995), agrees with Hyde's conclusion that most juvenile crime is committed by about six percent of the young. As Elliott views it, the trend shows these children are becoming more violent based on records that indicate they are committing more murders and other serious and violent crimes than in the past (Hyde, 1995). Dr. Howard Snyder's estimate is slightly higher. Snyder (November 2001)

believes that between eight and 10 percent of adolescents are responsible for up to 70 percent of all serious and violent crime committed by juveniles.

Mark Fleisher lists several potential solutions to reducing crime and making our families and communities safer (McGuckin, 1998). His ideas include community policing, controlling bullets and improving gun safety, real rehabilitation of criminals, establishing safe corridors, community planning with safety in mind, blocking out violence on television, providing conflict resolution training to children, raising public awareness, and tapping into citizen action groups (McGuckin 1998). The three most important issues surrounding delinquency prevention, according to Albanese, are basing efforts on the causes of delinquency, providing different strategies for primary and secondary prevention efforts, and remembering that a single prevention strategy will not work for everyone (Deatherage 1996).

Athens (Rhodes, 1999) proposes a custom-fit program to control violent crime within a community that blends “general prevention, selective rehabilitation and selective incapacitation.” He believes schools are the best place to address family violence and prevent or interrupt the violentization process (Rhodes, 1999). Preventing crime, according to Elikann (1996), requires strengthening families and providing crime prevention programs for youth. Peter Greenwood, RAND Corporation, studied four crime prevention programs in a variety of states (Elikann 1996). Greenwood’s findings show that research-based crime prevention efforts were two to three times more effective than incarceration (Elikann 1996). Targeting violent criminals by identifying those who are at highest risk of becoming repeat offenders is a recognized crime prevention theory also

mentioned by Elikann (1996). Scott Deatherage provides several options regarding crime prevention in his 1996 book, *A Crime Prevention Program for America's Youth*.

There is some argument between researchers on the use of punishment as a juvenile crime prevention tool. Kenneth Sukhia believes that harsh punishment is the best way to prevent juvenile crime (Nakaya 2005). Laura Carnell, on the other hand, states that harsh punishment has not worked in the past and ratcheting up the punishment is not always the best way to obtain a better outcome (Nakaya 2005). Carnell references the importance of parental involvement or parent surrogates in keeping children out of trouble, primarily because they know the child's individual needs better than anyone else (Nakaya 2005).

Funding cuts have had an impact on the ability of public and non-profit entities to implement juvenile crime prevention efforts. C. Ronald Huff advocates for reversing the funding cuts in federally supported urban programs by renewing investment in America's inner cities through the Eisenhower Foundation's 1990 strategy called "community enterprise" (Deatherage 1996). The community enterprise strategy is the opposite of the failed "trickle-down" approach in that it uses empowerment of the nonprofit minority community organizations to "bubble up" success (Deatherage 1996). Carnell (Nakaya, 2005) advocates for reinstatement of funding for juvenile crime prevention initiatives that are research based because they will promote public safety. In the end, funding will be required to deal with crime whether it is spent on preventing crime or on incarceration and rehabilitation after a crime has taken place.

Research was conducted on trends in and pathways to youth violence, risk and protective factors, and preventing youth violence for the United States Surgeon General's

2001 report. The report (U.S. Surgeon General, 2001) concluded that although youth violence is a very serious problem, it is one that can be corrected. The Surgeon General (2001) talks about the knowledge and tools we already possess and the urgent need to put research based approaches into action in a systematic way. Calling upon and using the existing knowledge and tools to prevent crime will reduce the negative impacts of crime to society and increase our feeling of safety and security.

Decisions for Policymakers

Can we really prevent up to 70 percent of all serious and violent crime committed by juveniles and the associated human suffering and loss of life? Can we really break the intergenerational cycle of crime and violence? And, can we really avoid many of the tax dollars that would be spent on law enforcement, child protection, prosecution, public defense, trials, incarceration, and probation, which are incurred as a result of criminal acts? If an ounce of prevention works, the answer to these questions is yes. That is a big “if” for policymakers because of the tax dollars required to implement crime prevention programs and the timeline within which results will be realized.

It is easier to make an effective case for allocating limited government resources, if the value returned to taxpayers can be proven. Most would agree that access to knowledge through public libraries is good for the community. But, libraries, just like prevention efforts are not mandated services and come under heavy scrutiny like any other investment by government. Policymakers ask about the number of people using the libraries and where they live, circulation rates, the number and type of events taking place at the library, the condition of the facilities, the number of hours it is open, and the cost of

providing library services at each location. The questions provide a basis for a cost benefit analysis. Generally, the public likes libraries, but is the cost worth the benefit?

Quantifying the value of crime prevention efforts, unlike the easily measured results from a library, proves to be more difficult because it is hard to measure the value of an event that did not occur. To conduct a cost benefit analysis for preventing criminal activity, the cost associated with preventing a criminal act and the level of government paying those costs need to be quantified. Once the avoided costs to taxpayers is determined by measuring the expenses incurred by activity and by the level of government paying the bills, the information can be used by policymakers to decide if specific crime prevention efforts are cost effective.

Hyde (1995) laments that the United States juvenile justice system is both overburdened and under-funded. Conclusions drawn by Mark Fleisher (1998) in his research on gang members primarily involved protecting juveniles from youth-gang life, which will require substantial change in the way government supports moving families out of poverty rather than ignoring these children's pain or building more prisons. Among the questions Hyde (1995) asks is, "Can they rehabilitate someone who has grown into his or her teens without education, proper nutrition, learning in moral responsibility and any career skills or hope for the future?" The most damaging thing, according to Guernsey (1996), especially for the 20 percent of Americans under 18 who are growing up poor, is a lack of hope.

The breadth of human emotion includes feelings of hopelessness. During the times an individual feels exasperated or overwhelmed by what is going on in their lives, they will often seek out someone to help them regain their footing and feel hopeful again.

As mentioned previously, many children do not have someone to whom they can turn for help or hope. Stating that there is agreement on the premise that prevention efforts are a good way to attack the problem, Hyde (1995) concludes that prevention is “the ultimate hope” for reducing juvenile delinquency.

Preventing or reducing violence will require social support and police protection programs focused on the small percentage of the population that is at the highest risk of being violent and dangerous (Rhodes, 1999). Rhodes (1999) points out that controlling violence will mean spending money, but believes that if already allocated funding is redirected away from ad hoc, inadequately researched programs and towards support for belligerent children, greater success will be achieved. Seven suggestions offered to decision makers by Anderson (July 14, 2002) to fight crime are: putting more police on the streets and more criminals in prison, focusing on habitual criminals, keeping violent criminals in prison longer, focusing government resources on the criminals and not on the weapons they use, providing alternatives for non-violent offenders, and developing community-based programs to deter crime.

A friend of Jay Lindgren (a Minnesota attorney) expressed frustration about the lack of juvenile crime prevention efforts (Deatherage 1996). The analogy used by Lindgren’s friend was of corrections staff acting as lifeguards on the banks of a river, in which children are struggling to stay afloat in the rapids (Deatherage 1996). Some children are rescued, but many are not (Deatherage 1996). The problem, as Lindgren describes it, is that no one appears to have an interest in going upstream to the beginning of the problem so that the children do not end up in the river in the first place (Deatherage 1996). Since corrections costs are high and the number of children saved is low, Lindgren

believes that more effective results at a lower cost can be achieved through prevention efforts (Deatherage 1996). Lindgren is careful to point out, however, that oversimplification of the problem through an analogy like keeping children out of a tumultuous river can be dangerous (Deatherage 1996). When considering juvenile crime prevention activities, Lindgren offered three questions that he believes should be asked: 1) How many youth offend and how persistent is it? 2) How accurately targeted are the diversion programs? and 3) What has the immediate quality of correctional response been to the identified youth? (Deatherage 1996).

Elikann's (1996) questioning of police and prosecutors resulted in the conclusion that the biggest problem to attacking crime in the United States is a lack of resources. Lack of political will was another reason for the worsening problem of violent crime in the United States, according to Elikann (1996). Elikann (1996) believes that most politicians are not really interested in preventing crime and making the public safer. Rather, most politicians are against spending money to prevent crime and support funding after the crime is committed to incarcerate the offender (Elikann, 1996). This approach focuses on what James Alan Fox, dean of the College of Criminal Justice at Northeastern University refers to as "The three R's: retribution, revenge and retaliation," (Elikann, 1996). Elikann's (1996) conclusion is that many politicians care more about going after the criminal rather than after the crime.

The medical research community can provide evidence about the negative causes and effects of high cholesterol on human health, as well as the high costs associated with health care. This evidence is the result of diagnostic tools being developed to first measure the impact on human health of different levels and types of cholesterol in the

human body and then to measure the impact of specific applications in reducing those negative impacts. Cholesterol blood tests are part of the normal routine when an adult goes to the doctor for a physical examination. The results of the tests are measured according to the “good” and “bad” cholesterol in a person’s blood. Then comes the analysis of what the cholesterol count means in each specific case. Two individuals could have the same counts of good and bad cholesterol, but the regimen recommended by the doctor may be very different. First, the factors leading to the cholesterol count must be determined. Is it your diet, lack of exercise, the fact that you smoke, or is it primarily a result of heredity. These are just some of the factors impacting cholesterol. Next, the level of risk to your health is investigated. If the risk is low, a relatively passive approach may be chosen. If you are at extremely high risk of a stroke, more dramatic steps will be recommended. The more complex the treatment, the more it generally will cost. In addition, a doctor would not prescribe cholesterol reducing medication if making a lifestyle choice by losing weight, reducing alcohol consumption, giving up cigarettes, and exercising more would deal with the problem. Not only is it costly to take prescription drugs, there are often side effects that must also be addressed. On the extreme end of over-treatment, a person with low risk factors would not be hospitalized in anticipation of treating a stroke, if and when one occurs.

Insurance companies and the health care industry recognize the financial benefit of prevention efforts through reduced insurance costs, free or low cost programs to help people stop smoking, improve their diets and/or to lose weight, and to encourage increased physical exercise. Finally, based on research and analyses, healthcare professionals try to target the high cholesterol prevention message to those at highest risk.

Patients are offered proven methods to reduce their risk to help them garner the best health outcome, fewer people suffering a stroke, at a lower cost to all.

Criminal behavior is often passed from one generation to another, and just as with a medical diagnosis, it is critical to know which children and families need the most help. Values and what is considered a normal way of life are learned at a very young age from the adults in a child's life. Although law enforcement, corrections, and school personnel may not have the time and resources to identify and work with the most troubled kids, they see the same children and families in the juvenile justice system over and over again.

When it comes to crime prevention, cause and effect and cost and benefit, are not as easy to determine as with high cholesterol and human health. The human suffering prevented to families, victims, and society in general cannot be as easily measured, but clearly exists. Therefore, for programs that have been evaluated and proven to be an effective means to prevent a crime from happening, the costs to taxpayers associated with that crime will be avoided and human suffering will be lessened. Fighting crime requires resources to identify the children most likely to become the eight percent Snyder refers to as being on the path to a life of serious and violent crime, and to provide the appropriate prescription, or ounce of prevention, needed to find the cure and prevent crime.

Elected policymakers are responsible for the level of public safety services provided in a community and for levying the taxes to pay for those services. At the same time that the seriousness and violent aspects of juvenile crime have escalated, increasing the importance of crime prevention, funding sources are becoming scarcer.

Unfortunately, crime prevention funding is often the first pool of funds cut from

governmental budgets because prevention efforts are discretionary and law enforcement and corrections activities are mandatory.

From an economic perspective, the cost to taxpayers is high. Policymakers are demanding justification for allocating tax dollars for all kinds of public services. This study is important because the research results will allow the economic benefits of tax expenditures on crime prevention efforts, specifically those that target high and very high-risk juveniles, to be quantified. The cost to taxpayers to be examined in this study includes only those public expenses directly associated with an individual who engages in criminal activity.

On the surface, preventing crime whenever and wherever possible seems like an obvious choice for policymakers to make. The problem for policymakers and the public alike is making a strong connection between resources allocated to efforts that are research-based and proven to prevent crime or reduce criminal activity, and the taxpayer costs avoided by reducing the expenditure of funds associated with criminal activity, such as law enforcement, incarceration, court trials, and probation.

Benjamin Franklin said, “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” The ounce of prevention is the measure of effectiveness resulting from the effort. Proving effectiveness is, therefore, critical. The evaluation of reducing criminal activity by specific crime prevention programs falls to program managers. While this study zeroes in on taxpayer dollars avoided by implementing programs proven effective, it is not to be interpreted as the only factor considered by policymakers in determining whether to invest in crime prevention efforts in our communities, as some programs will likely cost more to implement than the amount of avoided taxpayer costs. If there is no net cost to

government, or better yet, a cost savings, the argument for funding an effort is easier. However, it is important to state that a policymaker may make the argument that even if the costs avoided are less than the cost of a crime prevention program that has been proven effective, the value of abating a rape, murder or robbery is worth the amount of money being expended. This judgment call is about spending taxpayer money wisely, not requiring that there be no net cost to government. In addition, it is important to remember that in many cases, the level of government establishing the laws and mandating punishment is not the same level of government responsible for implementing the laws and paying the associated costs. Preventing crime is discretionary, and punishing a criminal is mandated.

The resulting ethical dilemma facing the implementing policymakers will be the tax dollars they are willing to spend to prevent a murder, rape, assault or damage to property. Some policymakers will make the public investment because it is considered the right thing to do, others will make their decision based on the amount of tax dollars to be spent. Providing the policymakers making the ethical argument with a cost data tool to justify using discretionary tax dollars for crime prevention efforts, even if the avoided costs do not fully cover expenditures, will assist them in making their case to the policymakers who will make their decision based on tax dollars.

In much the same way diagnostic tools were developed to measure the negative impacts of high cholesterol before the effectiveness of treatment methods could be proven, quantifying the taxpayer costs avoided allows for the measurement of public tax dollars spent when criminal activity takes place. The focus is on the taxpayer costs avoided if crime is prevented because there is little, if any, disagreement on the benefits

to society of having fewer homicides, assaults, robberies and other violent, serious crime. If the measurable outcomes of a crime prevention program prove that fewer crimes are being committed, then the societal benefit in terms of lives not being irreparably harmed or lost is obvious. What is not obvious to the average taxpayer is the quantifiable benefit to their pocketbooks if crime is prevented.

It is easier for a politician to make the case for increased funding to keep a sex offender incarcerated than it is to provide funding for that same offender to stop him or her from heading down this destructive path when he or she was six years old. Incarceration is expensive, but because the public feels safer when the sex offender is locked away from them and their families, the tax dollars spent are worthwhile. The other costs incurred to the public for law enforcement through the local police or sheriff's office, for incarcerating juvenile and adult offenders and providing probation services through government corrections departments, for public attorneys who prosecute and provide public defense, when necessary, for the judicial court system that tries, and if the person is found guilty, metes out an appropriate sentence, and for taking children in need of protection out of their home to a safer place to live because of criminal activity by a parent, also make people feel more secure. If evidence were offered that sex offenses would likely be prevented, and expensive, deep-end cures could save tax dollars, the public may see the value of investing in the ounce of prevention. In terms of dollars, the words "worth a pound of cure" are only true if we can put a monetary value on the pound of cure through the criminal justice system and on the cost and effectiveness of preventing criminal activity through the "ounce of prevention."

CHAPTER II

So What is the Problem and Why Should We Care?

The primary reason to care about violent crime is the toll it takes in terms of human suffering. Victims suffer from loss of life, mobility or income, family members suffer the loss or disabling of a loved one, society suffers because of the perception and/or reality of being less safe in our homes and communities, and, although we are less sympathetic to the offenders, they and the people who love them despite their crimes also suffer by being incarcerated and separated from their families. According to the United States Department of Justice (USDOJ), Bureau of Justice Statistics from data retrieved on July 15, 2006, Minnesota's violent crime rate per 100,000 people has risen from 42 in 1960 to 269.6 in 2004. During that same period of time the number of murders in Minnesota rose from 42 to 113, with the peak being in 2000 at 151 (USDOJ, n.d.). The sharpest increase in Minnesota's violent crime rate occurred between 1960 and 1970 when it more than tripled from 42 to 152, but the highest rate of 306.1 occurred in 1990 (USDOJ, n.d.). Statistics were provided at the Bureau of Justice Statistics website for municipal and county jurisdictions within Minnesota as well. From 1985 to 2004, the violent crime rate for Olmsted County rose from 36.3 to 95.2, and in Stearns County the rate went from 42.5 to 100.7 (USDOJ, n.d.). Other Minnesota counties marked substantial decreases in the violent crime rate from 1985 to 2004. For example, the Crow

Wing County violent crime rate went from 198.8 to 80.6, and Chisago County's rate dropped from 129.5 to 70.9 (USDOJ, n.d.).

Another reason to care is the amount of money spent on the American justice system. The article, *Crime in an American Family* (Butterfield, August 2002) is an interesting case study on the intergenerational cost of crime. *Crime in an American Family* (Butterfield, August 2002) follows the family history of Rooster Bogle, a migrant worker in Salem, Oregon. There are 28 members of the Bogle clan, all of who spent time in jail or state prison at some point. According to Rooster's daughter, "Rooster raised us to be outlaws." Butterfield (August 2002) cites Justice Department figures that show 47 percent of inmates in state prisons have family members who have also been incarcerated. In the case of only five of the Bogle family members, the Oregon Department of Corrections spent almost \$3 million (Butterfield, August 2002).

Juvenile and Adult Criminal Behavior

Chronic, serious and violent criminal behavior does not surface for the first time in adulthood. Children are committing crimes and being victimized as well. Research conducted by David Loeber and Rolf Farrington (2001) indicated that three of five chronic, serious and violent adult offenders began their careers before the age of 12. Whether or not the first offense is at the serious and violent level of aggression, and more than likely it is not, it should still be taken seriously. In *It Takes a Nation: A New Agenda for Fighting Poverty*, Rebecca Blank (1998) states that corrections staff often do not have the time to determine which of the children in the juvenile justice system are actually going to become chronic, serious and violent offenders, which she refers to as "super-

predators”. Bringing the child into an assessment process will help determine if the offending will escalate or become a pattern, or if it is an isolated incident.

Minnesota’s violent crime index in 1999 was 275 (Snyder, December 2001). The highest violent crime index by state was Illinois at 1,058 and the lowest was Vermont at 60 (Snyder, December 2001). To protect individuals and communities from crime, aggressive and expensive law enforcement is necessary. In a February 2000 report for the United States Department of Justice, Andrew Goldberg and Brian Reaves stated that sheriffs departments spent \$13.1 billion in fiscal year 1997. The average annual amount spent per sworn officer was \$73,000 at a cost per resident of \$49 (Goldberg and Reaves, February 2000).

Special attention was paid to juvenile crime rates by the researcher, as the highest rate of return on investment for implementing crime prevention efforts is likely to be early in the career of a criminal. In 1999 law enforcement agencies in the United States arrested 2.5 million people under 18 years old (Snyder, December 2001). The juvenile proportion of arrests for serious and violent crime at that time was 16 percent (Snyder, December 2001). Individually, the juvenile proportion of arrests in 1999 for murder was nine percent, 17 percent for forcible rape, 25 percent for robbery, and 14 percent for aggravated assault (Snyder, December 2001). The United States violent crime index for arrests per 100,000 juveniles between ten and 17 years old was 366, and the property crime index was 1,844 (Snyder, December 2001). Snyder (December 2001) notes that about two-thirds of the states have juvenile violent crime arrest rates below the national average.

Howard Snyder and Carl McCurley provided data on who is being victimized in their July 2004 article, *Victims of Violent Juvenile Crime*. Ninety-five percent of the victims of sexual assault by a juvenile were under 18 years old (Snyder and McCurley, July 2004). Approximately half (48 percent) of the victims of non-fatal violent crime committed by juveniles were acquaintances of the offender (Snyder and McCurley, July 2004). Victims of robbery by juveniles faced more than one offender 61 percent of the time (Snyder and McCurley, July 2004).

After arrest comes prosecution. From both a public safety and taxpayer point of view, the level of crime and costs associated with prosecution are an important part of trends in criminal behavior. Felony and misdemeanor cases, and the number of county prosecuting staff, along with their budgets, help to paint the picture of the problem of crime and the prosecution aspect of costs. The population for each jurisdiction is provided to better understand the scope of the issues. Prosecution of felony and misdemeanor cases by county were reported on the United State Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics website, and were retrieved on July 15, 2006. Demographic information about counties was retrieved from the Association of Minnesota Counties website on March 26, 2006. Olmsted County (population 119,077), Minnesota, reported 25 prosecution staff closing 422 felony and 22,331 misdemeanor cases, and a total budget in 2004 of \$1,466,381 (USDOJ, n.d.). St. Louis County (population 193,433) closed 351 felony and 498 misdemeanor cases with 66 staff and a total budget of \$3,207,973, and Blue Earth County (population 53,874) closed 220 felony and 680 misdemeanor cases with 13 staff and a budget of \$638,000 (USDOJ, n.d.). The metropolitan Minnesota counties of Dakota, Hennepin, Washington and Anoka, ranged from 56 to 347

prosecuting staff with budgets from \$1,900,000 to \$14,406,989 and felony cases closed from 700 to 6200 (USDOJ, n.d.). The research indicates that the proportion of the county budget devoted to prosecution of criminal cases is significant.

Individuals convicted of a crime are then sentenced. According to Allen Beck (August 2000), the number of people in 1999 under the jurisdiction of Federal or State adult corrections programs was 1,366,721. This translates to 476 inmates per 100,000 people in the United States (Beck, August 2000). In 1990, the rate of incarceration per 100,000 United States residents was 292 (Beck, August 2000). When taking into consideration additional inmates from territorial prisons, local jails, military and United States Immigration and Naturalization Service facilities, jails on Indian reservations, and juvenile facilities, 2,026,596 people were incarcerated in 1999 (Beck, August 2000). Beck (August 2000) links the increase in inmate population to violent and drug offenses.

One function of the correctional system is to rehabilitate offenders so that after serving out their sentence, they may go on to enjoy productive, self-sufficient, law abiding lives. Re-arrest or recidivism rates are closely scrutinized to help determine what works and what does not work in terms of rehabilitation efforts.

Breaking the pattern of arrest and re-arrest early in life will reduce the impact on the American justice system by decreasing law enforcement costs for arrests, court and attorney costs for prosecution, defense and sentencing, correction department costs for incarceration and probation, and costs for support services, such as mental and physical health. A study by the Orange County California Probation Department in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that eight percent of juvenile first time offenders were responsible for 55 percent of the recidivism cases (Basile, December 2005). The re-arrest rate for this

small group of juveniles was a minimum of four times in a three-year period (Basile, December 2005).

Targeting efforts on this smaller group can help achieve lower recidivism rate. The identified eight percent of juvenile offenders experience the known risk factors of abuse, neglect, poor family role models and peer relationships, lack of parental supervision, and problems in school (Basile, December 2005). Recidivism most often occurs within a year of release from incarceration or community supervision (Basile, December 2005). Basile (December 2005) concludes that putting resources up front the first time a juvenile offends is the only way to make a serious attempt to rehabilitate the individual and stop crime.

The League of Women Voters (LWV) report, *Breaking the Cycle of Violence: A Focus on Primary Prevention Efforts* (April 1995) makes the statement that “Violence is everyone’s problem.” Many of us have pre-conceived ideas of who criminals are and what type of life they live. We may think of criminals as someone very different from anyone we know, and look at crime itself as an individual problem. Our ideas are influenced by what we read, see and hear. Much of what we believe to be true is, in fact, a crime myth. Kappeler, Blumberg, and Potter (November 2002) discuss crime myths and its role in shaping our views of crime, criminals and the justice system. The four characteristics of a crime myth (Kappeler, Blumberg, and Potter, November 2002) are:

- 1) A distinct deviant population is identified and targeted;
- 2) A victim population exists;
- 3) Heroes emerge;
- and 4) A substantial threat to norms, values or lifestyles is posed.

Another unfortunate reality is that misperceptions, or crime myths, can become the base from which policymakers work. If all of their time is spent simply trying to

dispel a myth, very little will happen to solve the actual problem. When crime prevention programs are being developed and public buy-in is crucial, working to address the myths and criminal behavior at the same time can be very beneficial. In reviewing several juvenile crime prevention programs from across the country, it became clear that the measurable outcomes adopted by these efforts often fall into the same categories as Kappeler, Blumberg, and Potter's (November 2002) crime myths.

In an attempt to put crime myths aside and get to the root of the problem, the League of Women Voters (LWV) explored the causes of violence. One of the primary points of the LWV report revolves around the generational aspects of criminal behavior. This "cycle of violence" continues from generation to generation based on a number of family and community-based risk factors. The risk factors identified by the LWV (April 1995) include exposure to family violence, child abuse and neglect, parents' abuse of drugs and/or alcohol, poverty and joblessness, social isolation, teenage parents, and the absence of fathers in a child's life. The report also lays out the framework from which primary prevention efforts can be built. The protective factors identified by the LWV (April 1995) include competent parenting, connectedness to parents and community, close relationship with a caring adult, positive peer influence, and positive self-esteem. The conclusions and recommendations put forward by the LWV (April 1995) were the need for a consistent funding source, training for adults in violence prevention, the forming of additional community collaborations, and greater coordination between existing programs and collaborative efforts. The LWV conclusions and recommendations are just one example of research completed to help reduce juvenile and adult criminal behavior and use taxpayer dollars wisely.

Options to help children who are at high risk of becoming chronic, serious and violent adults are being implemented across the country, some more successfully than others. Although prevention efforts use tax dollars, the human and monetary cost of not successfully preventing crime is likely even higher.

The Cost of Crime to Society

Several research studies have been completed on a variety of costs associated with crime. To name only a few, Dr. Mark Cohen (1998) examined public and private expenditures, such as direct costs for drug treatment and incarceration and indirect expenses like lost wages and productivity and calculated those costs beginning at age 14, the Office of Minnesota Planning (March, 1996) reported primarily on the cost of incarceration to the State of Minnesota, and the United States Department of Justice (Goldberg and Reaves, February 2000) zeroed in on sheriffs departments cost in fiscal year 1997. Reports and articles that examined the data and methodology of other cost-benefit research studies were also reviewed.

Generally, the research studies were either very focused on one program or aspect of crime, such as the Functional Family Therapy juvenile crime prevention program or the cost of incarceration, or were quite broad and included both hard dollar expenditures for delivery of public and private services and the soft dollar value of wages lost and human suffering. Following is an overview of focused and comprehensive research studies examining the cost of crime to society or critiques of research studies.

Cohen (1998) states that the typical career criminal will cost society between \$1.3 million and \$1.5 million, a heavy drug user \$370,000 to \$970,000, and a high school

dropout between \$243,000 and \$388,000. Eliminating duplication, the “monetary value of saving a high-risk youth”, beginning at age 14, is \$1.7 to \$2.3 million (Cohen, 1998). In calculating criminal career costs, Cohen includes the mean number of offenses, victim cost of crime, cost of criminal justice investigation, arrest and adjudication, cost of incarceration in days, average time served in days, discount rate, and the opportunity cost of the offender’s time. Drug abuse costs include the risk premium for drug distributors, retail price of drugs to illegal users, fraction of offenders in drug treatment programs, drug treatment costs, hours of lost productivity while a drug user, risk of medical emergency, medical costs associated with drug use, risk of death from an overdose or related illness, value of future productivity lost due to death, number of “drug-related” and “drug-defined” crimes, risk of third party costs, and third party costs, such as crack babies, and neglected children (Cohen, 1998). The lifetime cost of dropping out of high school includes lost wage productivity, fringe benefits, non-market losses and a two percent discount rate to present value (Cohen, 1998). The costs included in Cohen’s study (1998) were very broad and measured hard and soft dollar, public and private sector costs beginning at age 14 and did not focus on direct taxpayer costs beginning in childhood.

A preview of the report, *The Extent and Costs of Crime Victimization: A New Look*, by Ted Miller, Mark Cohen and Brian Wiersema was published in January 1996. The period covered in the Miller, Cohen and Wiersema report (January 1996) was 1987 to 1990 and included tangible and intangible costs for murder, rape/sexual assault, and robbery/attempted robbery with injuries. The total cost for murder was \$2,940,000, which includes \$1,030,000 for tangible costs; \$86,500 for rape/sexual assault with \$5,100 attributable to tangible costs and the remainder of \$81,400 for intangible costs; and

\$19,000 for robbery/attempted robbery with injuries with \$5,200 for tangible costs (Miller, et al., January 1996). The aggregate cost estimates provided by Miller, Cohen and Wiersema (January 1996) for domestic violence against adults was \$67 billion per year in the United States and when violence against children is added in, the estimated costs exceed \$231 billion.

J.W. Mason critiqued the cost-benefit study completed by Mark Cohen, Ted Miller, and Brian Wiersema in the August 1996 article *The Costs of Crime*. Mason (August 1996) is critical of the methodology used by Cohen, Miller and Wiersema in coming to the conclusion that crime costs \$447 billion a year in the United States (Mason, August 1996). The costs included in the Cohen, Miller and Wiersema study were lost productivity, medical care, mental health care, police and fire services, social services, property loss and damage, and lost quality of life (Mason, August 1996). Two of the problems identified by Mason (August 1996) are an absence of data on the earnings of those murdered and trying to measure a nonexistent quantity. When Miller was questioned by Mason (August 1996) about justifying the conclusions, Miller responded by saying, "Politicians often know what they want to do, but they need the numbers to justify doing what they want to do." The researcher agrees that including intangible expenses in a cost analysis increases the likelihood of the results being challenged as legitimate. There is also danger to a politicians' credibility, if she or he relies on weak numbers to justify what they want to do.

In the May 1, 2002 article, *The Enormous Costs of Crime*, John Perazzo evaluated a 1996 Department of Justice (DOJ) study on victim costs of crime. The research team was lead by Dr. Mark Cohen (Perazzo, May 1, 2002). The DOJ team determined that the

average cost per life for a deceased person was approximately \$2.7 million (Perazzo, May 1, 2002). When the cost of crime was aggregated in the United States, it totaled an estimated \$450 billion annually (Perazzo, May 1, 2002). Perazzo (May 1, 2002) states that the study does not go far enough because it does not take into consideration white-collar crimes, criminal justice system expenses, costs for preventive measures, lack of productivity of a person who is incarcerated and of the victims, and costs associated with what he terms as “victimless” crimes like drug abuse, gambling, and prostitution. The annual cost of crime in the United States, including these costs is \$1.705 trillion per year, according to Perazzo (May 1, 2002).

In *The Comparative Costs and Benefits of Programs to Reduce Crime*, the authors, Aos, Phipps, Barnoski and Lieb (May 2001) researched six types of crimes and identified 14 types of costs incurred. Crimes included murder/manslaughter, rape/sex offenses, robbery, aggravated assault, felony property crimes, and drug offenses. Costs considered in the book include costs from police and sheriffs’ offices, superior courts and county prosecutors, juvenile detention with local and state sentences, juvenile probation, juvenile rehabilitation within institutions and while on parole, adults with local jail or prison sentences, state community supervision at the local and institutional levels, and crime victim monetary and quality of life costs (Aos, et al., May 2001). The quality of life costs are qualitative and are more difficult to measure from a dollars and cents perspective. Aos, et al. (May 2001) described five general findings from their research:

- 1) Some good investment options that will improve the cost-effectiveness of criminal justice systems exist – One example of a good return on

investment was Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care with a net taxpayer benefit of between \$21,836 and \$87,622 per participant.

- 2) Bad investment options that do not lower crime rates and use valuable taxpayer dollars ineffectively also exist – Juvenile Boot Camps and Scared Straight type programs did not reduce crime and had a net cost to taxpayers of up to \$24,531 per participant.
- 3) Even small reductions in crime can make a program cost-beneficial – The Multi Systemic Therapy program reduced crime by 31 percent and cost \$4,743 per participant to implement. The net taxpayer benefit per participant ranged from \$31,661 to \$131,918.
- 4) All programs need to be evaluated – Effectiveness of a prevention program must be evaluated to determine if the desired outcome, reducing crime, is actually taking place.
- 5) Taking a portfolio approach to crime prevention is recommended – One size does not fit all when it comes to working with high-risk juveniles. Each child and incident will involve a variety of risk and protective factors. To be successful, the right program must meet the needs of the child.

In the July/August issue of *Monitor on Psychology*, Tori DeAngelis cited between \$35,000 and \$64,000 as the average annual cost of incarcerating a juvenile. The article, *Youth programs cut crime, costs*, focused on three juvenile crime prevention programs – Henggeler’s Multi Systemic Therapy (MST); Alexander’s Functional Family Therapy (FFT); and Chamberlain’s Multidimensional Foster Care Treatment (MTFC). DeAngelis

(July/August 2003) reported on the evaluation of MST, FFT and MTFC by Dr. Steve Aos in May 2001. Aos estimated the annual savings from MST at \$31,661, FFT at \$14,149, and MTFC at \$21,836 per child (DeAngelis, July/August 2003). The savings for these three programs were based on documented major reductions in re-arrests and out-of-home placements over conventional treatment programs (DeAngelis, July/August 2003).

In a letter to the Florida Department of Corrections Secretary Michael W. Moore, Thomas Blomberg (July/August 1999) estimates the cost of crime in the United States at \$450 billion per year (\$426 billion for violent crime and \$24 billion for property crime). Child abuse and domestic violence are responsible for almost one-third of the \$450 billion (Blomberg, July/August 1999). Blomberg (July/August 1999) estimates the dollar amount assigned to the lost quality life for a single murder victim's family at \$1.9 million.

An article from U.S. News & World Report from January 17, 1994 estimated the annual cost of crime in the United States at \$674 billion (Shapiro, August 1999). The \$674 billion price tag includes \$78 billion for federal, state and local criminal justice systems, \$64 billion for private security, \$11 billion for medical and mental health care, \$191 billion for lost wages and victim's pain and suffering, \$120 billion for crimes against businesses, such as shoplifting and embezzlement, \$60 billion for stolen goods and non-corporate fraud, \$40 billion for drug abuse, and \$110 billion for drunk driving costs (Shapiro, August 1999). In addition, a research report from May 1995 discussed the loss of property tax revenue because of depressed home values in neighborhoods with high crime rates (Shapiro, August 1999).

Patsy Klaus reported on the cost of crime in the United States Department of Justice document, dated February 1994, *The Costs of Crime to Victims: Crime Data Brief*. Klaus (February 1994) stated that in 1992, twenty-three percent of United States households were victims of crime for a total of 33,649,340 incidents. The National Crime Victimization Survey estimated the direct costs of crime to victims in 1992 at \$17.6 billion (Klaus, February 1994). The costs included in the National Crime Victimization Survey were property theft, stolen cash, medical costs, property damage and lost wages related to the crime (Klaus, February 1994).

An Abuse, Rape and Domestic Violence Aid and Resource Collection (AARDVARC) article, *What Crimes Cost for Victims*, states that in 1992, an estimated 25 to 30 percent of violent crimes and property crimes were caused by alcohol and drug abuse. The direct costs related to alcohol and drug crimes were estimated at \$24.3 billion and included police, private security, adjudication, corrections, and property losses (AARDVARC, n.d.).

Kathryn McCollister (2004) calculated the tangible and intangible costs for murder, rape/sexual assault, aggravated assault, robbery and arson. Tangible costs included victim costs, mental health care and criminal justice system costs, and career criminal costs in terms of their lost productivity (McCollister, 2004). Intangible costs were primarily for pain and suffering (McCollister, 2004). Murder ranked the highest at \$8,492,905, of which \$1,139,922 was tangible (McCollister, 2004). In 2004 dollars, rape/sexual assault costs were \$200,037 (\$25,954 tangible), aggravated assault - \$111,801 (\$18,599 tangible), robbery - \$46,484 (\$20,890 tangible), and arson - \$8,405 (\$6,267 tangible) (McCollister, 2004). McCollister (2004) points out that resources

assessing the cost of crime are limited, use inconsistent methodologies, and contain disparate crime and cost data sources. Policymakers need economic benefit data to assist them in allocating funds for fighting crime, such as addiction programs and crime prevention efforts (McCollister, 2004). Substantial economic benefits can be obtained if even small reductions in criminal activity can be achieved (McCollister, 2004).

In a March 1999 article by David Berns and Barbara Drake, *Combining Child Welfare and Welfare Reform at a Local Level*, El Paso County, Colorado reported that it spent about \$34 million annually on child welfare services such as foster care, adoption, children in need of protection investigations, and in-home services. When a county is aware of a child who may be in harms way, it moves to protect that child by first investigating the situation, and, if warranted, taking the child out of the setting in which they are living and placing them in foster care. In some cases, parental rights are revoked or relinquished and the child is placed for adoption. If removal from the home is not warranted, services, such as mental or physical health care or parenting assistance, can effectively be administered in the child's current home. Regardless of the level of effort required to keep a child safe, the efforts are all deep-end services. These services do not prevent family hardships or negative impacts on our society, but rather react to crisis situations. The presumption (Berns and Drake, March 1999) of El Paso County policymakers is that by designing, consolidating and building a system to meet family needs, that less expensive, pro-active services will provide better outcomes for their residents, both in terms of reduced crime and fewer taxpayer dollars expended.

In a subsequent article by Berns (2000), *Addressing Poverty Issues in Child Welfare, Effective Use of TANF as a Prevention Resource*, he talks about the outcomes of

the unified child welfare and public assistance system. From July 1997 through December 31, 1999, family foster care declined by 7.2 percent, children in residential treatment facilities went from 145 to 91, and employable adults on TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families) was nearly cut in half (2,388 to 1,222) (Berns, 2000). The success of this prevention effort was credited to the 7 “Ps” mission of the department – Protection, Prevention, Preservation, Placement, Permanency, Partnerships, and Proficiency (Berns, 2000).

Vincent Basile (December 2005), a consultant for the Essex, Massachusetts Sheriff’s Department, refers to the multi-generational aspects of criminal activity. To underscore the extent of the potential problem, it is important to remember that in the United States, approximately 1.6 million children have at least one parent incarcerated (Basile, December 2005). Basile (December 2005) suggests that criminal justice professionals should follow the example of corporate executives who measure success by the quality and not just the quantity of the outcome. Front-end loading services to change behavior makes more sense than back-end loading the services at a time when they cost more and are less effective, according to Basile (December 2005). Basile (December 2005) estimates the annual cost of incarceration alone at about \$30,000 per inmate.

In the September 28, 1999 article, *New research shows that crime costs in U.S. have passed trillion-dollar mark*, David Anderson makes the statement that “crime may have become the single most expensive – and wasteful – aspect of life in America.” Anderson (September 28, 1999) suggests strategic community planning, enhanced local law enforcement, legal reform, education, and ethics curricula in schools as cost-effective strategies that can be used to reduce crime. In 2001, the National Center for Policy

Analysis Idea House (NCPA) quoted an article by David Anderson that estimated the net burden of crime in the United States at more than \$1 trillion per year. NCPA (2001) listed the costs researched by Anderson as direct losses, opportunity costs for both criminals and victims, and the cost of private security and deterrence equipment. In the April 13, 2000 article, *The Cost of Crime*, John Irons also reported on the paper by David Anderson. Anderson's total cost of \$1.7 trillion per year, broke down as follows: \$397 billion – crime related production; \$130 billion – opportunity costs; \$574 billion – life and health; and \$603 billion – cost of property or money obtained through fraud (Irons, April 13, 2000). The per capita cost of crime in the United States in 1999, according to Anderson (NCPA, 2001) was \$4,118.

Emily Shapiro authored the Minnesota House of Representatives August 1999 report, *Cost of Crime: A Review of the Research Studies*. Shapiro (August 1999) found that a majority of the studies assessed the cost of crime for homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Almost all of the studies included the costs associated with loss of property or physical injury to the victim (Shapiro, August 1999). Other costs included in many of the studies were legal expenses and pain and suffering of the victim, while others went even further and attempted to assess the direct and indirect costs to the victim's family and neighborhood (Shapiro, August 1999). Only a few of the studies researched by Shapiro (August 1999) attempted to quantify costs related to property taxes, medical care, government expenditures, and private security.

One conclusion drawn by Shapiro (August 1999) involved the tendency to undercount criminal incidents because people are reluctant to report the crime to police.

Shapiro (August 1999) cited the need to improve criminal incident estimates. Another area needing improvement, according to Shapiro (August 1999), is estimating costs. More and improved data is needed on issues such as the costs associated with the long-term psychological effects of crime on the victim, mental health care, loss of wages and quality of life, and crime-induced suicide (Shapiro, August 1999). Shapiro (August 1999) also noted, and the researcher agrees, that intangible costs for “pain and suffering” and “lost quality of life” are subjective.

Brandon Welsh researched fourteen cost-benefit analysis studies on the impact of offender reentry in his September 2004 report, *Monetary Costs and Benefits of Correctional Treatment Programs: Implications for Offender Reentry*. Welsh (September 2004) listed the factors contributing to offender reentry and an increase in crime rates as being fewer treatment programs for those in need while in prison, reduction of parole taking away the incentive for prisoners to participate in treatment when it is available, and less aid for employment and housing (Welsh, September 2004). All but one of the fourteen studies achieved more program benefits than the program cost (Welsh, September 2004). Welsh (September 2004) mentioned the appeal to politicians to fund short-term efforts, rather than investing in the longer-term programs to prevent reentry into prison.

To answer the question, “How many career criminals must be prevented before the program pays for itself?” Beuhring (March 15, 2001) states that two pieces of information are needed: the monetary savings or costs avoided by preventing a child from becoming a career criminal, and a determination on whether the child being served is highly likely to become a career criminal. In the *Monetary Value of Saving a Child at*

Risk for Chronic Offending – A Cost-benefit Analysis of Why the ACE Program Should be Expanded (March 15, 2001), Beuhring built on Dr. Mark Cohen's cost estimates and came to the conclusion that if only three to six children were prevented from taking the path to career criminality, all ACE (All Children Excel) program costs would be recouped for 180 children from 2001 through 2008. She estimates the lifetime costs per ACE child as being between \$2.7 and \$3.4 million (Beuhring, March 15, 2001).

On February 15, 2005, Ed Schwartz provided testimony before the Philadelphia City Council on the fiscal cost of crime. Of the \$2.2 billion annual budget for the City of Philadelphia, \$1.1 billion is for the criminal justice system, not including benefits to police, corrections officers or court employees (Schwartz, February 15, 2005). The cost for Philadelphia prisons was \$187 million (Schwartz, February 15, 2005). One reason for the dramatic increase in prison costs was a 70 percent increase in the daily prison census between 1994 and 2004 (Schwartz, February 15, 2005). Schwartz (February 15, 2005) suggested that Philadelphia use a similar approach to reduce prison costs by 25 percent to that used to reduce the homeless shelter budget by 40 percent. Schwartz's (February 15, 2005) approach is to invest in self-sufficiency efforts, such as six-month drug and alcohol treatment programs. This effort reduced recidivism for inmates by 66 percent (Schwartz, February 15, 2005).

In March 1996 the Minnesota Planning office reported the daily cost to incarcerate an inmate in a Minnesota prison was \$82 per day, which did not include administrative or health care costs. In addition, the number of inmates serving a life sentence went from 76 in 1985 to 222 in 1996, and the average prison sentence increased from 36 months in 1987 to 51 months in 1994 (Minnesota Planning, March 1996). In the

ten years between 1985 and 1995, Minnesota's prison population more than doubled, going from 2,244 to 4,591 (Minnesota Planning, March 1996). Daily costs were increasing at the same time more offenders were being sent to prison for longer periods of time.

Frank Adrienne (November 15, 2005) examines the cost of excessive punishment, which he refers to as "errors of justice". Brian Forst estimates the annual cost of crime in the United States at \$1 trillion (Adrienne, November 15, 2005). With 2 million people in United States prisons, the cost of incarcerating individuals longer than is needed to protect society carries a high price tag, according to Adrienne (November 15, 2005).

In March 1996, the Minnesota Planning Office in conjunction with the Department of Corrections and the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission prepared a report entitled, *Paying the Price, the Rising Cost of Prison*. The major factors listed for the dramatic growth in spending for state correctional facilities between 1980 and 1995 (\$37 million to \$162 million) were: a rise in the population most likely to commit crime - 15 to 24 year olds; increased arrests for violent crime; impact of tougher drug offense laws from the late 1980s; and increased criminal penalties (Minnesota Planning, March 1996). Choices for policymakers included adjusting sentencing policies and investing in prevention (Minnesota Planning, March 1996). Prevention efforts could have an impact on long-term costs for corrections, but would not impact the immediate need for more jail beds (Minnesota Planning, March 1996).

The significant role of counties in Minnesota's corrections system was also discussed in the Minnesota Planning report (March 1996). In 1995, Minnesota counties spent at least \$85 million to operate local jails, the State Corrections Department spent

\$146 million to incarcerate adults, and together they spent over \$134 million for community-supervised release programs for felony offenders and regular probation (Minnesota Planning, March 1996). County jail space in 1995 was generally cheaper than a state facility, \$56 per inmate as compared to \$82 per inmate per day (Minnesota Planning, March 1996). The Minnesota Planning report (March 1996) states that a shift to counties for incarcerating offenders would require the cooperation of the counties. However, in 2003 when Minnesota was in a budget crisis, the cost for an additional six months of a short-term offenders sentence was simply passed on to county governments.

On July 20, 2006, a cost-benefit study was distributed on the Ramsey County (Minnesota) Juvenile Substance Abuse Court (JSAC). The JSAC has been in operation since June 2001 and offers an alternative to out-of-home placement to eligible juvenile offenders (Ramsey County Courts, July 20, 2006). The average daily cost for a JSAC participant was \$41.40, compared to per diems of \$180 at the Ramsey County Juvenile Detention Center, \$195 at Boys Totem Town, \$105 at Chamberlain Academy, \$147 at St. Croix Girls Camp, and down to \$43 at Trott's, Hudson House (Ramsey County Courts, July 20, 2006). There were 22.9 participants during the two-year study period, and if JSAC had been at full capacity of 25, the costs would have been lower (Ramsey County Courts, July 20, 2006).

Research on the issue of the cost of crime is taking place around the world. Four studies reviewed were from England and Wales, Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean, and South Africa. In all four cases, the stated purpose of the research was to assist decision makers in the process of allocating funds to improve public safety.

The cost of crime in England and Wales for 2003 and 2004 was documented in a June 2005 report prepared by Richard Dubourg, Joe Hamed and Jamie Thorns. The average costs were reported in British pounds for homicide, serious wounding and sexual offenses (Dubourg, et al., June 2005). In addition, the average government costs were calculated in the same categories. The estimates provided by Dubourg, Hamed and Thorns (June 2005) with conversion to United States dollars at the current exchange rate of 1.96947 (www.xe.com, December 19, 2006) are presented in the following table.

Table II.1 - Estimated average costs of homicide, serious wounding and sexual offenses England and Wales 2003/2004				
Category of Crime	Average costs of crime		Government costs of crime	
	Pounds	Dollars	Pounds	Dollars
Homicide	1,458,975	2,873,407.40	144,239	284,074.38
Serious wounding	21,422	42,189.99	14,345	28,252.05
Sexual offenses	31,438	61,916.20	3,298	6,495.31

Dubourg, Hamed and Thorns (June 2005)

The indirect costs for physical and emotional impact, lost output, and health services, were also provided (Dubourg, et al., June 2005).

Table II.2 - Estimated average indirect costs of homicide, serious wounding and sexual offenses, England and Wales 2003/2004				
Category of crime	Physical and emotional impact	Lost output	Health services	
	Pounds	Pounds	Pounds	Total Dollars
Homicide	860,380	451,110	770	2,584,456.70
Serious wounding	4,554	1,166	1,348	13,920.21
Sexual offenses	23,015	4,430	916	55,856.14

Dubourg, Hamed and Thorns (June 2005)

In South Africa, the amount of money spent on the criminal justice system increased by 450 percent between 1990 and 2000, during which time the consumer price increased by only 159 percent (Nedbank ISS Crime Index, July-August 1999).

The annual public cost for prisons in Canada was \$9.7 million (Quebec Task Force/Horner, March 1993). Other comprehensive analysis of the costs of crime in

Canada provided estimates of up to \$146 billion per year (Quebec Task Force/Horner, March 1993). Dr. Horner (March 1993) projected a five-dollar to seven-dollar savings for every one dollar spent on crime prevention, and asks the question, "How can we not put our full support behind crime prevention initiatives?" The major findings of another Canadian study estimated the total annual cost of crime in Canada in 1995 at \$46 billion (Shapiro, August 1999). The Fraser Institute of Vancouver British Columbia Canada issued a Critical Issues Bulletin in June of 1998 entitled, *The Costs of Crime: Who Pays and How Much?* The bulletin was authored by Paul Brantingham and Stephen Easton. Brantingham and Easton (June 1998) state that millions of people are exposed to crime each year at an estimated cost of between \$15 and \$30 billion.

The World Bank Group, Latin America and the Caribbean (Inweb18.worldbank.org, retrieved on July 15, 2006) cite crime as not only being a major cause of death and suffering in the region, but a major drain on the economy and public sector budgets. In 1999 an Inter-American Development Bank Study estimated the cost of crime to be about \$16.8 billion per year, which equates to 14.2 percent of the region's Gross Domestic Product.

The estimates from cost of crime studies completed in the United States and from around the world range from billions to trillions of dollars at a national level. The range of costs for murders alone was from \$1.9 million to \$8.49 million per victim. Costs were broken down in a variety of ways, including by type of crime, tangible and intangible benefits, type of response, and by prevention or intervention programs or services offered. What was missing from the previous studies is a cost analysis by type of activity coupled with the level of government paying for the service. When decisions are being

made on allocation of resources by a specific level of government, the possible avoided costs, can be an important factor in the decision making process. Public officials and administrators know how much they are being asked to allocate for a specific program, what they do not know is if a given expenditure can possibly be offset by cost savings in another line item. Again, this information is simply one factor among many when allocation decisions are being made.

Crime and Crime Prevention on the Public and Political Agenda

Public safety efforts are important functions in our communities. We all want to feel safe and secure as we go about our daily lives. The laws that are passed and implemented are meant to provide us with that sense of security. Numerous cost studies confirm that a great deal of money is being spent by government, individuals, and for-profit and not-for-profit entities, to combat crime in our society. Resources are expended to try to prevent crime and to apprehend, punish, and, hopefully, rehabilitate individuals committing criminal acts.

The question asked by Fass and Pi in their presentation at the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Conference entitled, *Cost-Benefit Analysis of Dispositions in the Juvenile Justice System: A Study of Dallas County, Texas* (December 14, 2000), was “Are hoped-for benefits sufficient to justify the expenditures required to produce them?” Fass and Pi’s (December 14, 2000) research project examined the net benefits of alternative juvenile dispositions. Decision makers were provided with the findings that harsher sanctions did not result in more cost savings and, that, in fact, many less restrictive sanctions were very cost-effective (Fass and Pi, December 14, 2000).

Patricia Torbet, Richard Gable, Hunter Hurst IV, Imogene Montgomery, Linda Szymanski and Douglas Thomas authored the report, *State Responses to Serious and Violent Crime*, for the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in July 1996. The report chronicles the changes in legislation or executive orders in almost every state as a result of increased awareness of violent crimes being committed by juveniles (Torbet, et al., July 1996). New laws generally fall into one of five categories: jurisdictional authority, judicial disposition/sentencing authority, correctional programming, confidentiality of juvenile court records and proceedings, and victims of juvenile crime (Torbet, et al., July 1996).

Torbet, Gable, Hurst, Montgomery, Szymanski and Thomas (July 1996) cite several trends in jurisdictional authority. The demand on the judicial system and prosecutors is increasing because of laws like “three strikes and you’re an adult” being enacted (Torbet, et al., July 1996). Increased numbers of transferred juveniles and more complicated court procedures are resulting in longer periods of pre-trial detention of juveniles in both juvenile detention facilities and adult jails (Torbet, et al., July 1996).

The trends in judicial disposition and sentencing authority for juveniles have caused system ambivalence and confusion (Torbet, et al., July 1996). It is difficult for those involved in the juvenile justice system to know when a juvenile should be treated as a child, when the juvenile justice system is inadequate to deal with the offender, or when a blended sentencing option is best for the juvenile and for society (Torbet, et al., July 1996).

The issue of juveniles who commit violent or serious crime is sensitive. Correctional programming for these juveniles is also very complicated. Two of the trends

in programming include sentencing and incarcerating juveniles as if they were adults, and graduated incarceration in which juveniles are sentenced as adults, but incarcerated in juvenile detention facilities until they reach adulthood and are transferred to an adult jail (Torbet, et al., July 1996). Funding and capacity issues are major hurdles in most states (Torbet, et al., July 1996). Although new laws are passed, plans are not in place for either paying for the changes or developing implementation mechanisms (Torbet, et al., July 1996).

Revisions are being made to laws regarding confidentiality of juvenile records to make them more open (Torbet, et al., July 1996). Implementation issues include the quality and completeness of juvenile records, disclosure of outcomes of juvenile proceedings, and judicial authority to close proceedings (Torbet, et al., July 1996).

The final trend noted by the authors (Torbet, et al., July 1996) involves victims of juvenile crime becoming “active participants” in the juvenile justice system. Fairness of the system can become an issue with the new or expanded use of reparation and restitution (Torbet, et al., July 1996).

Since 1992, substantive changes have been made by 48 of the 51 State legislatures in the United States to target juvenile offenders (Torbet, et al., July 1996). A problem with the changes is that, in most cases, they have not been tested to determine if expanding adult systems to juvenile offenders is effective (Torbet, et al., July 1996).

Economic sanctions, such as restitution, are becoming more popular as decision makers are forced to deal with the rising cost of crime. Three types of economic sanctions were studied between 1994 and 2000 by Barry Ruback (June 2004) in *The Imposition of Economic Sanctions in Philadelphia: Costs, Fines, and Restitution*. Fines are defined as a

monetary penalty imposed on the offender by and payable to the state (Ruback, June 2004). The economic sanction referred to as costs, is an attempt on the part of the state to recover all or part of the costs for prosecuting, confining or supervising the offender (Ruback, June 2004). Restitution is the court-ordered requirement that funds be paid by the offender to the victims to help compensate for the losses as a result of the crime (Ruback, June 2004). The Ruback report (June 2004) concludes that fines have little penalty value, especially to more affluent offenders, costs are used as a funding mechanism rather than as a deterrent, and restitution programs have not been successful because offenders often lack the ability to pay because restitution generally follows other obligations, and collection rates are low due to unclear responsibility about monitoring, collecting, disbursing and enforcing payment (Ruback, June 2004).

In 2004, Tanya Eiserer wrote an article for the Dallas Morning News titled, *Costs of Crime*. Eiserer (2004) interviewed Chief Kunkle, who had been in his position for a few months at that time, about the police department budget being cut during the 1990s while the city policymakers proclaimed crime-fighting as a high priority. Kunkle believes that to keep the economy of a city strong, neighborhoods must be welcoming and worthy of investment (Eiserer 2004). Crime was increasing in certain poverty-ridden areas of Dallas and because the crime risk was so high, builders avoided it, according to Jeff Dworkin, president of a home building company in Dallas (Eiserer, 2004). If the problem of crime-ridden neighborhoods is not dealt with, there is an economic impact on the entire city because of a slow-growing tax base, according to Eiserer (2004).

In 1993, Minneapolis, Minnesota Police Chief Anthony Bouza wrote, *How to Stop Crime*. Bouza (1993) points to the United States failure to address poverty and

racism as the fuel for high levels of violence and murder. The criminal justice system has focused on controlling the offender, rather than educating or assisting with employment (Bouza, 1993). Bouza (1993) also states that although society has come to view crime as commonplace and are somewhat deadened to its impact, that the public would be open to and accept a complex, long-term, and thoughtful approach to crime prevention. Bouza (1993) believes that the “lock-em-up” agendas of Presidents Nixon, Reagan and Bush failed to provide the promised levels of safety, and that if nothing has been done to help a juvenile prior to being incarcerated, it may well be too late already.

The Minnesota Planning office (March 1996) makes the point that investing in prevention initiatives will not show immediate cost savings, rather it will take 15 to 20 years for the return on investment to be felt. Better data is also needed to scientifically link the money being spent on prevention efforts to future cost savings (Minnesota Planning, March 1996). The cost to construct an 800-bed prison in 1996 was between \$80 million and \$100 million with an annual operating cost of \$25 million (Minnesota Planning, March 1996). In the end, the escalating costs for prison construction and operation takes away from the funds available for prevention and healthy child development programs (Minnesota Planning, March 1996).

Our justice system is made up of many laws and mandates that are designed to mete out justice in a fair and impartial manner. The mandates are generally reactive to laws that have been broken, rather than proactive, which try to prevent the crime from being committed. If more focus were placed on preventing crime from happening in the first place, the expense of criminal prosecution, public defense, court and jury trials, law enforcement, incarceration, out of home placement, and probation would be reduced. As

has been pointed out by a number of researchers, to reduce crime, government decision makers would need to rethink their resource allocation policies and provide funding for research-based juvenile crime prevention programming for the children who are at the highest risk to commit serious and violent crimes into adulthood.

CHAPTER III

How Effective are Crime Prevention Programs?

“I mean it - I’m going to fucking kill you!” yelled Joey (fictitious name) at his elementary school teacher (Melton and Beuhring, May 1, 2001). These are serious, violent, and shocking words from a seven-year old boy. By the time Joey was nine, he had already been expelled from two elementary schools for threatening to kill his teacher. Joey is not alone. He is a good example of a child that falls into the category of high or very high-risk children, who previously fell through the cracks (Melton and Beuhring, May 1, 2001). He is in fourth grade, but is far behind academically. He has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and does not receive his medication on a regular basis. Joey’s mother is single, has a criminal history, and is a recovering addict (Melton and Beuhring, May 1, 2001). His father also has an extensive criminal record, which includes assaulting a police officer and domestic violence. All of Joey’s brothers and sisters are violent and use drugs. The family moves often requiring a change in schools, and they live in a high-crime neighborhood. Joey and his family are receiving services through a juvenile crime prevention program in Ramsey County, Minnesota called ACE (All Children Excel) (Melton and Beuhring, May 1, 2001).

Joey is part of the adolescent population that is at very high risk of becoming a serious, violent and chronic offender. The incidence of young children being the victims

and perpetrators of violent crime is increasing. Trends show that child delinquency is becoming more serious. Snyder (November 2001) stated that approximately 50 percent of very young offenders become serious, violent, and chronic juvenile delinquents. In 1997, child delinquents accounted for one in three juvenile arrests for arson, one in five for criminal sexual conduct, and one in 12 for violent offenses (Snyder, November 2001). And then the children grow up.

Crime Prevention Successes, Failures and Challenges

Dr. Scott Henggeler (1998) stated there was a “violence epidemic” in the 1990s. He points to the doubling of the homicide rate and a 50 percent increase in serious, violent crime between 1984 and 1994 as evidence of this epidemic. The problem, as Henggeler (1998) sees it, is that most of the juvenile crime prevention resources are being used in untested programs. A vast majority of the programs are not being evaluated primarily because there is little support for the evaluation component (Henggeler, 1998). With so little money allocated to prevention efforts, it is sometimes difficult for program managers to siphon off a portion of those funds for identifying measurable outcomes and evaluating results. Henggeler (1998) notes that few of the recommended programs name reductions in violent behavior as a desired outcome.

In the *2003 Report to Congress on the Title V Community Prevention Grants Program* (2005), the administrator of the United States Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), J. Robert Flores, stated that OJJDP is committed to using a research-based approach in determining effectiveness. In the OJJDP (2005) report, it was noted that great progress has been made over the past 10

years in determining what works and what does not work in preventing delinquency. OJJDP (2005) completed a long-term evaluation of prevention efforts funded through Title V Community Prevention Grants to assess program implementation and outcomes. The research questions OJJDP (2005) asked about effectiveness included describing the impact of the program “on risk factors, protective factors, and juvenile problem behavior” and the factors that lead to successful implementation of the program and positive outcomes. Measurable outcomes and ongoing evaluation are essential to determining qualitative and quantitative effectiveness of crime prevention programs.

Richard Mendel (2001) listed the eight challenges for juvenile justice reform as developing a continuum of community-based sanctions and interventions for non-dangerous juvenile offenders and reducing the amount of time they are incarcerated, reducing delinquency through the use of research-proven prevention program strategies, identifying and providing intensive prevention services for the youth at extreme risk for chronic delinquency, comprehensively supporting juveniles with behavioral disturbances, providing quality treatment and healthy development services for youth who are incarcerated, helping juveniles outgrow delinquency through quality educational and career development opportunities, and reducing inappropriate detention of youth waiting for their trial or out-of-home placement. Identifying and targeting children at highest risk is one of the major challenges focused on by Mendel and several other researchers.

Hawkins, Herrenkohl, Farrington, Brewer, Catalano, Harachi, and Cothorn (April 2000) grouped predictors of youth violence into five domains: individual, family, school, peer-related, and community and neighborhood factors. Targeting the risk factors that are most likely to be changeable is necessary for an intervention to be effective (Hawkins, et

al., April 2000). Using multi-component interventions may be more effective in preventing violence than targeting a single risk factor (Hawkins, et al., April 2000).

Since proving crime prevention effectiveness is critical, tools to measure and evaluate qualitative and quantitative outcomes are necessary. Assessment and evaluation tools have been developed to measure the level of risk for a child becoming a serious, violent and chronic offender and, once identified, evaluating the effectiveness of crime prevention efforts being used to direct that child onto a different path.

Accurate Assessment to Prevent a Lifetime of Crime

If assessment of a child's level of risk is inaccurate, the possibility of providing the correct services to direct the child away from a lifetime of crime is in jeopardy. Going back to the health analogy, although penicillin was an incredible discovery and has likely saved thousands, if not millions of lives, it cannot be used to cure a child's broken arm. A cast is required to correct the break, which could be followed up with physical therapy for long-term recovery. If the child, on the other hand, has pneumonia, penicillin would likely be the best option, and clearly a cast would not be needed or applied. Over- or under-compensation or the wrong treatment to a given health problem, may have serious repercussions. Preventing juvenile crime is similar in that incorrect identification of the problem could result in costly and ineffective services being provided. To achieve the outcome of preventing juvenile crime, the level and type of problem needs to be matched with the appropriate services. For a doctor, answering the question of whether she or he is dealing with a broken arm or pneumonia is pretty simple. The doctor needs x-rays and other tests for diagnoses and then determines the appropriate treatment. The juvenile

crime professional also needs an accurate assessment tool to determine the level of risk and what services would likely work best to prevent juvenile crime. Following are overviews of several juvenile crime assessment tools.

An assessment and evaluation tool was developed for ACE (All Children Excel) in 1999 in Ramsey County, Minnesota. ACE focuses on six through nine year-olds who are at high or very high risk of becoming lifetime criminals, according to the Risk and Protective Factor Profile Instrument® developed for ACE by Beuhring (October 2000). A confidential screening is held using the Risk and Protective Factor Profile Instrument®. Three scales, child, context, and interaction, are used to determine the final risk score (Beuhring, October 2000). The Child Scale range is from zero to six and assesses four risk factors: referring offense (severity for age and intention); behavior history (aggression, torture of animals, arson, theft, vandalism, drug abuse, risk of suicide, sexual behavior, lying and gang membership); child risk factors (history of abuse or neglect and likelihood of academic failure); and the child's temperament (volatile, impulsive or socially isolated) (Beuhring, October 2000). The Context Scale also ranges from zero to six and includes four risk factors: parent (family disorganization, criminal history, drug abuse, mental health, domestic violence, and abuse or neglect of other children in the family); sibling and peers (delinquency and problem behaviors); and community (neighborhood disorganization, student climate, and school or neighborhood resources) (Beuhring, October 2000). The Interaction Scale ranges from zero to nine and is calculated based on the interaction between temperament and context (Beuhring, October 2000). The final Risk Score ranges from zero to seven and is an average of the child, context, and interaction scale scores (Beuhring, October 2000). To complete the Risk and

Protective Factor Profile Instrument® a list of objective indicators or interviews are used (Beuhring, October 2000). All data collection is accessed in accordance with statutory regulations on data privacy and may include interviews with school or law enforcement officials reporting the offense, or teachers, principals, school counselors or case workers attending the screening (Beuhring, October 2000). Information is also gathered regarding the child being assessed about prior contact with the police, suspensions from school, child protection records, and documented mental health or medical diagnoses. Data is also pulled together regarding the family, peers, and community and may include, financial assistance records, county, state, and federal police records, arrests and treatment by the county for drug abuse, police and court orders regarding domestic violence, child protections services records, local crime and poverty statistics, and the team's knowledge of the neighborhood and school (Beuhring, October 2000). A child scoring three or above is considered a high risk and needs long term intervention services (Beuhring, October 2000). The low to moderate risk group (score of 2.9 or less) still needs services, but short-term programs are considered more cost effective (Beuhring, October 2000).

Another assessment and evaluation tool used by a number of juvenile crime prevention programs across the country is the Child and Adolescent Functional Assessment Scale (CAFAS®) (Hodges, 2000). The scoring within CAFAS® is summarized as followed:

- 1) Scale Scores for Youth's Functioning – Role performance
(School/work, Home, Community); Behavior toward others;

- Moods/self-harm, Moods/emotions, Self-harmful behavior; Substance use; Thinking;
- 2) Scale Scores for Caregiver's Resources – Material needs; Family/Social support;
 - 3) Risk Behaviors – Youth's functioning (includes issues about suicide, harm to others or self, aggression, sexual behavior, fire setting; runaway; psychotic or organic symptoms; severe substance abuse); and
 - 4) Caregiver Resourcefulness (Hodges, 2000).

Both an eight-scale sum and five-scale sum are provided in CAFAS® to measure the level of overall dysfunction (Hodges, 2000).

The Minnesota Department of Human Services (June/July 2003) developed a screening tool specifically designed for use in health care settings for adolescents aged 12 and older. The tool was developed to help identify risk areas and provide guidance on the appropriate intervention or effort to be undertaken (Minnesota Department of Human Services, June/July 2003). The Adolescent Health Review is a computerized instrument and is available online at <http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/HealthCare/screeningtools.htm>.

Catalano and Hawkins (1995) developed a comprehensive matrix of risk factors and adolescent problem behaviors. Risk factors in the community included the availability of drugs and firearms, community laws and norms favoring drug use, firearms and crime, violence portrayed in the media, lack of permanency and low neighborhood attachment, and extreme poverty (Catalano and Hawkins, 1995). Family risk factors described by Catalano and Hawkins (1995) included a history of problem behavior, management problems, conflict, and parents attitudes and involvement in

problem behavior. Early and persistent antisocial behavior, early academic failure, and lack of commitment are risk factors identified by Catalano and Hawkins (1995) in school settings. Individual and peer risk factors include being rebellious, having friends who are engaged in and have favorable attitudes toward problem behaviors, exhibiting problem behaviors in early childhood, and constitutional factors (Catalano and Hawkins, 1995).

Although incarceration prevents crime while the individual is confined and may deter others from committing crime, it is also used for accountability or punishment that have nothing to do with deterrence and risk reduction, according to David Altschuler and Troy Armstrong (September 2002). Altschuler and Armstrong (September 2002) point out that criminal history or severity alone should not be the only factors taken into consideration when determining if a juvenile is at high risk of becoming a serious and violent offender.

A disproportionate number of crimes are committed by a sub-group of offenders who are persistent predators (Bouza, 1993). The Rand Corporation developed a scale to predict criminality: previous conviction for the same charge; being incarcerated for more than 50 percent of the previous two years; a conviction before age 16; having spent time in a state juvenile facility; drug abuse during the last two years or while a juvenile, and being unemployed for more than 50 percent of the preceding two years (Bouza, 1993).

The intervention challenge with high and very high-risk children is to assess accurately the accumulation of risks, severity of risks, and interaction between temperament and context to distinguish between young offenders who are on the path to criminal careers and those who require short-term services (Beuhring, July 2002). This research and that of others points out that an accurate assessment of the risk level of

children is critical to providing appropriate services – from both a healthy child development and an economic perspective. The common thread with each of the assessment and evaluation tools discussed is that a variety of factors are used to determine risk. Just as there is no single reason a child turns to crime, there is no single answer as to how to change that path. If the right juvenile crime prevention strategy is chosen for the right child, success in preventing crime is more likely to result.

Juvenile Crime Prevention Efforts

This chapter asks how effective programs are at actually preventing crime. The answer to effectiveness is tied to whether or not measurable outcomes have been developed for the efforts and whether or not they are being evaluated on an ongoing basis. Over the years, researchers have assessed and evaluated specific crime prevention efforts after implementation has taken place. However, it appears that more recently research and evidence-based crime prevention programs, with built-in evaluation components, are becoming the norm. Regardless of the method of evaluating outcomes, researchers found some of the crime prevention programs to be stunning successes and others dismal failures.

Timothy Thornton, Carole Craft, Linda Dahlberg, Barbara Lynch and Katie Baer (September 2002) begin *Best Practices of Youth Violence Prevention, A Sourcebook for Community Action*, by offering startling data regarding homicide rates in the United States. In 1999, more than 3,200 young people aged 19 and under were victims of homicide. The average was nine deaths per day (Thornton, et al., September 2002). For 15 to 19-year olds, homicide is the second leading cause of death, and among ten to 14-

year olds, it is third (Thornton, et al., September 2002). Thornton, Craft, Dahlberg, Lynch and Baer (September 2002) discussed the importance of working with young children who are 10 and younger because their values, attitudes, and interpersonal skills, which are still being developed, play a key role in violent behavior.

Gail Wasserman, Laurie Miller, and Lynn Cothorn (April 2000) broke down three approaches to prevention of serious and violent juvenile offending – universal, selected, or indicated. Universal programs address an entire population of children and address community-level risks rather than individual delinquency prevention (Wasserman, et al., April 2000). Selected programs target high-risk children with some antisocial behavior, and indicated programs address juveniles who have clear signs of delinquency or antisocial behavior (Wasserman, et al., April 2000).

Wasserman, Miller and Cothorn (April 2000) also describe the three levels of prevention available for universal, selected or indicated program populations. Primary prevention addresses a disease or disorder (Wasserman, et al., April 2000). Secondary prevention programs focus on detecting early signs of a disorder and correcting the problem (Wasserman, et al., April 2000). Tertiary prevention programs deal with the damage caused by a disorder (Wasserman, et al., April 2000).

In an attempt to assess juvenile crime prevention efforts that are likely to be effective, Thornton, Craft, Dahlberg, Lynch and Baer (September 2002) overviewed four strategies for reducing juvenile crime: Parent- and family-based; Home visiting; Social-cognitive, and Mentoring. The parent- and family-based strategy is intended to improve family relationships. Research demonstrates that working with the parents of high-risk children is very effective (Thornton, et al., September 2002). Based on this research, the

advice given by Thornton, et al. (September 2002) is that a program should not be afraid of targeting high-risk families. The home-visiting strategy, as its name indicates, brings the resources from the community to the at-risk family in their home. This type of intervention improves parenting skills, provides a social network, deals with behavior problems, and promotes healthy child development (Thornton, et al., September 2002). The social-cognitive strategy is meant to improve the social problem solving skills of youth. Although social-cognitive interventions show short-term reductions in aggressive behavior, long-term evaluation has not been done. One of the limitations to this type of intervention is that the more violent youth are not being reached because they do not attend traditional schools (Thornton, et al., September 2002). Mentoring as a strategy provides very little scientific evidence as to its effectiveness (Thornton, et al., September 2002). At the same time, Thornton, et al. (September 2002) noted that a positive adult role model is a key protective factor against violent behavior.

The four crime prevention priorities listed by Currie (1998) are the prevention of child abuse and neglect, enhancing a child's intellectual and social development, supporting and guiding vulnerable adolescents, and intensive work with juvenile offenders. Many programs, especially those working closely with youthful offenders and their families, have been proven effective at reducing abuse and neglect (Currie, 1998).

Burns, Howell, Wiig, Augimeri, Welsh, Loeber and Petechik (March 2003) provided an overview of several programs from around the country as examples of cost effective interventions. Examples included:

- 1) The Michigan Early Offender Program – It provides specialized, intensive, in-home interventions for children 13 and under. Outcomes

included lower recidivism rates, reduced and shorter out-of-home placements, and improved relationships and behavior (Burns, et al., March 2003).

- 2) The Minnesota Delinquents Under 10 Program – This program was implemented in Hennepin County and used a community-based approach that integrated service delivery to improve behavior and school attendance (Burns, et al., March 2003).
- 3) Sacramento County Community Intervention Program – Burns, et al. (March 2003) described the Sacramento County Community Intervention Program as targeting at risk children aged nine to 12. It is a community based and family focused intervention approach.
- 4) The Toronto Under 12 Outreach Project – This project combines social learning and behavioral system approaches (Burns, et al., March 2003).

Burns, et al. (March 2003) concluded that no single system is capable of achieving the desired outcomes of reducing crime and delinquency and saving money, but that an integrated approach is essential. An integrated approach means one that is holistic and impacts all aspects of a child's development, from family to school to peers to the neighborhoods and communities in which the child lives. Currie (1998) concurs that it is important to remember that there is no single solution for preventing violence. The most successful programs address the multiple problems faced by the juvenile in a variety of settings – in the family, including housing and employment, in the community, and in the health care and school systems (Currie, 1998). Currie (1998) concludes that the growth of community-based crime prevention programs has helped in lowering crime

rates. Finally, Wasserman, Miller and Cothorn (April 2000) refer to the limitations of any program that addresses only one type of risk factor. Wasserman, et al. (April 2000) state that because antisocial behavior is a result of several complex risk factors, services need to target multiple risk factors. Programs that involve the entire family have been shown to be more effective than those that deal with an individual child (Wasserman, et al., April 2000). Wasserman, Miller and Cothorn (April 2000) also stress the importance of any intervention having a theoretical base so that it can be systematically evaluated and replicated.

Mendel (2001) evaluates and presents two programs in detail, the “8 Percent” Program and the “Wraparound” approach used in Milwaukee. The Wraparound approach works to address problems in all aspects of the child’s environment (Mendel, 2001). Working with and listening to the whole family is one of the fundamental principles of the program. Services are individualized and based on the needs of each child and family. The focus is building on strengths and providing a support system for the child and their family. The Wraparound approach has produced impressive results – the daily population in costly residential treatment programs is down by over 60 percent and psychiatric hospitalization of adolescents has decreased by 80 percent (Mendel, 2001).

Byron Johnson (December 2001) examined the role of religion in reducing crime and delinquency. In general, Johnson (December 2001) found higher levels of religious involvement resulted in reduced hypertension, suicide, rates of delinquency in youth and criminal activity in adults, levels of alcohol and drug abuse, and incidences of depression and promiscuous sexual behaviors. Although Johnson (December 2001) concludes that

the positive results are encouraging, he also notes that the literature on the subject is limited.

In the search for the most effective juvenile crime prevention programs, Thomas Sexton (July 12, 2000) recommends finding programs that have been proven to work, are cost effective, can be replicated, and fit the needs of the community in which it is being implemented. The Center for the Study of Prevention of Violence (CSPV) Blueprint Program states that most programs do not work, but for those with strong research support that are proven effective over time, the impact on recidivism, delinquency, drug abuse, and mental health problems is great (Sexton, July 12, 2000). The ten Blueprint Programs listed as effective by the CSPV are: Midwestern Prevention Project, Big Brothers and Big Sisters, Functional Family Therapy, Quantum Opportunities, Life Skills Training, Multi Systemic Therapy, Nurse Home Visitation, Treatment Foster Care, Bullying Prevention Program, and PATHS (Sexton, July 12, 2000).

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention categorizes juvenile crime prevention programs implemented in the United States, according to the expected outcomes. Functional Family Therapy, which provides family therapy for children age six to 18, Multi Systemic Therapy Program, a comprehensive program for youth age 10 to 18, and Treatment Foster Care, which provides parent training for families with children age 12 to 18, were all listed in 1999 as Exemplary I Programs by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (strengtheningfamilies.org, n.d.).

Research on implementation costs for juvenile crime prevention programs was somewhat limited. In the researchers opinion, this may be due to regional cost differences, reluctance on the part of program developers to release the information to

non-subscribers, or the thought that expense information may be out of date by the time it is published. The researcher recognized that because decision makers weigh implementation costs against expected crime prevention outcomes, cost data is important. Costs and outcomes, to the extent information was available, are included in a matrix in the Conclusion section of this dissertation.

The United States Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention issued a report to Congress in 2003 detailing crime prevention programs that are either proven or promising strategies for effectively reducing crime. To demonstrate the usefulness of the taxpayer costs avoided through preventing crime tool, it is applied to five crime prevention programs from across the country.

The five strategies detailed below are: All Children Excel (ACE), Ramsey County, Minnesota; Multi Systemic Therapy (MST); The 8 Percent Solution, Orange County, California; Functional Family Therapy (FFT); and Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC). A case study on ACE is also provided in Chapter Four.

Determining the benefit gained by the expenditure of tax dollars is the basic premise of the research in this dissertation. Where applicable, previous cost-benefit analyses completed for the five programs are also described.

A) All Children Excel (ACE)

In the *First Year Report to the McKnight Foundation, ALL CHILDREN EXCEL (ACE): Family Intervention for Children at Risk of Becoming Serious, Violent, and Chronic Offenders*, Melton and Beuhring (May 1, 2001) list the components of the ACE model as:

- 1) Police and/or school referral for a delinquent act;
- 2) Accurate identification of child at high risk of becoming chronic, serious, and violent offenders by screening for risk;
- 3) Establishment of intervention goals for school attendance and performance, social competency, skill building, connection to caring adults, and parenting skills;
- 4) Coordination of clinical supervision and community case managers through the Integrated Services Delivery Team;
- 5) Collaboration between schools and child protection staff;
- 6) Adoption of a “no drop” policy; and
- 7) Constant evaluation as a primary goal to determine cost and crime reduction benefits.

Deborah Locke’s (February 13, 2003) article in the *St. Paul Pioneer Press* focuses on ACE. Locke (February 13, 2003) references the increase in violent crimes being committed by children under the age of 12 – between 1987 and 1998 the problem has increased three-fold. About 70 percent of the 64 children in ACE had no recent contact with the police and two-thirds were no longer disruptive in school (Locke, February 13, 2003). The benefits of ACE affect the child’s entire family, school, and social environment (Locke, February 13, 2003). Locke (February 13, 2003) states that Ramsey County’s ACE program makes a lot of sense when you consider the tangible and intangible costs of not preventing serious crime.

Helping America’s Youth website was accessed on July 15, 2006 and contained a review of ACE. The evaluation design used by ACE is quasi-experimental pretest-posttest with a nonequivalent comparison group (helpingamericasyouth.gov, n.d.). Risk

and protective factors were grouped into five categories: individual, family, school, community and peer (helpingamericasyouth.gov, n.d.).

Effectiveness data for ACE on achieving its stated, measurable goals is provided in the research. Outcomes for ACE reported on the Helping America's Youth website included:

- 57 percent of the children in the comparison group were charged with a subsequent offense six or more months after screening while only 35 percent of the ACE treatment group re-offended;
- Comparison group children will, on average re-offend within two and one half years of the intervention compared with an average of three and one half years for the treatment group;
- The probability of a child in the comparison group re-offending was 20 percentage points higher than for a child in the ACE treatment group.

The measurable outcomes and estimated costs for implementing ACE are described in detail in the ACE case study in Chapter Four.

B) Multi Systemic Therapy (MST)

The principles of MST are understanding the link between the identified problems and their systemic context, emphasizing the positive and using strengths to make change, promoting responsibility, being focused on the present, targeting the sequences of problem behavior, being developmentally appropriate, providing continuous effort,

evaluating and being accountable, and empowering families to have their needs met across multiple systemic contexts (msts services.com, May 1999).

According to the University of Colorado at Boulder website, <http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/model/programs/MST.html>, visited on May 29, 2006, MST is an intensive family- and community-based program for high-risk adolescents and their families. The theoretical rationale for MST interventions is that it builds on the youth and family strengths, or protective factors, in a comprehensive and individualized manner. The primary goals outlined by Henggeler (1998) are reducing youth criminal activity and other types of antisocial behavior, and saving money while doing so, because the high cost of incarceration and out-of-home placements has been avoided.

The risk and protective factors used in MST fall into four categories: individual, family, school, and peer (helpingamericasyouth.gov, n.d.). Individual risk factors include anti-social behavior, early onset of aggression, tendency towards drug or alcohol use, and mental health issues (helpingamericasyouth.gov, n.d.). Family risk factors are a history of problem behavior in the family or a criminal parent, family management and parental supervision problems, and poor family attachment (helpingamericasyouth.gov, n.d.). Low academic achievement in school and association with delinquent or aggressive peers are the final risk factors (helpingamericasyouth.gov, n.d.). Protective factors include a perception of social support from adults and peers, effective parenting, good family relationships, positive school bonding, good relationships with peers, and positive peer group involvement (helpingamericasyouth.gov, n.d.).

The MST team, consisting of two to four therapists and their on-site supervisor, provides services to the client families 24 hours a day, seven days a week on an on-call basis during the course of the program (strengtheningfamilies.org, n.d.). The cost for implementing MST includes covering mileage for 8,000 to 12,000 miles per year per therapist plus \$15,000 to \$24,000 per team (strengtheningfamilies.org, n.d.). Each therapist handles a caseload of 15 families, bringing the cost to between \$400 and \$550 per youth served (strengtheningfamilies.org, n.d.). According to the website www.helpingmaerica-youth.gov (n.d.), MST therapists have small caseloads of four to six families and provide about 60 hours of contact during a four-month period.

The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) Model Programs website (accessed on July 15, 2006) describes the benefits to MST juveniles, ages 12 to 17, as having fewer arrests, spending less time in out-of-home placements, being significantly less likely to use substances, engaging in less aggressive behavior towards peers, and being less likely to be involved in committing a crime. The average cost per client in the MST group was about one-fifth the cost of an institutional placement (modelprograms.samhsa.gov, n.d.). Washington State Institute for Public Policy estimates a cost savings of \$31,000 to \$131,000 per youth in MST (modelprograms.samhsa.gov, n.d.).

In 1996 dollars, the cost of MST was approximately \$4,000 per juvenile, compared to traditional services costing over \$10,000 (mstservices.com, n.d.). According to a cost analysis performed by Schoenwald, Ward, Henggeler, Pickrel and Patel in 1996, the incremental costs of MST were nearly offset in the first year reduction in out-of-home placement costs (mstservices.com, n.d.). In a cost-benefit analysis completed on MST in

1998, MST costs were about \$4,500 per juvenile and proved to be very cost-effective (Henggeler, 1998). As an alternative to high cost psychiatric hospitalization, MST reduced days hospitalized by 85 percent, according to the Simpsonville Study (mstservices.com, n.d.). The approximate cost in 2004 for MST was \$5,000 per youth (evidencebasedprograms.org, 2002-2004).

Funding for MST does not come from one funding mechanism, but rather from a variety of creative sources, such as Medicaid reimbursement for rehabilitative services, shifting money from residential treatment programs or out-of-home placement budgets to MST, or making home-based MST a state rate eligible expense as a component of the continuum of care plan for seriously emotionally disturbed youth (mstservices.com, n.d.).

MST was developed to help address the mental health needs for serious juvenile offenders (mstservices.com, n.d.). The limitations of existing services included minimal effectiveness, low accountability for outcomes, and high costs (mstservices.com, n.d.). Numerous clinical trials on MST have demonstrated its effectiveness in reducing rates of long-term criminal offending and out-of-home placements, decreasing recidivism and mental health problems for serious juvenile offenders, improving family functioning and achieving these outcomes at a cost savings when compared with traditional mental health and juvenile justice services (mstservices.com, n.d.).

Because MST was developed in the 1970s, it has one of the longest track records of verifiable efficacy. The data from four such studies are presented below.

The Simpsonville study on the results of MST showed that there were significantly fewer re-arrests at the 59-week follow-up, and at 2.4 years, MST youths were half as likely to recidivate compared to those who received traditional services

(helpingamericasyouth.gov, n.d.). The long-term reduction rate of re-arrest is 25 to 70 percent, out-of-home placement reductions are 47 to 64 percent, and family functioning was greatly improved (Henggeler, 1998).

In the Missouri Delinquency Project, 200 offenders and their families were studied (mstservices.com, May 1999). The average number of previous arrests was 4.2, 64 percent had been incarcerated for at least four weeks, the average age was 14.8 years, 67 percent were male and 33 percent were female, 30 percent were African-American and 70 percent were Caucasian, and 47 percent lived with one parental figure (mstservices.com, May 1999). The initial outcomes, after MST treatment, showed significant increases in family cohesion and adaptability, family supportiveness and decreases in family hostility, parental symptoms, and behavior problems in the children in the family (mstservices.com, May 1999). Four years after completing MST, it was found effective at preventing violent, drug-related, and other criminal offending and decreasing the seriousness of crimes that were committed (mstservices.com, May 1999).

Results of two studies were included in the *2002-2004 Excel Gov. Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy, Social Programs That Work* report. In Study One, four years after MST services were provided, 26 percent of the MST group had been arrested at least once compared to 71 percent of the control group, there was an 88 percent reduction in the average number of arrests, and the MST participants arrests were for less serious crimes (evidencebasedprograms.org, 2002-2004). At 13.7 years after the MST intervention, when the average age of the participant was 29, there was a 54 percent reduction in the average number of arrests, a 56 percent reduction in arrests for violent crimes, and a 57 percent reduction in the average number of days the person was

incarcerated as an adult (evidencebasedprograms.org, 2002-2004). In Study Two, four years after MST was completed, the participants had 75 percent fewer convictions for aggressive crimes (evidencebasedprograms.org, 2002-2004). MST had no effect on property crime and its impact was unclear on drug use, according to Study Two (evidencebasedprograms.org, 2002-2004).

C) The 8 Percent Solution

The core elements of the 8 Percent Solution program (named for the eight percent of youth who will ultimately commit up to 70 percent of all serious and violent adolescent crime) are all-day academic and development programming, involving the entire family in the intervention and in counseling, and focusing on the issue of substance abuse (Mendel, 2001).

In June 1999, Michael Schumacher was the Chief Probation Officer for Orange County, California. Schumacher was in charge of a report, in which 6,400 first-time offenders were studied to determine the small portion of juveniles who will become serious, repeat offenders (Orange County, June 1999). The study concluded that only eight percent of those studied committed four or more offenses within three years and that 70 percent did not commit a second offense (Orange County, June 1999). The remaining 22 percent committed two or three offenses (Orange County, June 1999). Because this eight percent committed over half of the repeat offenses in Orange County, it was important to identify the key characteristics of these high-risk juveniles so that services could be targeted to prevent future criminal acts (Orange County, June 1999).

The juveniles age 15 or younger who are at the highest-risk of becoming repeat offenders have at least three of the four key characteristics identified in the Orange County study (June 1999). The four characteristics of children in this eight percent population include: 1) Serious problems at home, such as abuse, neglect, or criminal family member; 2) Behavioral problems at school, truancy, and poor grades; 3) Drugs or alcohol abuse; and 4) Indicators of delinquency, such as being a member of a gang, running away or stealing (Orange County, June 1999).

To be effective in reducing crime and the seriousness of offenses committed, services provided as part of the 8 Percent Solution focused on the family, not just the referred child (Orange County, June 1999). On-site services at the Youth and Family Resource Center in Orange County included probation staff and a substance abuse counselor being available, educational opportunities and tutoring, transportation to school and other activities, age-appropriate recreation, community services and life skill classes, and mental and physical health care (Orange County, June 1999). The program staff met weekly to review the services being provided for each child in the program (Orange County, June 1999). The cost for the 8 Percent Solution program in Orange County was estimated at \$14,000 per individual per year (Mendel, 2001).

A study was completed in 1987 on the recidivism rate of juveniles in Orange County, California (Kurz and Moore, March 1994). A six-year follow up on the 1987 study revealed that the average time incarcerated for a chronic juvenile offender was almost 20 months, costing taxpayers \$44,000 each (Kurz and Moore, March 1994). Since 500 new cases are referred to the 8 Percent Solution program each year, the potential cost savings each year is \$22 million for incarceration alone (Kurz and Moore, March 1994).

Gwen Kurz and Louis Moore of the County of Orange Probation Department reported on the impact of the 8 Percent Solution on preventing juvenile crime in March 1994. The Kurz and Moore (March 1994) conclusions regarding implementation of the 8 Percent Solution were:

- 1) Chronic juvenile recidivism can be reduced by aggressively treating high-risk juvenile offenders and their families;
- 2) A significant number of chronic juvenile offenders can be successfully identified and provided with targeted services at the time of their first offense;
- 3) Juvenile Justice System effectiveness can be increased through sharing of information related to risk factors;
- 4) Major benefits can be realized for many years to come by cooperatively empowering and building the families of high-risk juveniles; and
- 5) Even if only modest reductions in recidivism rates occur, long-term savings can be realized.

D) Functional Family Therapy (FFT)

Functional Family Therapy targets at risk children aged 11 to 18 ([colorado.edu](http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/model/programs/FFT.html), n.d.). The website <http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/model/programs/FFT.html> describes the phases of FFT as engagement, motivation, assessment, behavior change, and generalization. There is an average of 12 home visits per family over a 90-day

period (colorado.edu, n.d.). FFT is an outcome-driven, prevention/intervention program, which enhances protective factors and reduces risk (colorado.edu, n.d.).

For a 90-day FFT program averaging 12 home visits per family, the cost ranges from \$1,350 to \$3,750 (colorado.edu, n.d.). Clinical trials of FFT show that for juveniles and families it can effectively treat problem behaviors, reduce the use of social services, stop adolescents from being involved in the adult criminal system, and prevent future problems for younger children in the family (colorado.edu, n.d.).

The average cost of FFT in Clark County, Nevada, as reported in the December 2000 Juvenile Justice Bulletin (Wilson), were between \$700 and \$1,000 per family. At the same time, the average cost per adolescent was \$6,000 or more for incarceration and at least \$13,500 for participation in the Clark County residential treatment program (Wilson, December 2000). The three-year recidivism rate for the Clark County residential treatment program was more than 90 percent compared to a 19.8 percent recidivism rate at one year for FFT (Wilson, December 2000). A Washington State Study cited by Aos, Barnoski, and Lieb in 1998, stated that FFT saved up to \$14,000 per family (Wilson, December 2000). FFT has been proven effective and costs taxpayers much less, according to Wilson (December 2000).

The New York State Office of Mental Health website cited data from the December 2000 OJJDP Bulletin about the effectiveness of FFT. Youth and their families receiving FFT had recidivism rates of just over 20 percent, as compared to a recidivism rate of about 90 percent for residential treatment cases (omh.state.ny.us, n.d.).

The outcome studies completed by the founders of FFT, Sexton and Alexander, indicated recidivism can be reduced between 25 percent and 60 percent when FFT is

correctly implemented (omh.state.ny.us, n.d.). Alexander (1999/2001) reports a 50 to 75 percent recidivism reduction for less serious offenders and a 35 percent reduction in the re-offense rate for very severe cases (Alexander, 1999/2001).

E) Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC)

Patricia Chamberlain led the development and implementation of the first MTFC in 1983 in Lane County, Oregon (mtfc.com, n.d.). MTFC targets teenagers who are at risk of incarceration with a history of chronic and severe criminal behavior (colorado.edu, n.d.). Community families are recruited and trained to provide a living environment for the at risk youth that emphasizes behavior management (colorado.edu, n.d.). The goal of MTFC is to reduce antisocial behavior, emotional disturbance, and delinquency through an intervention providing corrective or therapeutic parenting to troubled adolescents (nexuskids.org, n.d.). The website, <http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/model/programs/MTFC.html> also describes the importance of frequent contact between the MTFC case manager and the probation officer, teachers, work supervisors and other adults.

MTFC places adolescents with chronic antisocial behavior, emotional disturbance, and delinquency in a family setting for six to nine months (helpingamericasyouth.gov, n.d.). Clinical trials were conducted from 1990 to 1996 with 79 male juvenile offenders aged 12 to 17 (helpingamericasyouth.gov, n.d.). Participants were randomly assigned to MTFC or group care for an average of seven months (helpingamericasyouth.gov, n.d.).

The cost per youth per month for MTFC is \$2,691 (colorado.edu, n.d.). With the average length of stay in MTFC at seven months, the total average cost is \$18,837 per participant (colorado.edu, n.d.). The estimated savings from the MTFC placement versus being hospitalized averaged \$10,280 per case (helpingamericasyouth.gov, n.d.). According to the website www.evidencebasedprograms.org, in 2004, the average MTFC cost per month is \$3,100, which is 30 to 50 percent lower than residential group care (evidencebasedprograms.org, n.d.).

A report on MTFC cost-effectiveness measured benefits per participant in two ways, including only taxpayer benefits and including taxpayer and crime victim benefits (mtfc.com, n.d.). The taxpayer savings was estimated at \$21,836 per MTFC participant and when crime victim's benefits are included, the cost savings rose to \$87,622 each (mtfc.com, n.d.). When taxpayer and crime victim benefits are included, the benefit-to-cost ratio is \$43.70 for every dollar spent (mtfc.com, n.d.).

The effectiveness of MTFC in preventing crime has been measured and reported on by researchers. In a PowerPoint presentation by Patricia Chamberlain, the significant positive outcomes of MTFC as compared to Group Care are listed for boys as having fewer runaways, less time incarcerated, 50 percent fewer criminal offenses, and being less likely to commit violent crimes (Bluestone, January 2004). Girls participating in MTFC also experienced fewer runaways and were incarcerated 62 percent fewer days, had 32 percent less symptom severity on mental health problems, and 42 percent fewer arrests than Group Care (Bluestone, January 2004).

The emphasis of MTFC is on preventing contact between the severely delinquent youths and their delinquent peers (evidencebasedprograms.org, n.d.). At the two-year

follow-up, MTFC participants, compared to the control group, were much less likely to commit one or more violent offense (21 percent versus 38 percent), or two or more violent offenses (5 percent versus 24 percent) (evidencebasedprograms.org, n.d.).

Prevention or Punishment – the Policy Choices

Berns and Drake (March 1999) in *Combining Child Welfare and Welfare Reform at a Local Level* looked to policymakers and agencies as the “architects, engineers, and builders of our system of services” and went on to state “It is up to us to design, consolidate, and build a system that meets the needs of our children and families.” Juvenile crime prevention efforts are expected to meet the needs of our high and very high-risk children and families and steering them away from a life of crime.

Vice President Al Gore served as chair of the President’s Crime Prevention Council (1997). Talking about the reinvention of government, Gore stated, “to be more effective, accountable and responsive, we must be committed to implementing programs and approaches that work and jettisoning those that do not” (President’s Crime Prevention Council, 1997). To be effective, accountable, and responsive regarding crime prevention, appropriate planning of prevention efforts is necessary. A comprehensive planning technique for juvenile crime prevention would use the following basic steps: identifying the planners; setting clear goals based on identified crime and violence; targeting the population that needs help; tailoring efforts to achieve goals for the targeted population; refining activity choices; and evaluating outcomes (President’s Crime Prevention Council, 1997).

Mendel (2001) estimates that between \$10 and \$15 billion was spent in 2000 to prosecute, supervise, punish, and treat juvenile offenders or to prevent crimes from taking place. Incarcerating a non-dangerous youthful offender in training schools or correctional boot camps has not been proven effective in rehabilitation and recidivism rates are high (Mendel, 2001). When the State of California started charging counties between 50 percent and 100 percent of the cost for incarcerating less serious juvenile offenders, admission rates fell by 41 percent within two years (Mendel, 2001). We are now in a better position to know which prevention efforts work and which ones do not (Currie, 1998). If a juvenile crime prevention program is ineffective, the money spent on implementing it will at best have minimal cost savings, and at worst, be wasted. For crime prevention programs that are effective, it is clear that they are far less costly than incarceration (Currie, 1998).

Chief Bouza (1993) states that the political will to do the right thing, take risks, acknowledge failures, and meet the challenges associated with preventing crime, are required to be successful and win the “War on Crime”. Short-term efforts will not work – rather long-term, sensible strategies are needed (Bouza, 1993). In answer to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter, research shows that sensible strategies to effectively prevent crime are available.

By implementing programs proven to prevent crime, the potential qualitative benefits to society will come from preventing up to 70 percent of the serious and violent criminal acts committed by adolescents in our communities. Without proof of taxpayer costs avoided, however, the future of effective crime prevention programs could be difficult to obtain.

Chapter Five will describe how the crime-related costs included in the taxpayer costs avoided tool were determined. The use of this tool is expected to provide statistical evidence that an investment in preventing juvenile crime may be paid back to taxpayers and society many times over – that, indeed, an ounce of the right prevention is worth a pound of cure and a stitch in time not only saves nine, it can also save lives, human suffering and millions of tax dollars.

CHAPTER IV

A Case Study – All Children Excel

“Daniel”, an eight year-old screamed, “Fuck you, bitch!” at his teacher and was sent to the elementary school’s intervention room (Melton, February 2002). He kicked teachers, screamed profanities, tried to run away, and threw himself on the floor (Melton, February 2002). It took four adults to restrain Daniel until he appeared calm, but when they released him, his attacks resumed (Melton, February 2002). Daniel finally calmed down and began his time out (Melton, February 2002). School staff called police and talked about Daniel’s frequent violent episodes, absence from school, and dirty clothes and hair when he comes to school (Melton, February 2002). Records show that his mother is a chronic alcoholic, suffering from depression, his father is in jail, and Daniel has previous reports of theft and property damage, (Melton, February 2002). Daniel has witnessed domestic violence and lives in a high crime neighborhood (Melton, February 2002). His older sibling is a serious and violent juvenile offender in an out-of-state residential facility (Melton, February 2002). At age eight, Daniel, is on the same path into the criminal justice system as his sibling and father. Daniel lives in Ramsey County, Minnesota and is part of All Children Excel (ACE), which is one of four interventions in North America for children under 12, who, like Daniel, are at very high risk of becoming serious, violent and chronic juvenile (SVJ) offenders (Melton, February 2002).

The structure to develop the program that evolved into ACE was put in place in 1998 (Belton, et al., May 8, 2003). Key players were brought together to determine the best, research-based method to intervene in the lives of young offenders (Belton, et al., May 8, 2003). Key players included: research consultants, county department directors, police departments, schools, youth, youth-servicing community agencies, and parents (Belton, et al., May 8, 2003). Belton, et al. (May 8, 2003) describes the development group's research on the common themes from effective, successful interventions to prevent serious and violent juvenile delinquency as:


- 1) A public health approach focusing on healthy youth development;
- 2) Integration of multi-faceted services among multiple county departments, schools, police, and community agencies;
- 3) Collaboration of multi-modal efforts among juvenile justice, mental health, child welfare, school, and community-based systems;
- 4) In-community programs with non-judgmental and tenacious workers, which received the best response from children and families;
- 5) A program where one size does not fit all – to achieve cost-effectiveness, the intervention must fit the risk level of the child;
- 6) Unified school, county, and community services, which focus on changing specific problem behaviors and attitudes; and
- 7) Clear lines of accountability through the monitoring of costs and outcomes achieved.

The major components of ACE are accurately identifying the high risk population, coordinating multi-jurisdictional services, using multidisciplinary information

systems, implementing intensive in-home and in-community casework, continuously tracking costs to outcomes, and applying multidimensional evaluation (Ramsey County, n.d.). A multiple gate approach that matches services to risk is used for ACE (Belton, et al., May 8, 2003). The first gate is referral for a chargeable offense (Belton, et al., May 8, 2003). The second gate is a systematic review of risk factors, and the third gate takes special circumstances into consideration to refine the correct intervention for the child (Belton, et al., May 8, 2003).

The ACE Model involves school staff, law enforcement, a county attorney, a screening team to determine risk, and the integrated service delivery team recommending a short-term intervention or the long-term intervention to ACE (Frickson, July 18, 2006).

Figure IV.1 – The ACE Model:
Flow Chart (Frickson, July 18,2006)




The three main intervention options for young offenders in Ramsey County, Minnesota are:

- 1) If the child is ten or older at the time of the offense, charges can be filed and standard delinquency prosecution initiated;
- 2) If the child is under ten years old a CHIPS (Child in Need of Protection or Services) petition can be filed in Juvenile Court; and
- 3) The child can be referred to ACE (Belton, et al., May 8, 2003).

The first step for a possible ACE referral involves law enforcement, often after being called to an elementary school for violence against a teacher or other children.

Following is the ACE referral process (Belton, et al, May 8, 2003).



Once the referral is made and probable cause is determined, the ACE Screening Process begins. The first step in the screening process consists of collecting records related to the family, such as involvement with child protection, the criminal history of parents and delinquency or criminal history of siblings, mental health or chemical dependency history, how often the family has moved, number of police calls to the home, truancy records, and domestic violence history (Frickson, July 18, 2006). School staff and other professionals are then interviewed (Frickson, July 18, 2006). The interviews and records are used to determine the level of risk and appropriate intervention (Frickson, July 18, 2006). Between August 1999 and December 2005, 495 referrals were made to ACE, of which 377 met the screening criteria (Frickson, July 18, 2006). Of the 377 meeting the screening criteria, 144 were determined to be at high risk with the remaining 233 at low to moderate risk of becoming serious, violent, and chronic juvenile offenders (Frickson, July 18, 2006). The breakdown of offenses for which children under the age of ten were referred to ACE is provided below.

Table IV.1 – Offenses for ACE Screenings		
Offense	Percentage	Number
Property	43%	162
People, non-sexual	29%	111
Public order	16%	62
People, sexual	5%	19
Weapons	3%	13
Other	3%	9
Drugs	1%	1

(Frickson, July 18, 2006)

Demographic information was collected on the 240 ACE children meeting the screening criteria in 2003. Two children, or one percent, were four years old (Belton, et al., May 8, 2003). Ten five-year olds (four percent), 12 six-year olds (five percent) and 40 seven-year olds (17 percent) were referred to ACE (Belton, et al., May 8, 2003). The

highest percentage screened at 47 percent (113 children) were nine years old, followed by 63 eight year-olds at 26 percent (Belton, et al., May 8, 2003). Boys accounted for 86 percent of the cases. The highest ethnic background was African American at 55 percent, or 132 children (Belton, et al., May 8, 2003). Next were 73 (30 percent) Euro-American children, followed by 16 (seven percent) Hispanic American, 12 (five percent) Asian American, and seven (three percent) Native American children (Belton, et al., May 8, 2003). Family context measures indicated 82 percent (197) of the children's parents are convicted criminals and 58 percent (140) of the parents were using illegal drugs (Belton, et al., May 8, 2003). Sixty-nine percent (166) of the families had a child protection history and 56 percent (135) experienced or witnessed domestic violence (Belton, et al., May 8, 2003).

The average turnaround time from the day a child commits a crime to the day the appropriate intervention is identified is 30 days (Belton, et al., May 8, 2003). The average time it takes the police and schools to submit a written referral to ACE is 19 calendar days (Belton, et al., May 8, 2003). Review of the case, collection of data, making arrangements for talking to school staff and other professionals, and holding the screening meeting is, on average, 11 days (Belton, et al., May 8, 2003).

The ACE Risk and Protective Factor Profile Instrument® is used to make sure there is a proper fit between the risk level and chosen intervention. Two case histories of children committing similar offenses, but with differing risk factors and, therefore, different interventions, were provided in a February 2003 Ramsey County report.

Table IV.2 – Risk Factor Profiles – Different Risk Scores for Similar Offenses		
Child	Male, 8 years old (third grade)	Male, 9 years old (fourth grade)
Offense	Broke windows at school. One co-offender (age 8)	Broke windows in a home. Two co-offenders (ages 9, 10)
Score*	1.2 (STI group)	5.8 (LTI group)
History	Child shows little evidence of aggression or other problem behaviors. Single mother has no criminal or drug history; she is employed. Father is a drug addict and schizophrenic, but there is no evidence of domestic violence or child abuse. Siblings show little evidence of behavior problems. Child's neighborhood is not ideal but it is not high-risk. Child's residence and school have been stable for three years. Child's reading and writing are at grade level.	Child is ADHD but does not get medication regularly. Child was expelled from two elementary schools for threatening to kill teachers. Single mother is a recovering addict with a criminal history. Father has an extensive criminal record, including assault on a police officer and domestic violence. Siblings are violent and use drugs. The family lives in a high-crime neighborhood. They move and change schools frequently. Child is far behind academically.

*On a scale of 0 to 7 ("no risk" to "extreme risk" of becoming a serious/violent juvenile delinquent)

An evaluation in 2004 produced the following statistics for ACE: 65 percent of the children had no further contact with police; 86 percent had not been charged with another offense over a four and one half year timeframe; and 60 percent were no longer disruptive at school, attended school on a regular basis and earned passing grades (Co.ramsey.mn.us, n.d.). The cost of implementing ACE is approximately \$9,125 per family per year (Melton, February 28, 2006). The average family is 4.3 individuals.

In March 2005, Connie Schmitz and Michael Luxenberg of Professional Evaluation Services and Professional Data Analysts, Inc., were engaged to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of ACE. The goals of the 2005-2006 contract were to enable ACE to comply with funding agencies evaluation and reporting requirements, implement a summative evaluation plan, help complete a curriculum and staffing guide, and pilot and conduct a cost-effectiveness assessment (Schmitz and Luxenberg, November 30, 2006). All goals were achieved, including the curriculum and staffing guide entitled, *ACE*

Program Guide to Promoting Healthier Development in Child Offenders (Schmitz and Luxenberg, November 30, 2006).

The primary question the Schmitz and Luxenberg (November 30, 2006) report was meant to answer is: “What short-term monetary benefits does the County derive, in terms of savings in juvenile justice costs, victim costs, and out-of-home placement costs from the ACE Program?” Diane Holmgren and Monty Martin (March 5, 2007) state that, “although there are not apparent short-term monetary savings to the County from the ACE program, there is a clear reduction in expenditures in police arrests and investigations, attorney costs, and dispositions from admitted crimes.” Holmgren and Martin’s March 5, 2007 memo goes on to state, “The projected diverging trajectories of children who receive ACE services compared to children who do not, however, suggests that during late adolescence, when more serious crime is likely to occur, that substantial cost savings would accrue to both the County and State of Minnesota.”

Schmitz and Luxenberg (November 30, 2006) note that it takes approximately three years before there is a significant improvement in the outcomes of ACE children versus the comparison group. This finding demonstrates “the need for long-term, multi-faceted case management rather than short-term, single focused interventions” according to Holmgren and Martin (March 5, 2007). Of the high-risk children not receiving ACE case management, 82.7 percent will re-offend by their thirteenth birthday (Schmitz and Luxenberg, November 30, 2006). Of the high-risk children enrolled in ACE, only 30.5 percent will re-offend by age 13, which means the odds of re-offending are 2.5 times higher without ACE (Schmitz and Luxenberg, November 30, 2006).

Frickson (July 18, 2006) provided an overview of the 2004, 2005 and 2006 ACE results in *Ramsey County All Children Excel (ACE) Deflecting Children from the Path of Violence – Intensive Early Intervention for Very Young Offenders*. In 2004, 65 percent of the ACE children displayed no disruptive behavior in school, 90 percent attended school regularly, 72 percent achieved passing grades, 85 percent were involved in pro-social and academic summer activities, 30 percent connected with a positive adult in addition to the ACE case manager, and 86 percent had not been charged with a subsequent offense over a 4.5 year period (Frickson, July 18, 2006). Parent satisfaction measured in 2005 indicates that 61 percent are very satisfied with ACE and 35 percent are satisfied, which equals a 96 percent parent satisfaction rate (Frickson, July 18, 2006). Finally, in the area of pro-social healthy development, in 2006, over 50 percent of the children participated in some form of social outing, recreation, after school activities, sports, faith-based programs, arts, and camps (Frickson, July 18, 2006).

St. Paul Youth Services (SPYS) website, accessed on July 15, 2006, described the goal of ACE as changing the dangerous path to a lifetime of criminal activity of a very small group of children under age 10 who have already committed crimes. ACE works with 65 children and their families (Spys.org, n.d.). Sixty-five percent of the children involved with ACE for more than six months did not have further contact with the police or court system (Spys.org, n.d.). SPYS provided the example of a 15 year-old male who was referred to ACE five years earlier for sexually assaulting a neighborhood girl. At the age of ten, “Dwayne” was already in a gang, selling drugs and stealing, failing classes in school, and verbally lashing out at teachers and classmates (Spys.org, n.d.). Dwayne and his brother quit dealing drugs and stealing and have not had further contact with the

police or courts since being involved with ACE ([Spys.org](#), n.d.). In addition, he is doing well in school, earning mostly “As” and “Bs”, playing junior varsity basketball, and tutoring other children ([Spys.org](#), n.d.).

The Ramsey County website visited on July 15, 2006 refers to ACE as one of only a handful of science-based programs in the world that targets children under age 10 who are at very high risk for serious and violent criminal behavior, substance abuse, school failure, teen pregnancy, and welfare dependency. ACE has the potential to reduce racial disparities in the criminal justice system, and break the inter-generational cycle of incarceration, neglect, domestic violence, and poverty ([Co.ramsey.mn.us](#), n.d.).

CHAPTER V

How was a Dollar Value Placed on an Ounce of Prevention?

The taxpayer costs avoided research identifies the taxpayer costs associated with individuals engaged in criminal activity. The costs measured are the cost for out-of-home placement of juveniles in need of protection because a parent or guardian is involved in criminal activity, incarceration for adults and out-of-home placement for correctional purposes of juveniles, prosecution, public defense, court proceedings, booking, pre-trial detention, and probation for juveniles and adults. The result of this study is a taxpayer costs avoided tool for public policymakers at the local, state and federal levels on the economic value to taxpayers of identifying and changing the path of individuals who are on the path to becoming lifetime criminals. The earlier in life this path is diverted, the earlier crime can be prevented and avoided costs can be realized. The reason for zeroing in on juveniles who are at high risk of a lifetime of criminal activity is because of the earlier increase in public safety and the associated cost savings. Even if the cost tool determines that the economic value exceeds the cost to provide services, a policymaker may still choose to make the investment in prevention because of the public safety benefit.

Public Taxpayer Costs Analyzed

In 2005, the Ramsey County Minnesota Corrections Department Director, Carol Roberts, stated the cost for a corrections department out-of-home placement of a juvenile by Ramsey County was over \$120 per day, and the average cost of incarcerating an adult at the Ramsey County Workhouse was \$78 per day. With just these two examples, the corrections out-of-home placement of juveniles and the incarceration of adults convicted of committing a criminal act, it is clear that dealing with criminal behavior is expensive. To quantify the costs avoided through preventing crime, the Minnesota State Supreme Court, Minnesota Department of Corrections, State of Minnesota Office of Public Defense, 18 Minnesota counties of varying sizes and locations, and 39 municipalities in Anoka and Ramsey Counties in Minnesota were asked to provide information from 2004 on the number of individuals involved in and the associated costs incurred for:

- 1) Incarcerating adults and juveniles (corrections out-of-home placement),
- 2) Providing probation services for adults and juveniles,
- 3) Out of home placement costs for children in need of protection because of a parent or guardian involvement in criminal activity,
- 4) Prosecuting adults and juveniles,
- 5) Court costs for jury and court trials for felony and misdemeanor gross misdemeanor criminal acts for adults and juveniles,
- 6) Local police and law enforcement costs, which includes pre-trial detention, and
- 7) The cost to taxpayers for public defense of individuals charged with a crime.

The need for a consistent funding source is a common theme in recommendations to policymakers attempting to prevent crime. Given the long timeline of intergenerational criminal activity, it is important to understand that it will require not only a consistent funding source, but also a long term financial commitment to break the cycle of violence referenced in the League of Women Voters (LWV) April 1995 report. Crime is not a problem that has suddenly arisen. Nor is there a simple or quick fix solution to preventing crime.

Attempting to put a dollar value on pain and suffering is not wrong, but in the fiscal world, the resulting number is not useful to policymakers (Currie, 1998). The money saved from pain and suffering avoided is not real, but there is a tangible cost to taxpayers for incarcerating offenders (Currie, 1998). Finding the appropriate balance between funding for incarceration, prevention and other public investments is difficult.

To determine the quantitative outcomes of crime prevention, the following question must be answered: How many tax dollars are spent on individuals engaged in criminal activity? Many of the economic costs associated with criminal activity are not directly associated with taxpayer dollars spent. Other criminal activity cost analyses quantified the impact on the economy, the ability of individuals to become self-sustaining, productive members of society, trauma caused to victims and perpetrators and to their family and friends, and for restitution. While any attempt to quantify the benefits of preventing crime is valuable, those government officials making the spending decisions about implementing crime prevention programs know that these efforts require upfront government funding and that many of the benefits are longer term and not easily attributed to the allocation for which they will be held accountable.

The research focused on the quantitative cost to taxpayers of major and minor criminal charges filed for adults and juveniles in seven expense categories:

- 1) County and municipal prosecution;
- 2) State public defense;
- 3) State, county and federal incarceration;
- 4) State, county and federal probation;
- 5) State jury and court trials;
- 6) County out-of-home placements for children in need of protection as a result of parental or guardian criminal activity; and
- 7) County and municipal law enforcement.

The data was also analyzed by level of government paying for the services, municipal, county, state, and federal. School district costs were not analyzed, as the costs could not be linked directly to crime prevention.

To understand how the value was determined for taxpayer costs avoided through preventing crime, a series of definitions is necessary.

Boot camp – Highly structured residential punishment programs for juveniles convicted of a crime, which are modeled after military basic training (O’Brien, et al., January 2005).

Career criminal – An individual who begins committing criminal acts as a juvenile and continues on this path through the age of 25. Blumstein estimated the average criminal career between five and 12 years, beginning at age 18 (Greene, 1983). According to Bouza (1993) and McGuckin (1998), the average criminal career runs through an individual’s early to mid-twenties. In 1997, The Stationery Office, Criminal

Statistics, England and Wales, stated that the peak age for criminal activities was 18 years old and approximately 80 percent of criminal activity took place between the ages of 10 and 26.

County government - There are 87 counties in Minnesota ranging in population from approximately 4,000 to over one million. Requests for data were sent to 18 Metropolitan and greater Minnesota counties.

County government costs – The expense to taxpayers for prosecution, incarceration of adults and corrections out-of-home placement for juveniles, human services out-of-home placement of children in need of protection because of a parental criminal activity, probation, and law enforcement were studied. Each expense and level of response is defined individually.

County corrections for adults – Six Minnesota counties responded to the request for information regarding the number of adults and the cost of incarcerating them in county correctional facilities.

County corrections out-of-home placement for juveniles – Five Minnesota counties provided data on the number of and cost to incarcerate a juvenile in either a county juvenile detention facility or in correctional out-of-home placement.

County human services out-of-home placement for children in need of protection, resulting from parental or guardian criminal activity – This category is included as a taxpayer cost avoided by preventing crime because it is directly related to criminal activity of a parent or guardian. When a parent or guardian is incarcerated and their child or children is in need of protection and placed out-of-home, there is a cost to taxpayers.

County law enforcement – The Minnesota Supreme Court (2005) criminal charges were divided equally between municipal and county law enforcement agencies and were used to calculate law enforcement costs per person. Thirteen Minnesota county sheriff departments responded to the request for information on law enforcement and pre-trial detention of individuals charged with a crime.

County and state probation for adults and juveniles – The number of adults and juveniles on probation was provided by county by the Minnesota Department of Corrections (2005). Six Minnesota counties responded with cost data for adults and juveniles on probation. The Midwest Consumer Price Index (March 26, 2006) for 2004 of 2.4 percent was applied to the 2003 data received from the Minnesota Department of Corrections (2005).

County prosecution – County prosecution costs are based on major criminal charges data provided by the Minnesota Supreme Court (2005). Ten county attorney's offices responded to the request for prosecution costs for adults and juveniles charged with a major criminal act.

Criminal act – Any action taken by an individual of chargeable age, according to the jurisdiction in which it is committed, that violates a criminal law.

Criminal charges, Minnesota Supreme Court – Major criminal charges included in the study are serious felony, felony DWI, other felony, DWI gross misdemeanor, and other gross misdemeanor (Minnesota Supreme Court, 2005). Minor criminal charges include fifth degree assault, DWI, and other non-traffic (Minnesota Supreme Court, 2005). Other traffic and parking minor criminal charges were not

included in determining prosecution or law enforcement costs. Examples of serious and violent criminal acts are homicide, assault, rape, robbery, and arson.

Delinquent act - Hyde (1995) defines a delinquent act as an act that could be prosecuted if committed by an adult. In Minnesota, a criminal charge cannot be brought against a child who is under 10 years of age.

Federal incarceration of adults – The National Consumer Price Index (March 26, 2006) was applied to the federal prison cost per adult inmate of \$23,542 per year from 1997 through 2004. The federal government does not house juveniles.

Federal probation/parole – The National Consumer Price Index (March 26, 2006) was applied to the 1983 federal probation/parole costs per adult of \$1,393 per year.

Group home - A group home is a long-term facility, which allows extensive access to community activities (Hyde, 1995).

Inflation factor – A 21-year average of the National Consumer Price Index, retrieved on March 26, 2006, was calculated at 3.05 percent. This inflation factor was applied to juvenile (age 10 through 17) and adult (age 18 through 25) taxpayer costs.

Law enforcement agency – Municipal police departments or contracts for law enforcement and County Sheriff Departments are defined as law enforcement agencies. Data from the United States Marshal's Office and the Minnesota State Patrol were not included in the study.

Municipal government – Municipal governments included in the study are cities and townships. The municipal governments studied included urban, suburban and rural communities.

Municipal prosecution – Minor criminal charges, as reported by the Minnesota Supreme Court (2005), were used as the basis for municipal prosecution. Prosecution responses were received from 14 cities and townships in Ramsey and Anoka counties in Minnesota. Ramsey and Anoka County include urban, suburban and rural communities.

Municipal law enforcement costs – The Minnesota Supreme Court (2005) criminal charges were divided equally between municipal and county law enforcement agencies and were used to calculate law enforcement costs per person. Municipal police data was received from 15 cities and one township in Ramsey County.

Probation – A Court ordered period of time for supervision of offenders, usually following incarceration. Probation may include house arrest, in-person contacts, drug testing or other approved methods of supervision or surveillance (Minnesota Planning, March 1996).

Prosecuting agency – Municipal prosecutor's offices or contracts for municipal prosecution and County Attorney's offices were included in the study. The United States Attorney's Office and the Minnesota Attorney General's Office were not included.

Recidivism – A criminal activity relapse by an individual previously involved with law enforcement (Minnesota Planning, March 1996).

Short-term offender - An offender sentenced to less than one year of incarceration or who is in their final year of incarceration (Minnesota Planning, March 1996).

State Court or Jury trial – District Court information was obtained from two Minnesota judicial districts and the State of Minnesota Supreme Court (2005) records for September 2005. Ramsey County District Court (July 20, 2006) estimated that the

average jury trial lasts 2.5 days and a court trial lasts 1.5 days. Included in court costs are salaries for a judge, court reporter, law clerk, two court clerks, deputy sheriff and administrative support plus juror payments, as appropriate (Ramsey County District Court, July 20, 2006).

State incarceration – The Minnesota Department of Corrections (2005) provided data on 12 adult and two juvenile correctional facilities. The types of crimes for which inmates were held in State Correctional facilities include drug related offenses, criminal sexual conduct, homicide, assault, burglary, robbery and other (Minnesota Department of Corrections, 2005). The number of inmates was also provided on a per county basis for Hennepin, Ramsey, Dakota, St. Louis, Anoka, Olmsted and other counties in Minnesota (Minnesota Department of Corrections, 2005). The average sentence length, according to the Minnesota Department of Corrections (2005), was 45.75 months in 2003. The Midwest Consumer Price Index (March 26, 2006) for 2004 of 2.4 percent was applied to the 2003 data received from the Minnesota Department of Corrections (2005).

State probation – See county and state probation.

State public defense – The Minnesota Office of Public Defenders (2005) provided data for the period of July 1, 2003 through June 30, 2004, for homicides, felonies, gross misdemeanors and other, misdemeanors, defense of juveniles, and children in need of protection cases in which a public defender was assigned.

Training school – A training school is a long-term facility where juvenile offenders are under strict controls (Hyde, 1995).

The quantitative taxpayer cost data on individuals charged with major and minor criminal activity was obtained from sources at the municipal, county, state and federal

departments or agencies. The public safety benefits to human society of reducing early criminal activity and the number of homicides, rape, assaults, robberies, arson and other violent, serious crime are assumed and were not specifically addressed in this study.

Costs Excluded from Analysis

The public taxpayer expenses associated directly with criminal behavior are the focus of this research. However, it is very important to understand the conservative nature of the categories studied and those costs not included in the analysis.

The conservative approach chosen includes only local prosecution, public defense, incarceration, probation, jury and court trials, out-of-home placements for children in need of protection as a result of parental or guardian criminal activity, and local law enforcement. These taxpayer costs have a direct link to major and minor criminal activity. There are many taxpayer costs not included because the links are more indirect. Among the tangible costs not included in the study are mental health and chemical dependency treatment costs (see Dr. Mark Cohen's 1998 study, *The Monetary Value of Saving a High-Risk Youth*), debt service on facilities, court facilities, crime prevention efforts in corrections and county attorney offices, the State Attorney General and State Patrol offices, and the United States Marshal and Attorney offices.

Public taxpayer dollars are being expended for services to convicted criminals and their family members. Examples of tangible, indirect public expenses include mental health services, treatment for chemical dependency, food and shelter welfare subsidies, re-entry programs, special education in schools, and medical assistance services. In addition, State and local prosecuting offices and the Courts also deal with non-criminal

issues, and public health or human services agencies provide services without a criminal act being committed. To break down and extrapolate the indirect costs for services, which are often mandated and clearly provided to offenders and their family members, would dilute the validity of the direct cost to taxpayers for preventing crime.

It is also clear the victims of crime experience financial hardship. Although these costs are not included in the study because they are not public taxpayer/government expenses, crime victim's costs are very real. Victims of crime experience tangible costs such as medical bills, lost wages, and lost property, and the intangible costs of pain, suffering, and lost quality of life.


Policy Methodology and Analysis

The policy process, agenda setting, decision making and implementation are described in *The World of the Policy Analyst, Rationality, Values, and Politics*, by Heineman, Bluhm, Peterson and Kearny (2002). An assumption in the policy process is that a decision should be made in a rational manner and that analysis enhances rationality. For analysis to take place, an issue must first be identified as a problem. Once identified, values and public opinion are key factors affecting what makes it to a public agenda (Heineman, et al., 2002).

Policy analysis is required to provide alternatives to address the identified problem. Heineman, Bluhm, Peterson, and Kearny (2002) list the four techniques of policy analysis as a cost-benefit analysis, decision-tree methods, simulations and models, and experiments. A cost-benefit analysis is a basic method of analyzing a policy and involves placing a dollar value on intangibles and quantitatively measuring the

uncertainties of social problems, according to Heineman, et al. (2002). When addressing the issue of crime prevention in a cost-benefit analysis, placing a dollar value on human suffering is, at best, difficult. By narrowly defining the benefit in terms of taxpayer costs avoided by preventing criminal activity and including only taxpayer dollars expended, the outcome becomes one tool to promote funding for prevention efforts. It cannot stand alone, however. The crime prevention program being recommended for funding must have measurable outcomes to reduce crime. The human suffering avoided perspective presented by the program outcomes can then be coupled with the taxpayer costs avoided model to back up the case to policymakers.

A quantitative data collection research design was used for the analysis of taxpayer costs for individuals charged with criminal activity. It is a pre-experimental design, one-shot case study as illustrated below. Taxpayer cost data was not random. The cost data was collected from Minnesota counties, municipalities, the State of Minnesota, and federal sources. There was no pretest or control group. The experiment consisted of collecting data on taxpayer costs for major and minor charges for criminal activity as reported by county to the Minnesota Supreme Court (2005). The research results will be usable as a posttest to compare the taxpayer cost for criminal activity to the cost for crime prevention efforts to reduce serious, violent and chronic crime. Questions the researchers would use on the posttest would measure the effectiveness of crime prevention programs at avoiding costs to taxpayers, as identified in this study.



The desired outcomes of preventing criminal activity will be measurable, but there is weak control of other explanations with this pre-experimental social research design. For example, if the juvenile crime prevention program being evaluated does not accurately identify high and very high-risk children, the cost savings will be inflated.

The one shot case study is an efficient way to gain basic knowledge. In this case, being able to identify the taxpayer costs for out-of-home placement of juveniles, prosecution, public defense, court proceedings, booking, pre-trial detention, incarceration, and probation is valuable to researchers who want to quantify cost to taxpayers. It could also point to the need for additional research, such as costs to public schools or selected indirect costs for treatment, which could potentially be linked to criminal behavior.

On October 16, 2005 a request for information was sent to the County Administrator, County Attorney, County Sheriff, and Court Administrator from the following 18 counties in Minnesota: Anoka, Blue Earth, Brown, Carver, Chisago, Dakota, Hennepin, Hubbard, Nobles, Olmsted, Pope, Ramsey, Sherburne, St. Louis, Scott, Wadena, Washington and Wright. A request for Human Services out of home placement costs for child protection resulting from a parent or guardian's criminal activity was sent to Blue Earth, Brown, Hubbard, Nobles, Pope, Sherburne, St. Louis, Wadena and Wright counties. Information regarding police and local prosecution costs was requested from each of the communities in Ramsey and Anoka Counties.

Counties, municipalities, and court districts were chosen to reflect Minnesota's broad geographic and demographic characteristics. Population ranges are provided for the responding entities within each cost category, in the Conclusion section of this

dissertation. The selected governmental entities were expected to provide taxpayer costs directly related to criminal activities from the core, inner cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, to urbanized cities, such as Rochester and Duluth in Olmsted and St. Louis counties, respectively, to suburban communities primarily in the metropolitan counties, to rural areas in metropolitan and greater Minnesota counties.

Although all levels of criminal behavior take place throughout the state, it was expected that areas with greater population density would experience different types or levels of criminal activity. For example, methamphetamine production is more prevalent in rural areas because of access to chemicals from agricultural sites, and more gang related crime occurs in densely populated cities than in suburban or rural communities. Another variable addressed by the diversity of governmental entities chosen is the potential market rate fluctuation to provide public services. Finally, the likelihood of data being easily and readily available, especially through the use of electronic technology, was taken into consideration.

At the state level, the number of adults and juveniles, with costs for the most recent year, 2003, were secured from the Minnesota Department of Corrections (2005) on a county-by-county basis. The Minnesota Office of Public Defense (2005) responded to the request for information by forwarding its budget and the number of adult and juvenile criminal cases for fiscal year 2004. The Minnesota Supreme Court (2005) provided major and minor criminal cases charged by county for 2003 and 2004. Major criminal charges include serious felony, felony DWI, other felony, DWI gross misdemeanor, and other gross misdemeanor. Minor criminal charges include fifth degree assault, DWI, and other non-traffic. Other traffic and parking minor criminal charges were not included in

determining prosecution or law enforcement costs. The base used for calculating county and municipal prosecution and law enforcements costs were the charges filed as defined and reported to the Minnesota Supreme Court (2005). For prosecution, major criminal charges were applied to county prosecutors and minor criminal charges to the municipal level. For law enforcement, the total of major and minor criminal charges were split evenly between municipal police and county sheriff's offices.

Federal incarceration and probation costs per year were obtained from an Office of National Drug Control Policy Fact Sheet and an online article, *A Fiscal Analysis of Marijuana Decriminalization, Chapter VI. Prison and Parole Costs*. When necessary, the United States Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index (CPI) was used to update average costs (Midwest CPI applied to state probation costs from 2003; National CPI applied to Federal probation/parole and incarceration data from 1997 and 1984, respectively). A letter and, when possible, an e-mail were sent requesting all data by November 20, 2005.

Adult prosecution through the Minnesota Attorney General's Office or the United States Attorney's Office, Federal District and Appellate Courts, and law enforcement through the Minnesota State Patrol or the United States Marshal's Office were not included in the study. The activities within each of these federal and state offices are not broken down in terms of law enforcement or prosecution for criminal acts. Therefore, assigning the taxpayer costs avoided through preventing criminal activity through these federal and state offices would not be reliable. Rather than including the costs associated with these federal and state activities and thereby inflating the costs, a conservative path was chosen which excludes them.

County Corrections Departments questions:

- 1) 2004 budget for incarcerating adults?
- 2) Number of adults incarcerated in 2004?
- 3) 2004 budget for incarcerating/out-of-home placement of juveniles?
- 4) Number of juveniles incarcerated or placed out of home in 2004?
- 5) 2003 budget for adults on probation?
- 6) 2003 budget for juveniles on probation?

It was noted that probation numbers were being requested for 2003 because it was the most recent data available from the State of Minnesota.

County Manager/County Attorney questions:

- 1) Total adult criminal prosecution budget for 2004?
- 2) Total juvenile criminal prosecution budget for 2004?

County Manager/County Sheriff question:

- 1) Total County Sheriff budget for 2004?

Human Services Departments questions:

- 1) 2004 total out of home placement budget for child protection because of a parent or guardian's criminal activity, including shelters and intake?
- 2) In 2004, the number of unduplicated individuals in child protection out of home placement because of a parent or guardian's criminal activity?

District Court Administrators questions:

- 1) Number of felony and misdemeanor gross misdemeanor jury trials in 2004?
- 2) Number of felony and misdemeanor gross misdemeanor court trials in 2004?

Court administrators were also asked to provide an estimate on the average cost per jury trial and per court trial, if readily available.

City Managers – Local police and prosecutor costs:

- 1) Total police department budget for 2004?
- 2) Total municipal criminal prosecution costs for 2004?

Responses were received from eight County Human Services departments, 10 County Attorney Offices, 89.3 percent of Ramsey County and 40.32 percent of Anoka County municipal prosecution/city managers offices, 99.58 percent of Ramsey County police departments, 13 County Sheriff Offices, six County Probation departments, five County Corrections/Juvenile Out of Home Placement offices, six County Corrections/Adult Incarceration offices and four State Court administrators.

The categories chosen for inclusion in the study are those public taxpayer expenses that can be directly traced to criminal activity by juveniles and adults. To assist each level of government in analyzing its' expected taxpayer costs for criminal activity and for implementing crime prevention efforts, cost categories are also broken down by level of government. The levels of government are based on the criminal justice system in Minnesota. The responsible level of government for a given activity within a criminal justice system varies between states.

In Minnesota, prosecution of minor criminal cases and police services are provided at the municipal level. The calculations for prosecution and law enforcement are based on major and minor criminal charges filed and recorded by county at the Minnesota Supreme Court.

The majority of activity related to crime is at the county level of government in Minnesota. The county attorney's office is responsible for prosecution of major criminal offenses. The county sheriff's office is charged with protecting the public through apprehending criminals and holding those arrested in pre-trial detention. The county corrections department is responsible for adult incarceration and juvenile out-of-home placement and probation services. The county human services department provides out-of-home placement of juveniles for a variety of reasons. However, the only human services out-of-home placement costs included in this study are those related directly to children who are in need of protection and placed outside of their home as a result of a parent or guardian's criminal activity.

The state has three primary areas of expense related to criminal activity – jury or court trials, incarceration and public defense. The state is also involved in probation, but it is primarily implemented through counties.

The two cost categories included at the federal level are probation/parole and incarceration. As noted, if costs borne by taxpayers could not be directly linked to criminal activity, such as the United States Attorney and Marshal, Federal Courts, and the State Patrol and Attorney General, they were not included.

The timeframe for expected taxpayer costs avoided is based on evidence that the average criminal career is over by the time the individual reaches their mid-twenties. Because the study was conducted in Minnesota and a juvenile cannot be charged with a crime in Minnesota until he or she reaches the age of 10, the total taxpayer costs avoided, with inflation, through preventing crime runs from age 10 through age 25.

CHAPTER VI

How Much Taxpayer Cost is Avoided if Crime is Prevented?

The cost to taxpayers for individuals engaged in criminal activity is significant and, once quantified, can be used to determine the cost effectiveness of implementing crime prevention efforts. The *Blueprints for Violence Prevention* used four criteria for selection of effective crime prevention efforts (Henggeler 1998). The criteria included being an experimental design, providing evidence of a statistically significant deterrent effect, having demonstrated effects through replication at multiple sites, and providing evidence that the deterrent effect lasted for at least one year after treatment. Using Henggeler's criteria (1998), if a crime prevention program is effective in reducing criminal acts from being committed, then the cost to taxpayers for out-of-home placement, prosecution, public defense, court proceedings, booking, pre-trial detention, incarceration, and probation will be avoided, and the cost to taxpayers of crime prevention programs may be offset many times over.

The juvenile justice system, schools, and mental health, child welfare and child protection agencies use significant funds on child delinquents who become serious and violent offenders, according to Burns, Howell, Wiig, Augimeri, Welsh, Loeber and Petechik in the *U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Child Delinquency Bulletin Series* (March 2003). Therefore, the motivation

to determine the most cost effective measures to prevent crime is tremendous. Over 200 studies conducted between 1950 and 1995 identified the most effective treatment approaches as interpersonal skills training, individual counseling, and behavioral programs. Outcome variables listed include delinquency/crime, substance abuse, education, employment, health, and family factors (Burns, et al., March 2003).

Four of the successful juvenile crime prevention programs studied by Burns, Howell, Wiig, Augimeri, Welsh, Loeber, and Petechik (March 2003) were Michigan Early Offender, Minnesota Delinquents Under 10, Sacramento County Community Intervention, and Toronto Under 12 Outreach. The Michigan program provides specialized, intensive services in the homes of children age 13 and younger. It documented reduced recidivism rates, fewer and shorter out of home placements, and better behavior in general (Burns, et al., March 2003). The authors concluded that a combination of integrated services through the juvenile justice, education, mental health, and child welfare systems are needed to identify children at high risk of committing delinquent or criminal acts, and to individualize and implement services for the child and their family that will prevent crime (Burns, et al., March 2003). When the integrated services are targeted correctly, there will be an increase in the potential to significantly reduce the level of crime in our communities (Burns, et al., March 2003). When criminal activity is reduced, it is likely that tax dollars expended will also decrease (Burns, et al., March 2003).

Taxpayer Expenses by Activity and Level of Government

Minnesota Counties report major and minor criminal charges to the Minnesota Supreme Court. For county and municipal prosecution, major criminal charges (serious felony, felony DWI, other felony, DWI gross misdemeanor, and other gross misdemeanor) are accredited to county prosecutors and minor criminal charges (fifth degree assault, DWI, and other non-traffic) to the municipal level. Since law enforcement is not as clearly delineated between levels of government, the total criminal charges (serious felony, felony DWI, other felony, DWI gross misdemeanor, other gross misdemeanor, fifth degree assault, DWI, and other non-traffic) filed per county were equally divided between the county sheriffs departments and municipal police departments. Counties for which 2004 Supreme Court data was collected were Anoka, Carver, Blue Earth, Brown, Chisago, Dakota, Hennepin, Hubbard, Nobles, Olmsted, Pope, Ramsey, St. Louis, Scott, Sherburne, Wadena, Washington, and Wright.

Counties range in population from 11,236 to 1,116,200 with overall budgets from the low millions to nearly two billion (Association of Minnesota Counties, 2006). The number of major and minor criminal charges filed per capita in metropolitan and rural counties did not vary substantially. The primary purpose for the criminal charges filed data was to calculate the per person cost of prosecution and law enforcement at the municipal and county levels of government.

Table VI.1 – Criminal Charges Filed – Minnesota Supreme Court – 2004			
County	Minor Criminal Charges	Major Criminal Charges	Total Criminal Charges
A	5,784	1,268	7,052
B	11,431	3,647	15,078
C	1,645	651	2,296
D	27,206	6,249	33,455
E	3,033	794	3,827
F	884	272	1,156
G	2,520	689	3,209
H	13,437	4,249	17,686
I	25,832	13,301	39,133
J	943	300	1,243
K	821	266	1,087
L	5,135	1,431	6,566
M	538	117	655
N	3,872	862	4,734
O	9,877	2,697	12,574
P	0	1,236	1,236
Q	793	200	993
R	9,576	2,055	11,631

Criminal Prosecution Costs – County:

Criminal prosecution data for 2004 was received from ten Minnesota counties: Anoka, Blue Earth, Dakota, Hennepin, Nobles, Olmsted, Ramsey, Sherburne, St. Louis and Washington. Prosecution costs are based on information received from the Minnesota Supreme Court on major and minor criminal charges (serious felony, felony DWI, other felony, DWI gross misdemeanor, other gross misdemeanor, fifth degree assault, DWI, and other non-traffic) filed by county. The county level uses major criminal charges (serious felony, felony DWI, other felony, DWI gross misdemeanor, and other gross misdemeanor) and the municipal level is based on the minor criminal charges (fifth degree assault, DWI, and other non-traffic) filed. The percentage of adult and juvenile charges filed is based on the breakdown of prosecution costs between adults and juveniles within the county attorney's offices. Therefore, the costs per adult or juvenile

included in the overall analysis are equal. County prosecution costs are included in taxpayer costs for county, state, and federal prosecution expenses.

Responding counties ranged in population from 20,832 to 1,116,200 (Association of Minnesota Counties, 2006). County attorneys were asked to provide criminal prosecution costs. The number of major criminal charges filed in each county was obtained from the Minnesota Supreme Court (2005). The cost to prosecute a major criminal charge per adult or juvenile ranged from \$766.20 to \$1,325.59. The average county prosecution cost is \$1,011.35.

Table VI.2 – County Prosecution Costs – 2004							
Prosecution Costs				MN Supreme Ct Major Criminal Charges			Cost per Charge-Adult or Youth
Co	Adult	Juvenile	Total	Adult	Youth	Total	
A	\$6,807,176.87	\$1,318,897.00	\$8,126,073.87	5235	1014	6249	\$1,300.38
B	\$2,095,208.00	\$1,658,706.00	\$3,753,914.00	2036	1611	3647	\$1,029.32
C	\$585,488.84	\$113,435.80	\$698,924.64	665	129	794	\$880.26
D	\$2,692,071.00	\$563,528.00	\$3,255,599.00	3514	735	4249	\$766.20
E	\$13,214,479.00	\$4,417,222.00	\$17,631,701.00	9969	3332	13,301	\$1,325.59
F	\$283,312.00	\$54,890.00	\$338,202.00	223	43	266	\$1,271.44
G	\$1,060,000.00	\$210,000.00	\$1,270,000.00	1194	237	1431	\$887.49
H	\$676,473.00	\$157,448.00	\$833,921.00	699	163	862	\$967.43
I	\$1,697,754.00	\$505,953.00	\$2,203,707.00	2078	619	2697	\$817.10
J	\$1,170,300.00	\$614,100.00	\$1,784,400.00	1348	707	2055	\$868.32
Average county prosecution cost per charge filed for adult or juvenile							\$1,011.35

Criminal Prosecution Costs – Municipal:

The Minnesota Supreme Court data is provided on a county basis. The municipalities in two Minnesota counties, Ramsey and Anoka, were surveyed for municipal prosecution costs. Fourteen municipalities responded, accounting for 89.53 percent of Ramsey County and 40.32 percent of Anoka County. Responding municipalities varied in size and population density. Survey results were received from Blaine, Coon Rapids, Gem Lake, Ham Lake, Lauderdale, Maplewood, Mounds View,

New Brighton, North St. Paul, Roseville, St. Paul, Vadnais Heights, White Bear Lake, and White Bear Township. Costs per minor criminal charges (fifth degree assault, DWI, and other non-traffic) filed were pro-rated according to the percent of county population reporting. The average taxpayer costs per adult or juvenile for municipal prosecution of a minor criminal charge is \$128.82.

Table VI.3 – Municipal Prosecution Costs – 2004			
Municipality	Prosecution Costs	MN Supreme Court Minor Criminal Charges	Cost/charge/ Adult or Juvenile
A	\$1,222.75		
B	\$10,677.00		
C	\$117,900.00		
D	\$44,520.00		
E	\$50,150.00		
F	\$56,100.00		
G	\$125,835.00		
H	\$2,783,804.00		
I	\$57,600.00		
J	\$86,493.00		
K	\$30,000.00		
County total	\$3,364,301.75	24,358	\$138.12
L	\$466,924.00		
M	\$181,672.00		
N	\$78,000.00		
County total	\$726,596.00	6,079	\$119.53
Average municipal prosecution adult or juvenile cost/minor charge filed			\$128.82

Criminal Public Defense Costs – State:

The Minnesota State Public Defenders Office provided statewide cost data for fiscal year 2004 (July 1, 2003 through June 30, 2004) and case data for calendar year 2003. In both cases, numbers were adjusted to reflect 2004 information. Expenses included additional Hennepin County expenditures and costs associated with District Public Defense and the Appellate Court and Administrative Services offices. Categories supplied by the Minnesota State Public Defenders Office (2005) were homicide, felony,

gross misdemeanor and other, misdemeanor, juvenile, and children in need of protection (CHIPS). The Appellate Office data from the Minnesota Public Defenders Office (2005) includes 1,101 appellate cases, 434 sex offender notification hearings, and 2,757 parole revocation cases. The average cost to taxpayers for public defense of an adult charged with a criminal act is \$350.81 and for a juvenile it is \$322.08.

Table VI.4 – Minnesota State Public Defenders Office Charges – FY2004							
Fiscal Year	Homicide	Felony	Gross Misd/Other	Misdemeanor	Juvenile	CHIPS	Total cases
2004	160	24,633	43,731	58,964	27,873	8,239	163,600

Table VI.5 – Public Defenders Costs – 2004					
Office	Cases		Total Budget	Annual Cost per Case	
	Adult	Juvenile		Per Adult	Per Juvenile
Public Defense	127,488	163,600	\$65,231,450.23	\$322.14	\$322.08
*Appellate	4,292		\$3,800,000.00	\$885.37	
Administrative Services	N/A		\$1,838,000.00	N/A	
Average cost of public defense				\$350.81	\$322.08

District Court Costs – State:

District Court information was obtained from county and state sources – Olmsted County District Court, Third Judicial District Court, Ramsey County District Court, and the Minnesota Supreme Court. The statewide juror data is from September 2005. Ramsey County District Court provided the average time and personnel for jury and court trials. District Court costs are included in county, state and federal court costs. Court costs did not differentiate between a trial for an adult or a juvenile. The average court costs per adult or juvenile is \$5,565.40.

Table VI.6 – District Court Costs – 2004		
Type of Expense	Jury Trial (2.5 days avg)	Court Trial (1.5 days avg)
Judges salary – Court time plus an additional day for arraignment, pre-trial, motions, and case preparation	\$1,553.00	\$1,109.60
Court reporters salary	\$508.58	\$305.15
Law clerks salary	\$443.85	\$295.90
Court clerks (2) salary	\$665.76	\$443.84
Deputy sheriffs salary	\$610.29	\$406.86
Juror payments – Based on average juror payments of \$2,556.75 per jury trial (10.5 average jurors per trial at \$243.50 per juror)	\$2,556.75	N/A
Administrative support costs	\$110.96	\$110.96
Total Court Costs	\$6,449.19	\$2,672.31
Average court costs per adult or juvenile trial (76.6 percent jury trials and 23.4 percent court trials)	\$5,565.40	

**Adult Incarceration/Juvenile Out-of-home Placement Corrections
Costs – County:**

County Corrections Departments incur expenses for incarceration of adults and juveniles and for out-of-home placement of juveniles convicted of a crime. Six Minnesota counties, Anoka, Nobles, Pope, Ramsey, Washington, and Wright provided data for adults.

The cost to incarcerate an adult in a county correctional facility ranged from \$648.23 to \$2,518.91. The average county incarceration cost for an adult criminal is \$1,111.00. This annual taxpayer cost is lower than anticipated by the researcher, given the average cost per inmate per day at the Ramsey County Workhouse of \$89 per day (Ramsey County, January 23, 2007). However, because adults sentenced to a county correctional facility are generally incarcerated for less than one year, the total annual cost for incarcerating adults divided by the number of adults served is lower than the daily cost per individual incarcerated. Because this study was based on an individual committing a criminal act and not on the length of sentence served, the average annual

cost per person in the county correctional facility was included in the taxpayer costs avoided through preventing crime. This approach reflects actual out of pocket taxpayer costs.

Table VI.7 – County Corrections Adult Incarceration Costs – 2004			
County	County Corrections Adult Incarceration Costs	Number of Adults	Cost/adult/year
A	\$12,020,215.00	4,772	\$2,518.91
B	\$4,439,760.00	4,293	\$1,034.19
C	\$762,963.00	1,177	\$648.23
D	\$158,163.00	228	\$693.70
E	\$7,305,300.00	7,605	\$960.59
F	\$3,943,399.00	4,866	\$810.40
Total	\$28,629,800.00	22,941	
Average adult county corrections incarceration costs			\$1,111.00

Five counties, Blue Earth, Dakota, Nobles, Ramsey, and Rock responded to the survey with information for juveniles. Two of the counties shared juvenile corrections facilities. The annual cost by county to incarcerate a juvenile ranged from \$8,970.65 to \$17,461.04 per year for an average cost to taxpayers of \$11,567.02.

Table VI.8 – County Corrections Juvenile Incarceration Costs – 2004			
County	Juvenile Incarceration Costs	Number of youth	Cost/youth/year
A	\$7,628,890.00	810	\$9,418.38
B	\$62,508.00	6	\$10,418.00
C	\$4,144,442.00	462	\$8,970.65
D & E	\$419,065.00	24	\$17,461.04
Total	\$12,254,905.00	1,302	
Average juvenile county corrections incarceration/OHP costs			\$11,567.02

Adult and Juvenile Incarceration Corrections Costs – State:

The Minnesota Department of Corrections supplied data on the number of adult and juvenile inmates incarcerated in its system by facility, county and type of crime.

Table VI.9 – State Corrections Incarceration Costs – 2004	
Category	Number of inmates
Type of Criminal Offense	
Drugs	2,090
Criminal Sexual Conduct	1,411
Homicide	1,155
Assault	903
Burglary	613
Robbery	524
Other	1,786
TOTAL	8,482
County of Inmate	
Hennepin	2,112
Ramsey	1,411
Dakota	372
St. Louis	342
Anoka	303
Olmsted	278
Other	3,664
TOTAL	8,482
Adult Facility	
Stillwater	1,375
Lino Lakes	1,290
Faribault	1,234
Willow River/Moose Lake	1,121
Rush City	1,023
St. Cloud	975
Oak Park Heights	432
Shakopee	452
Work Release	222
Institution Community Work Crews	44
County Jail (Contract)	87
Prairie Correctional Facility	148
TOTAL	8,403
Juvenile Facility	
Red Wing	55
Thistledeew	24
TOTAL	79

According to the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics website www.bls.gov, the Consumer Price Index for the Midwest Region from 2003 to 2004 was 2.4 percent. The 2003 expenditure of \$366,923,083 by the Minnesota

Department of Corrections was adjusted for inflation by 2.4 percent, resulting in a total state incarceration cost for 2004 of \$375,729,471.

The total cost per adult or juvenile inmate per year is \$44,297.27 and was determined by dividing the total state incarceration costs by 8,482 inmates. Since the number of inmates in 2003 was 7,795, the cost per year was higher at \$47,071.63. In 2003, the Minnesota Department of Corrections reported the average sentence length as 45.75 months, making the total cost for the average sentence \$168,883.38 in 2004 dollars.

Juvenile Out-of-home Placement Human Services Costs for Criminal Activity of Parent or Guardian – County:

County Human Services Departments use out of home placement for children in need of protection as a result of their parent or guardian being involved in criminal activity. The cost of child protection out of home placement is, therefore, applied to the adult cost of crime. At a High-risk Juvenile Crime Workshop for the Ramsey County Board of Commissioners, held on February 28, 2006, ACE Director, Hope Melton, stated that the average family in ACE has 4.3 members. Melton (February 28, 2006) also noted that 83 percent of the fathers and 65 percent of the mothers of ACE children have a criminal history. According to the Center for Children of Incarcerated Parents (CCIP) (June 30, 2004), there were 2,201,123 adults in United States jails and prisons. The inmates with children averaged 2.08 children each (CCIP, June 30, 2004). The average number of children per inmate is 1.27 children. The United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics (August 2000) stated that in 1999 the average number of children per inmate parent was 2.07.

The eight Minnesota counties responding to the survey were Anoka, Blue Earth, Brown, Hennepin, Nobles, Ramsey, Wadena, and Wright. The importance of including

only data on children in out-of-home placement as a result of a parent or guardian's criminal activity was stressed.

Table VI.10 – County Human Services Child Protection Out of Home Placement Costs – 2004			
County	County Human Services OHP Costs	Juveniles in OHP	Cost/juvenile/year
A	\$17,756,691.00	933	\$19,031.82
B	\$2,198,400.00	212	\$10,369.81
C	\$1,262,546.00	129	\$9,787.18
D	\$825,000.00	73	\$11,301.37
E	\$23,364,955.00	1,661	\$14,066.80
F	\$419,065.00	55	\$7,619.36
G	\$260,000.00	48	\$5,416.67
H	\$3,041,591.00	247	\$12,314.13
Total	\$49,128,248.00	3,358	
Average child protection out of home placement costs			\$11,238.39

The model conservatively assumes only one child per adult offender and does not take into consideration additional services, such as mental health and chemical dependency treatment, often needed by the children of individuals in prison. Charlene Wear Simmons (March 2000) listed the possible developmental effects on children of incarcerated parents as anxiety, developmental regression, acute traumatic stress, reactive behaviors, and premature termination of the parent and child relationship.

The average annual cost for human services placing a child out of their home related to criminal activity of their primary caregiver ranged from \$5,416.67 to \$19,031.82 for an average cost to taxpayers of \$11,238.39.

Adult Incarceration Corrections Costs – Federal:

Federal incarceration costs were not readily accessible. The most recent data found at the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics website www.bls.gov was from 1997. The National Consumer Price Index for the years 1997 through 2004 was applied to \$23,542 for a total annual cost for federal prison of

\$27,816.10 per inmate. Juveniles are handled through the state and county correctional systems, rather than at the federal level.

Law Enforcement Costs – County:

The following 13 county sheriffs departments in Minnesota provided 2004 data for law enforcement: Anoka, Carver, Chisago, Dakota, Hennepin, Nobles, Pope, Ramsey, St. Louis, Sherburne, Wadena, Washington, and Wright. Minnesota Supreme Court major and minor criminal charges (serious felony, felony DWI, other felony, DWI gross misdemeanor, other gross misdemeanor, fifth degree assault, DWI, and other non-traffic) were divided equally between county and municipal law enforcement. County sheriff law enforcement expenses are included in the county, state and federal law enforcement costs.

The range per charge to county law enforcement per criminal charge filed was \$1,470.54 to \$9,726.01 for an average of \$3,417.60. As with the county incarceration costs, the cost for county law enforcement, including pre-trial detention was lower than expected by the researcher. The cost per day per detainee at the Ramsey County Law Enforcement Center is \$108.90 (Ramsey County, January 23, 2007). The average cost is on a per year basis and most detainees are housed in a pre-trial detention facility for a limited number of days.

Table VI.11 – County Sheriff Law Enforcement Costs – 2004			
County	Total Cost	MN Supreme Court criminal charges (50 percent)	Cost per charge
A	\$23,739,731.00	8,843	\$2,684.58
B	\$18,843,234.95	7,539	\$2,499.43
C	\$11,165,455.52	1,148	\$9,726.01
D	\$5,193,367.00	1,604	\$3,237.76
E	\$31,614,096.00	16,727	\$1,890.00
F	\$61,119,321.00	19,566	\$3,123.75
G	\$798,504.00	543	\$1,470.54
H	\$697,992.00	327	\$2,134.53
I	\$14,587,214.00	2,367	\$6,162.74
J	\$18,312,302.00	6,287	\$2,912.73
K	\$933,860.29	496	\$1,882.78
L	\$20,720,200.00	5,815	\$3,563.23
M	\$11,074,075.00	3,526	\$3,140.69
Average county sheriff law enforcement cost per case			\$3,417.60

Law Enforcement Costs – Municipal:

Municipal law enforcement costs were collected for 99.58 percent of Ramsey County. Municipalities providing data included Arden Hills, Falcon Heights, Gem Lake, Lauderdale, Little Canada, Maplewood, New Brighton, North Oaks, North St. Paul, Mounds View, Roseville, St. Paul, Shoreview, Vadnais Heights, White Bear Lake, and White Bear Township. Seven municipalities contract for local law enforcement with the Ramsey County Sheriffs Department. As with the county sheriffs departments, a pro-rated share of 50 percent of the total criminal charges (serious felony, felony DWI, other felony, DWI gross misdemeanor, other gross misdemeanor, fifth degree assault, DWI, and other non-traffic) filed in Ramsey County were attributed to municipal law enforcement.

Table VI.12 – Municipal Law Enforcement Costs – 2004			
Municipality	Total Cost	MN Supreme Court criminal charges (50 percent)	Cost per charge
A – G	\$4,825,970.00		
H	\$463,030.00		
I	\$240,818.00		
J	\$5,947,160.00		
K	\$3,174,100.00		
L	\$1,888,169.00		
M	\$1,484,046.00		
N	\$4,599,000.00		
O	\$67,705,337.00		
P	\$2,618,782.00		
Total	\$92,946,412.00	16,658	\$5,579.69

Municipal law enforcement costs are included in the county, state and federal law enforcement costs. The average cost per criminal charge filed to municipal law enforcement is \$5,579.69.

Adult and Juvenile Probation Costs – County and State:

The Minnesota Department of Corrections (2005) supplied data by county on the number of adults and juveniles on probation in 2003. All data in this analysis is adjusted to the year 2004.

Therefore, the 2003 numbers were multiplied by 2.4 percent, the Midwest Consumer Price Index (www.bls.gov, n.d.). The adult probation information was subdivided by the level of crime – felony, gross misdemeanor, and misdemeanor.

The six Minnesota counties responding to the request for budget data on adults and juveniles were Anoka, Dakota, Nobles, Pope, Ramsey, and Washington. Although county government provides probation services, it is directed through the State of Minnesota Department of Corrections.

Table VI.13 – Adult County and State Probation Costs – 2004						
County	Felony	Gross Misdemeanor	Misdemeanor	Total adults	Total costs	Cost/adult
A	5,561	2,866	5,746	14,173	\$12,579,959.81	\$887.60
B	2,365	2,941	5,530	10,836	\$5,258,482.69	\$485.28
C	2,965	2,143	2,342	7,450	\$6,990,470.14	\$938.32
D	124	155	198	477	\$201,323.52	\$422.06
E	51	69	45	165	\$143,685.63	\$870.82
F	1,257	1,393	2,778	5,428	\$3,479,347.20	\$641.00
Total	12,323	9,567	16,639	38,529	\$28,653,268.99	
Average cost for county and state probation per adult						\$707.51

The range in taxpayer costs for adult probation at the state and county level was \$422.06 to \$938.32 with the average annual cost per adult of \$707.51.

Table VI.14 – Juvenile County and State Probation Costs – 2004			
County	Total juveniles	Total costs	Cost/juvenile
A	1,604	\$5,474,088.96	\$3,412.77
B	982	\$2,364,780.54	\$2,408.13
C	736	\$4,578,670.59	\$6,221.02
D	86	\$373,515.26	\$4,343.20
E	26	\$71,842.82	\$2,763.19
F	307	\$1,359,872.00	\$4,429.55
Total	3,741	\$14,222,770.17	
Average cost for county and state probation per juvenile			\$3,929.64

For juveniles, the range of costs for probation was between \$2,408.13 and \$6,221.02. The average probation expense per juvenile per year is \$3,929.64.

Adult Probation Costs – Federal:

Federal probation costs were difficult to obtain. The most recent information was from the Schaffer Library of Drug Policy (www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/hemp/moscone/chap6.htm, n.d.) for individuals convicted of a charge related to marijuana. The 1983 annual cost was \$1,393. The National Consumer Price Index at the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics website www.bls.gov was applied from

1983 through 2004 for a total of \$2,615.63 per individual. Juveniles are handled at the state and county levels.

Adult and Juvenile Law Enforcement, Prosecution, Incarceration and Probation Costs – Municipal, County, State or Federal:

A number of assumptions were made to avoid duplication of costs for law enforcement, prosecution, incarceration and probation at either the municipal, county, state or federal levels of government. The assumptions include:

Major and minor criminal charges – Supreme Court major and minor criminal charges filed by county are the basis for county (major - serious felony, felony DWI, other felony, DWI gross misdemeanor, and other gross misdemeanor) and municipal (minor - fifth degree assault, DWI, and other non-traffic) prosecution costs, and for county sheriff (50 percent of all criminal charges) and municipal police (remaining 50 percent of all criminal charges) costs.

Re-arrest rate of one every four years – How often an individual is likely to be rearrested during their criminal career is important to calculating the cost to taxpayers of arrest, prosecution, public defense, trial, incarceration and probation. John O'Brien, John Newton, Anita Zinnecker and Bill Parr (January 2005) reported to the Texas State Legislative Budget Board that in 1994 the national three-year re-incarceration rate was 51.8 percent. Paul Fauteck (Retrieved January 21, 2007) stated that 60 percent to 70 percent of released prisoners are convicted of a subsequent crime within three years. Timothy Hughes and Doris James Wilson (August 20, 2003) reaffirmed Fauteck's statement with a re-arrest rate within three years of nearly 70 percent in 1994. The re-arrest rate for violent offenders in 1994 was 61.7 percent, according to Terence Gorski (July 30, 2002). In addition, the earlier the first offense occurs, the longer the criminal

career and more criminal acts committed. According to *The Life Span of Criminal Behaviour: What Do We Know?* (Correctional Service Canada, 1993), the range of convictions for individuals between age 10 and 32 is 8.1 to 1.5, which equals one conviction every 1.98 to 3.75 years. In an adult and juvenile criminal trajectory study conducted over an average 12.1-year timeframe by David Day, Irene Bevc, Jeffrey Rosenthal, Thierry Duchesne, Lianne Rossman and Frances Theodor (August 7, 2003), the number of convictions ranged per individual from 8.8 to 19.0. If the first offense occurs between 10 and 13 years old, the average number of offenses for which an individual would be convicted during their criminal career is 8.1 (Correctional Service Canada, 1993). The cost to taxpayers tool begins at age 10 and runs through age 25. If 8.1 offenses occurred during that 16-year timeframe, it would mean one criminal conviction every 1.98 years. To remain conservative, the model assumes a re-arrest and trial rate of one every four years.

Municipal or county law enforcement – An individual will be arrested by either the local police or county sheriff, and not both, for each crime charged. The average per individual local law enforcement cost is \$570.09, and is included in the total taxpayer costs avoided once every four years beginning at age 10.

Municipal or county prosecution – An individual will be prosecuted by either the municipal prosecutor or county attorney, and not both, for each crime charged. The average per individual local prosecution cost is \$4,498.65, and is included in the total taxpayer costs avoided once every four years beginning at age 10.

Public defense and trial – Since the model anticipates re-arrest, prosecution, public defense, and trial once every four years, public defense costs are applied once every four years beginning at age 10.

Incarceration and probation – An adult will be incarcerated and on probation at only the county, state or federal level, and a juvenile will be incarcerated and on probation at either the county or state level. The Clark County, Nevada, residential treatment program reported that more than 90 percent of convicted criminals recidivate within a three-year period (Wilson, December 2000). According to Basile (December 2005), the re-arrest rate for the highest risk juvenile offenders was a minimum of four times in a three-year period. Therefore, the model assumes that in a given four-year cycle of arrest, prosecution, public defense, trial, incarceration and probation, that an individual is incarcerated for three years and on probation for one year. The average annual state incarceration and probation rate is \$33,399.83 for an adult and \$34,205.36 for a juvenile. The average annual county incarceration and probation rate for an adult is \$1,010.13 and for a juvenile, it is \$9,657.68. The average annual federal incarceration and probation rate for an adult is \$21,515.98.

Human services out of home placement for children in need of protection because of a parent or guardian's incarceration – The average annual cost of \$11,238.39 for one child per adult offender is applied to the total adult cost every year. It is not assumed a child would be returned to the home of the adult offender during the short period of time before re-arrest and incarceration.

The total taxpayer costs avoided for an adult offender is the average of total costs with incarceration and probation at the county, state, and federal levels of government.

(For a juvenile, the total taxpayer costs avoided is the average total cost whether the child is incarcerated and on probation at either the county or state level. Total average cost in 2004 for an adult is \$40,865.32 and for a juvenile is \$32,887.74.

Taxpayer Costs Avoided through Preventing Crime by Activity

Following is a compilation of data collected by type of activity being conducted in response to criminal acts. The taxpayer cost categories are prosecution, public defense, incarceration, probation, court or jury trial, out-of-home placement of children in need of protection because of a parent or guardian's criminal activity, and law enforcement.

The average annual taxpayer cost avoided per adult in 2004 is \$40,865.32 and for a juvenile it is \$32,887.74.

Table VI.15 – Taxpayer Costs Avoided through Preventing Crime by Activity – 2004		
Category	Average Cost/Adult	Average Cost/Juvenile
PROSECUTION COSTS		
County prosecution	\$1,011.35	\$1,011.35
Municipal prosecution	\$128.82	\$128.82
AVERAGE prosecution cost	\$570.09	\$570.09
PUBLIC DEFENDER COSTS		
State public defense	\$350.81	\$322.08
TOTAL public defense cost	\$350.81	\$322.08
CORRECTIONS INCARCERATION COSTS		
State incarceration (2.4% CPI applied)	\$44,297.27	\$44,297.27
County incarceration/out-of-home placement	\$1,111.00	\$11,567.02
Federal incarceration (Natl. CPI to data)	\$27,816.10	N/A
PROBATION COSTS		
County/state probation (2.4% CPI applied)	\$707.51	\$3,929.64
Federal probation (Natl. CPI to data)	\$2,615.63	N/A
CORRECTIONS INCARCERATION/PROBATION COSTS – 3 years/1year		
AVERAGE State incarceration/probation	\$33,399.83	\$34,205.36
AVERAGE County incarceration/probation	\$1,010.13	\$9,657.68
AVERAGE Federal incarceration/probation	\$21,515.98	N/A
JURY and COURT TRIAL COSTS		
State courts	\$5,565.40	\$5,565.40
TOTAL jury or court trial cost	\$5,565.40	\$5,565.40
HUMAN SERVICES – CHILD PROTECTION – OUT OF HOME PLACEMENT COSTS		
County human services– (1) ChiPs OHP	\$11,238.39	N/A
TOTAL human services-child protection cost	\$11,238.39	N/A
LAW ENFORCEMENT COSTS		
County sheriff	\$3,417.60	\$3,417.60
Municipal police	\$5,579.69	\$5,579.69
AVERAGE law enforcement cost	\$4,498.65	\$4,498.65
TOTAL (County incarceration/probation)	\$23,233.47	\$20,613.90
TOTAL (State incarceration/probation)	\$55,623.17	\$45,161.58
TOTAL (Federal incarceration/probation)	\$43,739.32	N/A

Taxpayer Costs Avoided through Preventing Crime by Level of Government

Because policy makers are making decisions on tax expenditures at the municipal, county, state, and federal levels of government, taxpayer costs avoided are also provided by level of government providing the service.

Table VI.16 – Taxpayer Costs Avoided through Preventing Crime by Level of Government – 2004		
Category	Average Cost/Adult	Average Cost/Juvenile
MUNICIPAL COSTS		
Police	\$5,579.69	\$5,579.69
Prosecution	\$128.82	\$128.82
SUB-TOTAL municipal costs	\$5,708.51	\$5,708.51
COUNTY COSTS		
Sheriff	\$3,417.60	\$3,417.60
Prosecution	\$1,011.35	\$1,011.35
Probation/incarceration/out of home place	\$1,010.13	\$9,657.68
Human services - out of home placement	\$11,238.39	N/A
SUB-TOTAL county costs	\$16,677.47	\$14,086.63
AVERAGE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT and PROSECUTION		
AVERAGE local law enforcement costs	\$570.09	\$570.09
AVERAGE local prosecution costs	\$4,498.65	\$4,498.65
STATE COSTS		
Public defense	\$350.81	\$322.08
Courts	\$5,565.40	\$5,565.40
Probation (county level)/incarceration	\$33,399.83	\$34,205.36
TOTAL state costs	\$39,316.04	\$40,092.84
FEDERAL COSTS		
Incarceration and probation	\$21,515.98	N/A
TOTAL federal costs	\$21,515.98	N/A
TOTAL (County incarceration/probation)	\$23,233.47	\$20,613.90
TOTAL (State incarceration/probation)	\$55,623.17	\$45,161.58
TOTAL (Federal incarceration/probation)	\$43,739.32	N/A

The average annual taxpayer cost avoided per adult in 2004 is \$40,865.32 and for a juvenile it is \$32,887.74.

Taxpayer Costs Avoided through Preventing Crime – Age 10 through Age 25

In Minnesota a juvenile cannot be charged with a crime until age 10. For comparison purposes, juveniles are therefore defined as being age 10 through 17 years old. The average adult criminal span in years is age 18 through 25 years old. When the juvenile reaches age 18 he or she enters the adult criminal justice system. Without intervention, the individual progresses through the justice system from age 10 through age 25. The 21-year (1984 through 2004) average consumer price index is 3.05 percent per year (Consumer price index, n.d.).

Table VI.17 – Juveniles and Adults - Age 10 through 25 (Four offenses, four-year cycle – prosecution, public defense, trial, law enforcement, incarceration-3 years, and probation-1 year)		
Year	Age	Taxpayer Costs Avoided with 3.05% Average Annual CPI
2004	10	\$32,887.74
2005	11	\$55,488.17
2006	12	\$78,777.91
2006	13	\$102,777.99
2008	14	\$140,630.52
2009	15	\$179,637.56
2010	16	\$219,834.30
2011	17	\$261,257.04
2012	18	\$333,414.10
2013	19	\$407,771.95
2014	20	\$484,397.72
2015	21	\$563,360.56
2016	22	\$661,971.02
2017	23	\$763,589.08
2018	24	\$868,306.51
2019	25	\$976,217.81

The conservative answer to the question, “How much taxpayer cost is avoided by preventing one child from becoming a career criminal?” is \$976,217.81.

This figure, \$976,217.81, can be used as a powerful tool when measured against the cost of research-based juvenile crime prevention programs that have been proven effective.

Policy Implications for Elected Officials

Government officials are responsible for collecting taxes to provide safety and security to their constituents. One aspect of public safety is preventing crime. In making the decision to either fund or not fund certain crime prevention activities, officials would likely find it helpful to understand the value and benefits associated with that decision. Costs associated with crime prevention efforts at one level of government could reap benefits at another level. Therefore, knowing costs to their respective level of government for municipal and county prosecution, state public defense, state, county and federal incarceration and probation, state courts, county out-of-home placement for children in need of protection based on parental criminal activity, and county and municipal law enforcement, can also be helpful.

CHAPTER VII

Conclusion – “*Why does the system only offer a pound of cure, when an ounce of prevention is what we need?*”

- Welfare client, Ramsey County, Minnesota

The primary public policy issue associated with juvenile crime prevention is public safety. Serious and violent crime being committed by juveniles is increasing (Dawson, February 18, 1995). Reporting on a presentation about violent crime, Dawson (February 18, 1995) stated that the murder rate among white male teenagers doubled in the past decade and tripled for black male teenagers. If long-term solutions are not implemented, the criminal activity will continue into adulthood. In *Hard Time for Hard Youths: A Battle Producing Few Winners*, Treaster (December 28, 1994) states that up to 75 percent of youth offenders re-offend. The societal benefits of increased public safety are apparent, whereas the costs to taxpayers are not.

Allocation of Funds to Proven Crime Prevention Efforts

Dr. Peter Greenwood (January 25, 2001) listed the risk factors for youth violence as physiological traits, family characteristics, abuse and/or neglect, inadequate parenting, school problems, early onset of delinquency and drug use, delinquent peers, and extent of delinquency. He indicated there are three categories for judging a program's effectiveness: Promising – a good, popular idea; Proven – experimental evidence exists

and it has been or can be replicated; and Cost-effective – estimated benefits exceed costs. He stated that the common characteristics of effective programs include those that are theoretically grounded, evidence-based, multi-faceted, highly targeted, costly on a per client basis, and that the programs sometimes pay for themselves many times over. The projects covered in the Blueprints Program mentioned by Greenwood (January 25, 2001) are Nurse Home Visitation, Alternative Thinking Strategies, Bullying Prevention Program, Midwestern Prevention Project, Life Skills Training, Big Brothers Big Sisters, Quantum Opportunity, Multi Systemic Therapy, Functional Family Therapy, and Treatment Foster Care. The results of the projects included convictions being reduced by 81 percent through Nurse Home Visiting and by 85 percent with MST, arrests reduced by 50 percent and 61 percent, respectively, through Functional Family Therapy and Treatment Foster Care, and crimes being reduced by 13 percent through mentoring (Greenwood, January 25, 2001). In determining which method is best, the effect size, cost, targeting ratio, crimes prevented and cost savings, other benefits and local needs, and capacity must be taken into consideration (Greenwood, January 25, 2001).

The five research-based juvenile crime prevention programs analyzed in Chapter Three are All Children Excel (ACE), Multi Systemic Therapy (MST), The 8 Percent Solution, Functional Family Therapy (FFT), and Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC). The taxpayer costs avoided tool was applied to each of the five juvenile crime prevention models. A matrix was prepared with a brief description of the program, primary partners involved with its implementation, a partial list of documented or proven outcomes, the average annual cost for the juvenile crime prevention effort, the first year taxpayer costs avoided, and the projected lifetime savings.

First year taxpayer costs avoided were calculated by subtracting the per person first year cost to implement the crime prevention program from the projected first year taxpayer costs avoided. Lifetime direct taxpayer costs avoided could be calculated by applying the 3.05 percent average consumer price index used for the costs avoided to the annual cost of program implementation. If implementation occurs in less than one year, the total cost reflected in the table would be avoided in subsequent years. Another option that will likely be used by policymakers is to calculate taxpayer costs avoided by the level of government paying for the crime prevention efforts.

All Children Excel (ACE) – Ramsey County, Minnesota:

ACE targets the youngest children, ages six through nine, of the five programs studied. Once the ACE child is identified as high or very high risk of becoming a serious, violent and chronic offender, every member of that child's family receives services through ACE. Services will be provided to the family through ACE until the target child reaches age 18. The average cost per day for ACE is \$25 and the average family size is 4.3 (Melton, February 28, 2006). Ramsey County is the implementing agency for ACE at a cost of \$9,125 per family, although the total cost and taxpayer costs avoided are credited to only the ACE target child. The total taxpayer costs avoided for the ACE child in 2004 are \$23,762.74. With inflation of program implementation costs from age six through age 17, the lifetime savings is \$842,386.12. This figure does not include taxpayer costs avoided from age six through nine, even though local law enforcement and out of home placement costs may be experienced, because a juvenile cannot be charged with a crime in Minnesota until he or she reaches age 10.

Multi Systemic Therapy (MST):

MST is implemented with youth ages 12 to 17 and involves their family and community. The cost for MST ranges between \$4,500 and \$6,000 per youth and services are generally provided over a four to six month period. The average cost per youth served is \$5,250. The total taxpayer costs avoided in 2004 through implementing MST is \$27,637.74. Because MST is implemented in less than a year, subsequent annual savings would be at full value. Costs avoided would begin at age 12. For the 14-year period after MST is implemented, the total taxpayer costs avoided would be \$758,339.08.

The 8 Percent Solution – Orange County, California:

The 8 Percent Solution is implemented at the county level and works with the identified eight percent of youth that are most likely to become chronic offenders. The cost per youth is estimated at \$14,000 per year. The timeframe for implementation is unclear in the documentation, although it appears to be completed within one year. Using the taxpayer costs avoided tool, The 8 Percent Solution would save taxpayers \$18,887.74 in 2004. Over the following 16-year period, the total taxpayer costs avoided would be \$962,217.81. If implementation takes more than one year, each additional years cost with inflation would need to be subtracted from this total.

Functional Family Therapy (FFT):

FFT targets at risk youth ages 11 to 18 and their family. Implementation involves two 90-day program periods with each family. FFT is funded through the county in Ramsey County, Minnesota. The cost per family ranges from \$1,350 to \$3,750 per family per year, with the average at \$2,550. As with ACE, the full cost of FFT implementation and the taxpayer costs avoided are accrued only to the FFT child, even though all

members of the family will see positive impacts. The taxpayer costs avoided in 2004 through implementation of FFT is \$30,337.74. Cost savings begin at age 11. All costs for implementation are incurred in the first year. Total taxpayer costs avoided for the subsequent 15-year period would be \$865,756.51.

Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC):

Family therapy is provided to teenagers and their family members through MTFC. The program is implemented over a period of six to nine months. The goal is to return the troubled youth to their family home at the end of the program. The average stay is seven months and costs \$2,691 per month for a total of \$18,837 per year. Although services are provided to family members MTFC primarily focuses on the target youth. Therefore, the annual costs and savings are based on one person. In 2004, the first year taxpayer costs avoided through MTFC would be \$14,050.74. Costs avoided begin when youth are teenagers with all costs for implementation occurring in less than a year. Assuming age 13 at the time MTFC is implemented, the total cost savings for this 13-year period would be \$643,134.02.

Table VII.1 – Crime Prevention Strategies – Taxpayer Costs Avoided					
Program	Description	Primary partners	Proven Results	Annual cost	Taxpayer costs avoided
All Children Excel - ACE Ramsey County, MN Melton (February 28, 2006)	Identify 6-9 yr olds at high or very high risk of becoming chronic, serious and violent criminal offenders-intensive treatment Implementation costs over a 12-year period	County Schools Police Family	86% no further charges; 66% attended school, no problem behaviors, earn passing grades	\$25 per day/family \$9125/ACE youth	First year-2004 \$23,762.74 Lifetime: 10-26 yrs old (16 years) \$842,386.12
Multi Systemic Therapy - MST www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/model/programs/MST.html	12-17 year olds who are chronic, violent or substance abusing, at high risk of out of home placement; work with youth and their family at home and in community Implementation < 1 yr	City County Schools Family	25-70% reductions in rearrest; 47-64% reductions in out-of-home placement	\$4,500 to \$6,000 per youth Average-\$5,250/MS T youth	First year-2004 \$27,637.74 Lifetime: 12-26 yrs old (14 years) \$758,339.08
The 8 Percent Solution Orange County, CA Mendel (2001)	Identify 8% of youth that will become chronic offenders – intensive treatment, substance abuse focus Implementation < 1 yr	County Schools Family	Significantly reduced offending behavior	\$14,000 per individual	First year-2004 \$18,887.74 Lifetime: 10-26 yrs old (16 years) \$962,217.81
Functional Family Therapy – FFT www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/model/programs/FFT.html	Two 90-day programs with an average of 12 home visits per family; At risk youth 11-18; 8-26 hours of direct service to youth and their families Implementation < 1 yr	County State Family	Prevented further problem incidents with referred youth and younger siblings	\$1,350 to \$3,750 per family Average-\$2550 per FFT youth	First year-2004 \$30,337.74 Lifetime: 11-26 yrs old (15 years) \$865,756.51
Multi-dimensional Treatment Foster Care - MTFC www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/model/programs/MTFC.html	Teenagers with histories of chronic and severe criminal behavior; family therapy provided - goal of youth returning to home Implementation < 1 yr	County Schools State Family	60% fewer days incarcerated at 1 year; 3 times less run-aways from program	Average stay is 7 months @ \$2,691 per month \$18,837 per MTFC youth	First year-2004 \$14,050.74 Lifetime: 13-26 yrs old (13 years) \$643,134.02

The Political Will and the Public's Demand to Prevent Crime and Save Money

In *Public Policymaking, Fourth Edition* (2000), Anderson describes the top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementing public policies. Top-down focuses on the actions and goals of the top-level officials. The main premise of bottom-up is that more attention needs to be paid to the lower-level officials who are ultimately part of the bureaucracy that will implement public policies (Anderson, 2000). The approach that will work best is often dependent on financial resources and knowledgeable staff. If there is funding for staff and materials for start-up or a pilot project, a bottom-up approach would likely be the easiest (Anderson, 2000). The implementers will be able to establish a track record to present to the top-level officials at the point it is ready to be expanded. If funding is a major roadblock, then top-down focus is necessary (Anderson, 2000). A champion for the public policy or program is in a better position to convince his or her peers about the importance of funding and implementing certain activities.

There are many other stakeholders to consider when advocating for a public policy change. Anderson (2000) discusses influencing factors such as the legislature, the courts, pressure groups, community organizations, and administrative agencies. Each of these players has a role in public policy, which varies in significance based on either the top-down or bottom-up approach (Anderson, 2000). For example, in a top-down effort, the legislature is key and in a bottom-up approach, administrative agencies and community organizations play a larger role.

Taxpayers want accountability from their elected officials. The adoption and implementation of a public policy, which in this case would allocate funding to crime

prevention efforts, has stumbling blocks in either a top-down or bottom-up approach, because the public safety and public health goals of elected officials are longer term. The anticipated positive outcomes often exceed a term in office, are difficult to measure, and are not easily attributable to the actions taken years earlier by an elected official. This is not to say elected officials will only take action if they can see an immediate benefit. Rather, the stronger the argument in terms of verifiable outcomes, the easier it is for the official to justify his or her advocacy and vote when questioned by taxpayers. The taxpayers hold public officials accountable for feeling safe and secure in their communities, workplaces and homes and for how their tax money is spent.

A champion at the top level is critical to adopting a crime prevention policy. This champion may try to place unreasonable outcomes on the bottom- or street-level bureaucrats because of the political need to produce immediate, meaning during their term of office, results. For a public policy to be successful, buy-in is needed by the bureaucratic implementers. If the implementers believe too much pressure or attention is on the elected officials expectations, these lower-level officials can avoid, ignore or divert the policy (Anderson, 2000). When the concept of a juvenile crime prevention program was introduced in Ramsey County, Minnesota, there was resistance from department directors. The director of Budget and Accounting did not believe staff or community agencies would be willing to accept outcome-based budgeting across departmental lines. The directors of the Corrections, Public Health, and Human Services departments were concerned about loss of funding within the individual departments because of consolidation. It was not until an inventory of juvenile crime prevention efforts was conducted and staff could see the lack of coordination between departments

and the opportunities to leverage their work to better the lives of high risk children and families, that the directors and line staff bought in to developing and implementing All Children Excel (ACE).

Kingdon (1995) also references the influences on elected officials in public policymaking. Kingdon's multiple streams framework (1995) refers to the problem stream, the political stream, the policy stream, and the policy window. In Kingdon's (1995) political stream he includes interest groups, the media, public opinion or mood, election results, Congress, and changes of administration. Knowledge of the taxpayer costs avoided through preventing crime can assist the policymaker in keeping the policy window open long enough to line up the necessary support in the other streams to introduce the problem, offer solutions, adopt policies, and implement crime prevention programs.


The problem stream for preventing crime includes an increase in serious and violent crime being committed by juveniles, government funding for non-mandated services becoming scarcer because policymakers are reluctant to raise taxes or feel pressured to reduce taxes, lack of accountability in terms of reducing juvenile crime, and increasing risk factors such as abuse, neglect, chemical dependency and mental health issues.

The crime prevention policy stream includes having more information available to the judiciary, public health and safety professionals, school officials, and the community about research- and evidence-based crime prevention programs, such as ACE, FFT, MST, The 8 Percent Solution, and MTFC.

The politics stream for preventing crime stems from the public mood and awareness about increased risk to public health and safety. Major events like the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center or school shootings in Columbine, Colorado, or on the Red Lake Reservation in Minnesota, left people feeling less safe in their communities. More attention is also being focused on issues closer to home like the devastating impacts on families of domestic violence and methamphetamine use. Local, state and federal elected officials are facing increased demand by their constituents to help them feel safer whether they are at home, work, school or play.

The policy window to prevent crime in a cost effective manner is currently open, the research-based policies are readily available, and the politics are favorable to take action.

Policy makers are also interested in which level of government will benefit from expending funds on prevention, which generally falls on county government in Minnesota. Beuhring (March 15, 2001) estimated that between 85.5 percent and 95.2 percent of the savings take place during adulthood, with the primary beneficiary being the state.



The previous cost of crime research conducted did not focus on the actual cost to taxpayers of criminal activity. Rather, a broader approach regarding the opportunity and/or avoided costs to society in general have been measured. In addition, measuring actual out-of-pocket costs to taxpayers of the criminal justice system results in a lower per person cost than the average daily costs. For example, Frickson (July 18, 2006) reported daily costs of \$100 for juvenile corrections, \$88 for adult corrections, \$281 for civil commitment of a sex offender, and \$485 for a mentally ill and dangerous offender. Although the daily costs could have been used, they would have inflated the taxpayer costs avoided beyond the tax bill actually being paid. The results of this research will provide government policymakers with data to measure the actual costs each level of government could potentially avoid by preventing crime.

What do we know and what is missing in the analysis surrounding crime prevention programs? We know that preventing crime is good for society. We know that some crime prevention efforts are successful and some are not, and that the cost associated with implementing crime prevention programs varies. Many crime prevention efforts are proving they are effective at reducing crime, according to the OJJDP (2005). Successful programs are research based, have measurable outcomes, and a strong evaluation component (OJJDP, 2005). We also know that cost and benefit analyses to society of preventing crime have been conducted on a variety of topics, such as the cost for drug abusers, high school dropouts, prisoners, victims of crime, and business owners. What we do not know, and what is covered in this study, are the direct public costs avoided to taxpayers by level of government through preventing crime.

With government financial resources becoming more and more limited, quantitative research for government policymakers will show that an investment in preventing crime as early in life as possible can be cost effective. This study focused on the taxpayer costs associated with individuals who have committed criminal offenses. In using this information to assess the cost-effectiveness of a crime prevention program, it is important that the tax impact be measured for crime prevention programs that serve individuals who are likely to commit criminal offenses.

Each of the five crime prevention strategies described save significant taxpayer dollars by avoiding costs associated with addressing criminal behavior. The earlier in life juvenile crime prevention efforts are implemented, the more taxpayer costs and human suffering can be avoided. The taxpayer costs avoided through preventing crime tool can be used to demonstrate that if an effective juvenile crime prevention program is implemented we can save money and save lives. This is a message that will resonate with policymakers and the public alike.

We have a choice to make, we can pay now or pay later when the likelihood of successful intervention is lower and the cost is higher (Belton, et al., May 8, 2003).

Taxpayer cost avoided through preventing crime – An ounce of prevention in the form of an effective juvenile crime prevention program most often costs less than the pound of cure offered through arrest, prosecution, public defense, probation, and incarceration.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

National Consumer Price Index

21-Year Average CPI is 3.05%

Year	Consumer price index	
1984	3.90%	1.039
1985	3.80%	1.038
1986	1.10%	1.011
1987	4.40%	1.044
1988	4.40%	1.044
1989	4.60%	1.046
1990	6.10%	1.061
1991	3.10%	1.031
1992	2.90%	1.029
1993	2.70%	1.027
1994	2.70%	1.027
1995	2.50%	1.025
1996	3.30%	1.033
1997	1.70%	1.017
1998	1.60%	1.016
1999	2.70%	1.027
2000	3.40%	1.034
2001	1.60%	1.016
2002	2.40%	1.024
2003	1.90%	1.019
2004	3.30%	1.033
AVERAGE	3.05%	1.03052381

APPENDIX B

Municipal Law Enforcement/Police Costs 2004

MUNICIPAL LAW ENFORCEMENT/POLICE COSTS 2004			
Municipality	Police Costs	Supreme Court Charges - 50 percent	Cost per charge filed
Municipalities A – G	\$4,825,970.00		
Municipality H	\$463,030.00		
Municipality I	\$240,818.00		
Municipality J	\$5,947,160.00		
Municipality K	\$3,174,100.00		
Municipality L	\$1,888,169.00		
Municipality M	\$1,484,046.00		
Municipality N	\$4,599,000.00		
Municipality O	\$67,705,337.00		
Municipality P	\$2,618,782.00		
Total	\$92,946,412.00	16,658	\$5,579.69

County population is 515,411.

Percentage of population $(515,411 - 2143 = 513,268)$ for which police costs were provided is 99.58 percent.

Total criminal Supreme Court charges filed for County x 50 percent is 16,728 (33,455 total – 50 percent county and 50 percent municipal). $16,728 \times 99.58 \text{ percent} = 16,658$.

Average law enforcement cost includes municipal police and county sheriff costs.

Average cost of \$570.09 is included in state and federal law enforcement/police costs once every four years.

APPENDIX C

County Sheriff Costs 2004

COUNTY SHERIFF COSTS - 2004			
County	Total Cost	Supreme Court Charges –50 percent	Cost per charge filed
County A	\$31,614,096.00	16,727	\$1,890.00
County B	\$18,843,234.95	7,539	\$2,499.43
County C	\$11,165,455.52	1,148	\$9,726.01
County D	\$5,193,367.00	1,604	\$3,237.76
County E	\$23,739,731.00	8,843	\$2,684.58
County F	\$61,119,321.00	19,566	\$3,123.75
County G	\$798,504.00	543	\$1,470.54
County H	\$697,992.00	327	\$2,134.53
County I	\$14,587,214.00	2,367	\$6,162.74
County J	\$18,312,302.00	6,287	\$2,912.72
County K	\$933,860.29	496	\$1,882.78
County L	\$20,720,200.00	5,815	\$3,563.23
County M	\$11,074,075.00	3,526	\$3,140.69

Average sheriff cost per case – 2004	\$3,417.60
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Total criminal Supreme Court charges filed for each county x 50 percent (50 percent county and 50 percent municipal).

Average law enforcement cost includes municipal police and county sheriff costs. Average cost of \$570.09 is included in state and federal law enforcement/police costs once every four years.

APPENDIX D

County Prosecution Costs 2004

COUNTY PROSECUTION COSTS - 2004							
Prosecution Costs				Major Supreme Court Charges			Cost per charge filed
Co	Adult	Juvenile	Total	Adult	Juvenile	Total	Per Adult or Juvenile
A	\$6,807,176.87	\$1,318,897.00	\$8,126,073.87	5235	1014	6249	\$1,300.38
B	\$2,095,208.00	\$1,658,706.00	\$3,753,914.00	2036	1611	3647	\$1,029.32
C	\$585,488.84	\$113,435.80	\$698,924.64	665	129	794	\$880.26
D	\$2,692,071.00	\$563,528.00	\$3,255,599.00	3514	735	4249	\$766.20
E	\$13,214,479.00	\$4,417,222.00	\$17,631,701.00	9969	3332	13301	\$1,325.59
F	\$283,312.00	\$54,890.00	\$338,202.00	223	43	266	\$1,271.44
G	\$1,060,000.00	\$210,000.00	\$1,270,000.00	1194	237	1431	\$887.49
H	\$676,473.00	\$157,448	\$833,921.00	699	163	862	\$967.43
I	\$1,697,754.00	\$505,953.00	\$2,203,707.00	2078	619	2697	\$817.10
J	\$1,170,300.00	\$614,100.00	\$1,784,400.00	1348	707	2055	\$868.32
Average county prosecution cost per charge filed for adult or juvenile							\$1,011.35

Supreme Court charges are for major criminal charges at the county level. Minor criminal charges are at the municipal level.

Average prosecution costs include municipal and county attorney costs. Average cost of \$4,498.65 is included in state and federal prosecution costs once every four years.

APPENDIX E

Municipal Prosecution Costs 2004

Munic	Prosecution Costs	Minor Criminal Supreme Court Charges Filed	Cost per charge filed
B	\$1,222.75		
C	\$10,677.00		
D	\$117,900.00		
E	\$44,520.00		
F	\$50,150.00		
G	\$56,100.00		
H	\$125,835.00		
I	\$2,783,804.00		
J	\$57,600.00		
K	\$86,493.00		
L	\$30,000.00		
Total	\$3,364,301.75	24,358	\$138.12

County A population is 515,411.

Percentage of population ($515,411 - 53,986 = 461,425$) for which prosecution costs were provided is 89.53 percent.

Total minor criminal Supreme Court charges filed for County A is 27,206.

$27,206 \times 89.53$ percent = 24,358 minor criminal charges.

MUNICIPAL PROSECUTION COSTS - 2004 - COUNTY M			
Munic	Prosecution Costs	Minor Criminal Supreme Court Charges Filed	Cost per charge filed
N	\$466,924		
O	\$181,672		
P	\$78,000		
Total	\$726,596.00	6,079	\$119.53

County M population is 316,830.

Percentage of population ($316,830 - 189,077 = 127,753$) for which prosecution costs were provided is 40.32 percent.

Total minor criminal Supreme Court charges filed for County M is 15,078

$15,078 \times 40.32$ percent = 6,079.

Average municipal prosecution cost per charge filed for adult or juvenile	\$128.82
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Average prosecution cost includes municipal and county attorney costs. Average cost of \$4,498.65 is included in state and federal prosecution costs once every four years.

APPENDIX F

District Court Costs 2004

DISTRICT COURT COSTS - 2004		
Expense	*Jury Trial	**Court Trial
Judge salary	\$1,553.00	\$1,109.60
Court reporter salary	\$508.58	\$305.15
Law clerk salary	\$443.85	\$295.90
Court clerks salary (2)	\$665.76	\$443.84
Deputy sheriff salary	\$610.29	\$406.86
***Juror payments	\$2,556.75	N/A
Administrative support	\$110.96	\$110.96
Total Court Costs	\$6,449.19	\$2,672.31

*Based on estimated average of 2.5-day jury trials.

**Based on estimated average of 1.5-day court trials.

Judge's salary: Court time plus an additional day for arraignment, pre-trial, motions, and case preparation.

Law clerk's salary: Additional half day added to court time to include case entry and case management.

Deputy sheriff's salary: Additional half day added to court time to account for defendant transportation to and from the courtroom.

***Juror payments: Based on average juror payments according to the Minnesota Supreme Court of \$2,556.75 per jury trial. (\$243.50 per sworn juror, 10.5 jurors. The 10.5 juror per jury trial is based on an average of seven and 14 juror panels.)

District Court information obtained from three judicial districts/counties and the State of Minnesota Supreme Court records for September 2005.

Percentage of jury trials and court trials average .766 and .234, respectively.
 $(.766 \times \$6,449.19) + (.234 \times \$2,672.31) = \$4,940.08 + \$625.32 = \$5,565.40$

Average court costs per adult or juvenile is \$5,565.40.

Jury and court trial costs are included in county, state and federal costs once every four years.

APPENDIX G

County Corrections Adult Incarceration Costs 2004

COUNTY CORRECTIONS ADULT INCARCERATION COSTS - 2004			
County	County Corrections Adult Incarceration Costs	Number of Adults	Cost per adult per year
County A	\$12,020,215.00	4772	\$2,518.91
County B	\$4,439,760.00	4293	\$1,034.19
County C	\$762,963.00	1177	\$648.23
County D	\$158,163.00	228	\$693.70
County E	\$7,305,300.00	7605	\$960.59
County F	\$3,943,399.00	4866	\$810.40
Total	\$28,629,800.00	22941	

Average county corrections incarceration/out of home placement costs.	\$1,111.00
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Average annual county, state, or federal adult incarceration and probation costs are calculated using three years incarcerated and one year on probation. Average, annual county and state juvenile incarceration and probation costs are calculated using the same formula.

Average annual state incarceration and probation for an adult is \$33,399.83 and for a juvenile, it is \$34,205.36.

Average annual county incarceration and probation for an adult is \$1,010.13 and for a juvenile, it is \$9,657.68.

Average annual federal incarceration and probation for an adult is \$21,515.98.

The total taxpayer costs avoided through preventing crime is the average of incarceration and probation at the county, state and federal levels for an adult (\$18,641.98) and at the county and state level for a juvenile (\$21,931.52).

APPENDIX H

County Corrections Juvenile Incarceration/Out of Home Placement Costs 2004

COUNTY CORRECTIONS INCARCERATION/OUT OF HOME PLACEMENT COSTS - JUVENILES 2004			
County	County Corrections-Juvenile Incarceration/OHP Costs	Number of Juveniles	Cost per juvenile/year
County A	\$7,628,890.00	810	\$9,418.38
County B	\$62,508.00	6	\$10,418.00
County C	\$4,144,442.00	462	\$8,970.65
Counties D & E	\$419,065.00	24	\$17,461.04
Total	\$12,254,905.00	1302	

Average juvenile county corrections incarceration/out of home placement costs.	\$11,567.02
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Average annual county, state, or federal adult incarceration and probation costs are calculated using three years incarcerated and one year on probation. Average, annual county and state juvenile incarceration and probation costs are calculated using the same formula.

Average annual state incarceration and probation for an adult is \$33,399.83 and for a juvenile, it is \$34,205.36.

Average annual county incarceration and probation for an adult is \$1,010.13 and for a juvenile, it is \$9,657.68.

Average annual federal incarceration and probation for an adult is \$21,515.98.

The total taxpayer costs avoided through preventing crime is the average of incarceration and probation at the county, state and federal levels for an adult (\$18,641.98) and at the county and state level for a juvenile (\$21,931.52).

APPENDIX I

Federal Incarceration Costs

Federal prison cost per adult inmate per year in 1997 was \$23,542.

Year	Consumer price index		Federal prison cost/year
1997			\$23,542.00
1998	1.60%	1.016	\$23,918.67
1999	2.70%	1.027	\$24,564.48
2000	3.40%	1.034	\$25,399.67
2001	1.60%	1.016	\$25,806.06
2002	2.40%	1.024	\$26,425.41
2003	1.90%	1.019	\$26,927.49
2004	3.30%	1.033	\$27,816.10

Average annual county, state, or federal adult incarceration and probation costs are calculated using three years incarcerated and one year on probation. Average, annual county and state juvenile incarceration and probation costs are calculated using the same formula.

Average annual state incarceration and probation for an adult is \$33,399.83 and for a juvenile, it is \$34,205.36.

Average annual county incarceration and probation for an adult is \$1,010.13 and for a juvenile, it is \$9,657.68.

Average annual federal incarceration and probation for an adult is \$21,515.98.

The total taxpayer costs avoided through preventing crime is the average of incarceration and probation at the county, state and federal levels for an adult (\$18,641.98) and at the county and state level for a juvenile (\$21,931.52).

APPENDIX J

Human Service Out of Home Placement Costs for Children with Parent or Guardian Criminal Activity 2004

CHILD PROTECTION SERVICES COSTS - 2004			
County	Out of Home Placement Budget	Individuals in Out of Home Placement	Cost/individual
County A	\$17,756,691.00	933	\$19,031.82
County B	\$2,198,400.00	212	\$10,369.81
County C	\$1,262,546.00	129	\$9,787.18
County D	\$825,000.00	73	\$11,301.37
County E	\$23,364,955.00	1661	\$14,066.80
County F	\$419,065.00	55	\$7,619.36
County G	\$260,000.00	48	\$5,416.67
County H	\$3,041,591.00	247	\$12,314.13
	\$49,128,248.00	3358	

Average child protection out of home placement costs.	\$11,238.39
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Human Services out of home placement for child protection is a result of parent or guardian criminal activity. Therefore, the cost of child protection out of home placement is charged against the adult cost of crime. The model conservatively assumes one child per adult offender and is applied to each adult year.

APPENDIX K

Federal Probation/Parole Costs

Federal probation cost per adult inmate on probation/parole (marijuana charge) in 1983 was \$1,393.

Year	Consumer price index		Federal probation cost
1983			\$1,393.00
1984	3.90%	1.039	\$1,447.33
1985	3.80%	1.038	\$1,502.33
1986	1.10%	1.011	\$1,518.85
1987	4.40%	1.044	\$1,585.68
1988	4.40%	1.044	\$1,655.45
1989	4.60%	1.046	\$1,731.60
1990	6.10%	1.061	\$1,837.23
1991	3.10%	1.031	\$1,894.18
1992	2.90%	1.029	\$1,949.11
1993	2.70%	1.027	\$2,001.74
1994	2.70%	1.027	\$2,055.79
1995	2.50%	1.025	\$2,107.18
1996	3.30%	1.033	\$2,176.72
1997	1.70%	1.017	\$2,213.72
1998	1.60%	1.016	\$2,249.14
1999	2.70%	1.027	\$2,309.87
2000	3.40%	1.034	\$2,388.41
2001	1.60%	1.016	\$2,426.62
2002	2.40%	1.024	\$2,484.86
2003	1.90%	1.019	\$2,532.07
2004	3.30%	1.033	\$2,615.63

Consumer Price Index inflated cost per year for federal probation is \$2,615.63. Average annual county, state, or federal adult incarceration and probation costs are calculated using three years incarcerated and one year on probation. Average, annual county and state juvenile incarceration and probation costs are calculated using the same formula.

Average annual state incarceration and probation for an adult is \$33,399.83 and for a juvenile, it is \$34,205.36.

Average annual county incarceration and probation for an adult is \$1,010.13 and for a juvenile, it is \$9,657.68.

Average annual federal incarceration and probation for an adult is \$21,515.98.

The total taxpayer costs avoided through preventing crime is the average of incarceration and probation at the county, state and federal levels for an adult (\$18,641.98) and at the county and state level for a juvenile (\$21,931.52).

APPENDIX L

County and State Probation Costs – Adults and Juveniles, 2004

ADULTS 2003 (2.4% CPI applied to COST)							JUVENILES 2003 (2.4% CPI applied)		
Co	Felony	Gross Misd	Misd	Total Adults	*Total Cost	Cost/adult	Total Juv.	*Total Cost	*Cost/youth
A	5561	2866	5746	14,173	\$12,579,959.81	\$887.60	1604	\$5,474,088.96	\$3,412.77
B	2365	2941	5530	10,836	\$5,258,482.69	\$485.28	982	\$2,364,780.54	\$2,408.13
C	2965	2143	2342	7450	\$6,990,470.14	\$938.32	736	\$4,578,670.59	\$6,221.02
D	124	155	198	477	\$201,323.52	\$422.06	86	\$373,515.26	\$4,343.20
E	51	69	45	165	\$143,685.63	\$870.82	26	\$71,842.82	\$2,763.19
F	1257	1393	2778	5428	\$3,479,347.20	\$641.00	307	\$1,359,872.00	\$4,429.55
	12323	9567	16639	38,529	\$28,653,268.99		3741	\$14,222,770.17	

Average cost for probation per adult.	\$707.51
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Average cost for probation per youth.	\$3,929.64
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Average annual county, state, or federal adult incarceration and probation costs are calculated using three years incarcerated and one year on probation. Average, annual county and state juvenile incarceration and probation costs are calculated using the same formula.

Average annual state incarceration and probation for an adult is \$33,399.83 and for a juvenile, it is \$34,205.36.

Average annual county incarceration and probation for an adult is \$1,010.13 and for a juvenile, it is \$9,657.68.

Average annual federal incarceration and probation for an adult is \$21,515.98.

The total taxpayer costs avoided through preventing crime is the average of incarceration and probation at the county, state and federal levels for an adult (\$18,641.98) and at the county and state level for a juvenile (\$21,931.52).

APPENDIX M

State Corrections Adult and Juvenile Incarceration Costs 2004

STATE CORRECTIONS ADULT and JUVENILE INCARCERATION COSTS 2004			
State Corrections Adult and Juvenile Incarceration Costs		Number of Adults and Juveniles	Cost per adult or juvenile per year
2004	\$375,729,471.00	8482	\$44,297.27

Average adult and juvenile state corrections incarceration costs.	\$44,297.27
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Average annual county, state, or federal adult incarceration and probation costs are calculated using three years incarcerated and one year on probation. Average, annual county and state juvenile incarceration and probation costs are calculated using the same formula.

Average annual state incarceration and probation for an adult is \$33,399.83 and for a juvenile, it is \$34,205.36.

Average annual county incarceration and probation for an adult is \$1,010.13 and for a juvenile, it is \$9,657.68.

Average annual federal incarceration and probation for an adult is \$21,515.98.

The total taxpayer costs avoided through preventing crime is the average of incarceration and probation at the county, state and federal levels for an adult (\$18,641.98) and at the county and state level for a juvenile (\$21,931.52).

APPENDIX N

Costs Avoided through Preventing Crime by Cost Category 2004

TAXPAYER COSTS AVOIDED THROUGH PREVENTING CRIME – 2004		
Category	Average Cost/Adult	Average Cost/Juvenile
PROSECUTION COSTS		
County prosecution	\$1,011.35	\$1,011.35
Municipal prosecution	\$128.82	\$128.82
AVERAGE prosecution cost	\$570.09	\$570.09
PUBLIC DEFENDER COSTS		
State public defense	\$350.81	\$322.08
TOTAL public defense cost	\$350.81	\$322.08
CORRECTIONS INCARCERATION COSTS		
State incarceration (2.4% CPI applied)	\$44,297.27	\$44,297.27
County incarceration/out-of-home placement	\$1,111.00	\$11,567.02
Federal incarceration (Natl. CPI to data)	\$27,816.10	N/A
PROBATION COSTS		
County/state probation (2.4% CPI applied)	\$707.51	\$3,929.64
Federal probation (Natl. CPI to data)	\$2,615.63	N/A
CORRECTIONS INCARCERATION/PROBATION COSTS – 3 years/1year		
AVERAGE State incarceration/probation	\$33,399.83	\$34,205.36
AVERAGE County incarceration/ probation	\$1,010.13	\$9,657.68
AVERAGE Federal incarceration/probation	\$21,515.98	N/A
JURY and COURT TRIAL COSTS		
State courts	\$5,565.40	\$5,565.40
TOTAL jury or court trial cost	\$5,565.40	\$5,565.40
HUMAN SERVICES–CHILD PROTECTION–OUT OF HOME PLACEMENT COSTS		
County human services– (1) ChiPs OHP	\$11,238.39	N/A
TOTAL human services-child protection cost	\$11,238.39	N/A
LAW ENFORCEMENT COSTS		
County sheriff	\$3,417.60	\$3,417.60
Municipal police	\$5,579.69	\$5,579.69
AVERAGE law enforcement cost	\$4,498.65	\$4,498.65
TOTAL (County incarceration/probation)	\$23,233.47	\$20,613.90
TOTAL (State incarceration/probation)	\$55,623.17	\$45,161.58
TOTAL (Federal incarceration/probation)	\$43,739.32	N/A

*2.4 percent Consumer Price Index applied for 2004.

**National Consumer Price Index applied to most current data.

Total average cost in 2004 for an adult is \$40,865.32 and for a juvenile is \$32,887.74.

APPENDIX O

Costs Avoided through Preventing Crime by Level of Government 2004

TAXPAYER COSTS AVOIDED THROUGH PREVENTING CRIME – 2004		
Category	Average Cost/Adult	Average Cost/Juvenile
MUNICIPAL COSTS		
Police	\$5,579.69	\$5,579.69
Prosecution	\$128.82	\$128.82
SUB-TOTAL municipal costs	\$5,708.51	\$5,708.51
COUNTY COSTS		
Sheriff	\$3,417.60	\$3,417.60
Prosecution	\$1,011.35	\$1,011.35
Probation/incarceration/out of home place	\$1,010.13	\$9,657.68
Human services - out of home placement	\$11,238.39	N/A
SUB-TOTAL county costs	\$16,677.47	\$14,086.63
AVERAGE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT and PROSECUTION		
AVERAGE local law enforcement costs	\$570.09	\$570.09
AVERAGE local prosecution costs	\$4,498.65	\$4,498.65
STATE COSTS		
Public defense	\$350.81	\$322.08
Courts	\$5,565.40	\$5,565.40
Probation (county level)/incarceration	\$33,399.83	\$34,205.36
TOTAL state costs	\$39,316.04	\$40,092.84
FEDERAL COSTS		
Incarceration and probation	\$21,515.98	N/A
TOTAL federal costs	\$21,515.98	N/A
TOTAL (County incarceration/probation)	\$23,233.47	\$20,613.90
TOTAL (State incarceration/probation)	\$55,623.17	\$45,161.58
TOTAL (Federal incarceration/probation)	\$43,739.32	N/A

*2.4 percent Consumer Price Index applied for 2004.

**National Consumer Price Index applied to most current data.

Total average cost in 2004 for an adult is \$40,865.32 and for a juvenile is \$32,887.74.

APPENDIX P

Taxpayer Costs Avoided with Inflation – Age 10 through Age 25

Year	Age				
2004	10				\$32,887.74
2005	11	1.0305	\$21,931.52	\$22,600.43	\$55,488.17
2006	12	1.0305	\$22,600.43	\$23,289.74	\$78,777.91
2007	13	1.0305	\$23,289.74	\$24,000.08	\$102,777.99
2008	14	1.0305	\$36,732.20	\$37,852.53	\$140,630.52
2009	15	1.0305	\$37,852.53	\$39,007.03	\$179,637.56
2010	16	1.0305	\$39,007.03	\$40,196.74	\$219,834.30
2011	17	1.0305	\$40,196.74	\$41,422.74	\$261,257.04
2012	18	1.0305	\$70,021.41	\$72,157.06	\$333,414.10
2013	19	1.0305	\$72,157.06	\$74,357.85	\$407,771.95
2014	20	1.0305	\$74,357.85	\$76,625.76	\$484,397.72
2015	21	1.0305	\$76,625.76	\$78,962.85	\$563,360.56
2016	22	1.0305	\$95,691.85	\$98,610.45	\$661,971.02
2017	23	1.0305	\$98,610.45	\$101,618.07	\$763,589.08
2018	24	1.0305	\$101,618.07	\$104,717.42	\$868,306.51
2019	25	1.0305	\$104,717.42	\$107,911.30	\$976,217.81

Assumes: law enforcement, prosecution, public defense, and trial at ages 10, 14, 18 and 22; County, state or federal incarceration for three out of every four years and county, state or federal probation for one out of every four years; One child in need of protection in out of home placement per adult inmate; and 21-year average consumer price index of 3.05 percent.

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